This chapter shows how conflict between the American hegemon and a rising China led to the collapse of the Doha Round (2001–11) and the breakdown of the WTO’s core negotiation function. At the center of the Doha standoff, I argue, is a dispute between the US and China centered on how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system. China has maintained that, as a developing country, it should be entitled to the special and differential treatment (SDT) promised to developing countries. The US, however, is unwilling to extend such treatment to its chief rival, and therefore refused to conclude the round without greater market opening from China. China rejected American demands that it undertake additional liberalization concessions, and, in doing so, showed that it has sufficient power to refuse to concede to US demands that it views as fundamentally against its own development interests. The US has a long track record of successfully overpowering opposition in multilateral trade negotiations and securing assent for its desired outcomes. Yet, in contrast with the past, the US has been unable to overpower China, and this deep and lasting impasse between the two powers resulted in the collapse of the Doha Round.

This chapter examines efforts to establish new global rules to restrict export subsidies for coal-fired power plants, which are highly polluting and a major contributor to climate change. Government-backed export credit for coal power plants acts as a form of export subsidy, and thus promotes the expansion of such plants abroad. The US spearheaded multilateral negotiations within the context of the OECD Arrangement to prohibit the use of export credit for coal power plants. However, since China is not part of the Arrangement, it was not a participant in the negotiations or bound by the new disciplines created. China’s absence, I argue, weighed heavily over the negotiations and undermined efforts to construct an ambitious agreement. OECD exporters were extremely resistant to agree to restrict their use of export credit when China—the world’s largest supplier of export credit for overseas coal plants, accounting for nearly half of all export credit in this sector—would face no similar restraints on supporting its exports. Without China’s participation, the impact of the resulting agreement is severely limited. This case thus highlights the difficulty of building effective global trade rules today without the participation of China.

The American hegemon’s ability to exercise power in and through international institutions has been sharply constrained by the rise of China. China has consistently thwarted US efforts to construct new global trade rules, producing a recurrent deadlock across a wide range of different areas of global trade governance. The rise of China and its resulting clash with the US is blocking global rule-making in trade and undermining the institutions designed to prevent global trade wars. The China paradox—the fact that China is both a developing country and an economic powerhouse—has created significant challenges for global trade governance. The issue of whether, and how, the rules of the multilateral trading system will apply to China is proving to be a difficult and intractable source of conflict. While China demands exemptions from global trade disciplines as a developing country, the US refuses to extend special treatment to China and insists on universal rules and reciprocal concessions. This fundamental conflict over how China should be treated in the multilateral trading system, which has paralyzed global rule-making in trade, has profound implications—not only for the governance of global trade, but also for pressing issues related to global development and environment.

China’s rise has transformed the global politics of agricultural subsidies, which is among the most controversial issues in the trading system. China has emerged as the world’s largest subsidizer, upending the entrenched understanding of agricultural subsidies as a harm perpetrated by the Global North upon the Global South. From a North-South battle, WTO negotiations on agricultural subsidies have been transformed into a conflict centered on the US and China. The US, as the world’s largest agricultural exporter, is eager to restrain China’s subsidies and insists that it will only agree to stricter rules on its own subsidies if they also apply to China. But China has refused, insisting that as a developing country, it should be exempt from any new restrictions on subsidies. The US has been unable to force China to accept disciplines on its subsidies, leading to a stalemate. While reducing trade-distorting subsidies remains a pressing concern for developing countries, efforts to negotiate new and strengthened disciplines at the WTO have been paralyzed by an impasse between the two dominant powers, heavily shaped by the hegemonic rivalry between the two states. China, along with the US, is now blocking pro-development reform of the trading system at the WTO.

This chapter analyzes China’s impact on the global governance of export credit. For decades, the OECD Arrangement has been held up as a successful example of liberal trade governance, with its system of disciplines proving highly effective in preventing a destructive, competitive spiral of state subsidization via export credit. I show, however, that the rise of China has profoundly altered the landscape of export credit and disrupted its governance arrangements. China has emerged as the world’s largest provider of export credit, but China has refused to join the Arrangement and it has persistently thwarted efforts to negotiate a new set of international rules. China has little incentive to agree to disciplines on its use of export credit, which plays a central role in its development strategy. Despite considerable US pressure, China has refused to capitulate and subject itself to international disciplines that it views as fundamentally against its interests. China has shown that it has sufficient power to stand up to the US in defending its development interests. Yet the result, I argue, is that China’s rise is undermining the liberal regime for governing export credit by eroding the efficacy of existing disciplines and blocking efforts to construct new ones.

This chapter introduces the central argument and themes of the book and situates its contribution within contemporary debates regarding the rise of China and its impact on global economic governance. The book challenges two key prevailing views: (1) the US maintains its dominance in the international system, with China too weak to pose a serious threat to American hegemony; and (2) a rising China can be integrated into the US-led liberal international economic order. I argue that an important aspect of US hegemony to date—its ability to lead or dominate global institutions—has been severely undermined by the rise of China. If the US once “ran the system,” this book demonstrates the extent to which that has now been disrupted. China’s emergence as a counterweight to US power has sharply curtailed the US’s institutional or rule-making power. The US and China are engaged in a struggle over the rules of global trade, with each seeking to shape the rules to reflect and advance its interests. China has refused to defer to American power or simply be a rule-taker, but instead has repeatedly blocked the US from obtaining its objectives. US–China conflict is profoundly undermining global trade institutions and rule-making.

Amid widespread concern about the role of subsidies in the depletion of global fish stocks, the UN Sustainable Development Goals identified achieving a WTO agreement to restrict fisheries subsidies as a major international priority. Seen as an important means for the WTO to contribute to addressing a pressing global development and environmental issue, and thus resuscitate the institution following the Doha Round collapse, fisheries subsidies have been the subject of intense negotiating efforts at the WTO. However, the key issue of contention is how China and other large emerging economies should be treated under any new disciplines. The fisheries subsidies issue sharply underscores the problem with extending special and differential treatment (SDT) to China: since China now has the largest industrial fishing fleet in the world and provides the greatest volume of subsidies, exempting its subsidies from disciplines would severely harm the sustainability of global fisheries. Efforts to negotiate a standalone agreement on fisheries subsidies have run aground amid this central issue of dispute. The result has been a failure to arrive at new disciplines, the consequences of which are felt most keenly by poor developing countries whose populations are heavily dependent on fisheries for food security, livelihoods, and exports.

From the British East India Company to Alibaba and Amazon, from Westminster to Washington and Beijing

When Microsoft CEO Bill Gates visited India in 2002, he was received and entertained by India's Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee as if he were a head of state. On his visit Gates announced that Microsoft would invest $400 million in India over three years (Pigman 2010, p. 17). For at least three decades now, such diplomatic summits, as it were, between technology CEOs and heads of government have become the norm rather than an exception. One of the most significant ways that technology has changed diplomacy has been through the rise of large technology firms as actors on the diplomatic stage. What we think of as state– firm diplomacy today is not a new business, but it is evolving. Large firms intimately involved with international trade have been around since the seventeenth century. The original idea of the international system (or nationstates system) mainly referred to states and their governments and to how they interacted: through diplomacy between governments, including institutions they set up to make diplomacy easier, or through conflict and war. Most scholars agree that the modern system of nation-states began with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War between supporters of the Catholic Holy Roman Empire and Protestant states. Yet even from the beginning of the ‘Westphalia system’ of diplomacy, which was based upon the principle of sovereign equality of nation-states, private firms, if they were large enough, had sufficient resources, wealth, and negotiating capacity to function analogously to governments as diplomatic actors.

The first such companies were chartered by the parliaments of their home countries specifically to engage in international trade: firms such as the British East India Company (chartered in 1600), the Dutch East India Company (1602), the Virginia Companies (1606), and the Massachusetts Bay Company (1629). In order to trade, from the start these firms had to engage in diplomacy. The boundaries between firms and governments themselves were more fluid than it would appear initially. The English-chartered Massachusetts Bay Company and the Virginia Company of London effectively became the governments of the colonies of Massachusetts and Virginia respectively.

In 2016, two elections shocked the globe, challenging the foundations of the open trading, liberal global economy and the diplomatic comity that had enabled it to flourish since the end of the Second World War. On 23 June, voters in the United Kingdom cast ballots by a 52/ 48 percent margin in a referendum to withdraw from the European Union, after 43 years of membership in the largest, most successful economic and political integration project in human history. Five months later, the rabidly protectionist and openly anti-diplomatic presidential campaign of Donald Trump in the United States resulted in Trump's accumulating enough votes in the 1789 Constitution's Electoral College to secure the presidency (despite losing the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes). As events of the next three years in these two countries that were cornerstones of the diplomatic promotion of liberal trade worldwide in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively would bear out, voters had taken a hatchet to a system of economic and diplomatic principles that had brought unprecedented economic fortune to their own forebears and to much of the world in the process.

But the votes of that annus horribilis 2016 were only the tip of the iceberg, or more precisely the tip of several interlocking icebergs, to use a soon-to-beanachronistic metaphor. A succession of crises afflicted the global economy, and international relations and the practice of diplomacy more broadly, in the second decade of the twenty-first century with particularly negative consequences for international trade. The global economy's recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 and the ‘Great Recession’ that followed was slower and more uneven than recoveries from other recent economic downturns. Emerging new technologies, extending from micro-targeting in advertising to robotics to machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), have played a significant part in determining whose recovery has been strong and whose has been marginalized.

Taking a longer view, the evolution of both trade and diplomacy has always been driven by technological development: for trade, the invention of the wheel, the steam engine, the internet; for diplomacy, the telegraph, the telephone, email, and video conferencing.

Harder medium-term choices: diplomacy to govern superintelligence

If we manage to meet the challenge of the climate crisis with any degree of success, humanity will still have to survive the singularity, the emergence of superintelligence. We will have to establish a new relationship with superintelligent machines much more powerful than our own minds with the capacity to make their own choices about their objectives and the means to their ends (Kurzweil 2000; Bostrom 2014; Tegmark 2017). Superintelligent machines will be able to make these choices and implement strategies for achieving their objectives independently of and much faster than humans. In order to prevent superintelligent machines from making choices that are at best disadvantageous and at worst lethal to human civilization, we must engage in the types of existing diplomacy between governments, firms, and civil society that are required to govern the development of superintelligence before superintelligence emerges. We must prepare now for the diplomacy that will be needed to prevent the ‘breakout’ of superintelligence unconstrained by human-imposed curbs on its potential capacity to harm us.

In anticipation of the emergence of even benign superintelligence, we must prepare for superintelligent machines, in whatever form they take, to emerge as diplomatic actors in their own right. Establishing a working relationship with superintelligent machines may demand of us to create a wholly new form of diplomacy. The process of initiating a diplomatic collaborative relationship between humans and superintelligence might resemble the earliest human diplomatic encounters hypothesized by Sharp (2009, pp. 94– 95). Superintelligent machines as diplomatic actors could be as radically different from us humans as the very first other tribes that early human tribes discovered living across the nearest hill from their own village. Superintelligent machines will be thinking beings with their own ends and means that are intrinsically ‘other’ to us, in the way that different existing diplomatic actors are other to us today. We will need diplomacy to mediate and live with those differences into the future.

Webb (2019) recognizes that the challenges facing global society concerning how to govern the development of artificial general intelligence and superintelligence must be addressed through diplomacy.