Overview

This chapter theorizes about identity, change in capabilities and dyadic relations. The frame of reference for this work combines analytic eclecticism and systemism. Analytic eclecticism guides assembly of causal mechanisms into an integrated whole, while systemism – a means towards visual representation of hypotheses – provides the method. The intended empirical domain of application concerns Taiwanese (and to some extent Mainland Chinese) identity, the dramatic rise of the PRC, dyadic cross-Strait relations, and the role of the US as the key ingredient from outside of Northeast Asia.

Why bother with analytic eclecticism and systemism in the turn towards theorizing? Consider, as the obvious alternative, implementation of a particular school of thought as the foundation for theory. Carried out in Chapter 3, a review of paradigmatic research reveals that realist and liberal perspectives, while offering a range of insights, are not sufficient to explain the dynamics of the rise of China, cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese identity and US influence. Thus, attention turns to analytic eclecticism as a guide for assembly of causal mechanisms from diverse points of origin (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010a, 2010b). Our approach emphasizes theorizing that is inclusive, notably going beyond paradigmatic boundaries. Analytic eclecticism also stresses the importance of relevance to policy.

Analytic eclecticism is not without its limitations. An important shortcoming of analytic eclecticism in its original form is the potential for research findings to lack coherence because there no longer is a paradigm to guide investigation. To head off the problem of contradictory theorizing and evidence, systemism is incorporated into the process. Systemism is a graphic technique for representing causal mechanisms in a logically consistent and comprehensive way (Bunge, 1996; see also James, 2012, 2019a, 2019b; Pfonner and James, 2020). The principal result of this chapter is a diagrammatic exposition of cause and effect, based on research reviewed in Chapter 3, which connects Taiwanese identity, the rise of China, cross-Strait relations, and the role of the US. This graphic version of what is known so far provides a baseline of expectations, upon which research in this volume will build. The combination of analytic eclecticism and systemism is also an attempt to extend the effort made by Yu (2017) to broaden and deepen the methodological approach to study China.

Work proceeds in four additional sections.

Taiwan National Security Survey by Emerson Niou

Overview

This chapter reports and assesses popular reflections on the basis of evidence gathered during an online survey in 2015. The contents of the survey permit assessment of Taiwanese voters’ participation and identity formation, along with their views about cross-Strait relations and the role of the US in Northeast Asia. Evidence gathered through the surveys strongly corroborates the patterns from elite reflections and interviews reported in the preceding chapter while also offering data on some aspects that have been covered less so far.

This chapter provides empirical support for the theoretical approach of analytic eclecticism and systemism described in Chapter 4. As shown in that theoretical chapter, the issue of Taiwanese identity, the rise of China, cross-Strait relations and the US presence in Northeast Asia cannot be satisfactorily and effectively explained with one single theoretical paradigm. Several prevailing International Relations paradigms – realism, liberalism and constructivism – would lead the dynamics of cross-Strait relations in their respectively distinct directions. Empirical evidence presented in this chapter, together with material presented in the preceding and next chapter, is part of the effort to unite inter-paradigm ideas and evidence to produce improved explanations of what goes on across the Taiwan Strait.

Work in this chapter on survey results for popular reflections unfolds in three following sections. The second section conveys basic traits of the survey and sample. The third section offers analysis and synthesis by linking elite interviews with surveys on issues that pertain to the political economy of China's rise, cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese identity and US activity in Northeast Asia. The fourth and final section sums up the contributions of the chapter and sets the stage for the second survey that follows in Chapter 7.

Basic traits of the survey and sample

Conducted by Frank C.S. Liu of the Institute of Political Science at the National Sun Yat-Sen University between 20 November and 14 December 2015, the online survey collected 824 valid responses. The distribution of respondents in the sample includes 38.2 per cent from northern Taiwan, 19.3 per cent from central Taiwan, 30.8 per cent from southern Taiwan and 2.5 per cent from eastern Taiwan.

Overview

This chapter focuses on Taiwan in historical perspective. The goal is to review the most important aspects of the evolution of Taiwanese identity, cross-Strait relations, the rise of China, the role of the US, and how these matters are connected to each other. These lines of inquiry capture the essential components for an account of the likely pathway for cross-Strait relations, which in turn obviously have reverberations that further impact on cause and effect within the regional system of Northeast Asia and even beyond. Thus, emphasis is placed on a review of historical events that are believed to be important for the development of a comprehensive understanding of the situation today.

This chapter proceeds in seven additional sections. The second section moves forward from early history to the arrival of the Japanese in 1895. The third section covers the era of Japanese rule from 1895 to 1945. The initial decades of Nationalist rule are reviewed in the fourth section from 1945 to 1979. Corresponding to the 1980s, the Taiwanese economic miracle and identity-related developments appear in the fifth section. The sixth section – an era of one country with many problems – covers the 1990s. The seventh section focuses on key interactions involving the DPP in power vis-à-vis the US and PRC in the new millennium. The eighth and final section sums up the history of Taiwan as presented in this chapter.

Early history

Taiwan, also known as Formosa, is an island about 160 kilometres (100 miles) from the Asian coastline. With mountainous territory and a subtropical climate and diverse ecosystem, the approximately 36,000 square kilometre (14,000 square mile) island is well-suited to human habitation, which goes back a long way in history. Aboriginal groups with Oceanic and Chinese origins, along with others about whom less is known, can be traced back to prehistoric times (Knapp, 2007: 5–9). A short-lived Dutch colonial settlement in the 17th century brought with it intensive agriculture to complement the hunting, gathering, fishing and small-scale farming that existed already (Knapp, 2007: 11). Ming General Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, expelled the Dutch from Taiwan in 1662 (Spence, 1999: 54; Sheng, 2001: 9; Knapp, 2007: 13). Chinese dynasties then ruled the island for over two centuries.

Taiwanese Identity and the Rise of China: Survey Questions, 27 October 2015

People with extreme views appear to have fixed positions, but actually reflect calculations unlikely to be swayed by wartime information. The Evaluative Public, whose valuations are not in the tails, use wartime information to form their conflict approval. Evaluators are sensitive to changes in beliefs about observed casualty levels and expectations of likely future casualties. The Evaluative Public represents those who change positions in war, from support to opposition, depending on their ETC and RP. Using historical data and innovative experiments, we demonstrate that people’s personal experience with war drives their estimates of total casualties. Holding goals constant, higher costs yield higher opposition while lower costs increase support. Holding costs constant and allowing goals to change leads to opinion change. Geographically and temporally proximate casualties strongly influence estimates of a war’s total costs. Thus, we see that casualty patterns affect people’s estimates of a war’s costs and that these costs, when contextualized with the value of a conflict and expected costs, shape wartime support, even in the face of strong individual-level characteristics.

• 1. To what degree is Taiwanese identity shaped and influenced by the rate of China's military modernization?

  • a. To what degree is Taiwanese identity shaped and influenced by China's economic development?

  • b. What implications does the change in the Beijing's capabilities have for political economy?

  • c. For security?

• 2. How do these external factors (in Question 1) affect Taiwan's rate of democratization? Any specific examples?

• 3. Would cross-Strait economic and security policy be seen as constituency-driven or constituency-constrained?

• 4. What is the general public mood on cross-Strait relations?

  • a. How will this mood determine the way presidential candidates present their policy towards Beijing?

• 5. How relevant is the ‘1992 Consensus’ as the basis for future developments in cross-Strait relations?

  • a. How does the evolving Taiwanese identity affect the continued relevance of the ‘1992 Consensus?’

• 6. Do you agree that there seems to be a diverging trend in cross-Strait relations, where there is increasing economic integration and interdependence all the while political fragmentation remains persistent?

• 7. Looking ahead, how might a DPP-or a KMT-government strike deals with Beijing without upsetting their domestic constituencies?

• 8. What are some of the emerging results – benefits and costs – of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)?

• 9. Is the government ensuring that the agreement's benefits are more widely diffused to a broader spectrum of Taiwanese society (eg small and medium enterprises, labour unions, manufacturing and agriculture)?

  • a. If so, how and if not, why not?

• 10. Have disadvantaged domestic constituents complicated the cross-Strait negotiation process?

• 11. What role might the United States play in the evolving situation in cross-Strait relations?

• 12. Under what conditions do you think the United States will more (or less) likely honour its security commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act?

Casualties affect elections in two ways. First, wartime variables affected position formation, where higher state casualties increased the likelihood that challengers openly opposed the war. Second, casualties influence Senate elections directly. Incumbents are held responsible for the conduct of the war, and their vote share is adversely affected by higher casualty rates in their states. Although both incumbents and challengers face constraints, our findings suggest that incumbents face the greatest constraints while challenger behavior is endogenous to casualties. Candidates react strategically to the information provided to them by their state-level casualties, suggesting strategy is not reserved to the battlefield. Candidates behave strategically when formulating wartime positions, rightly perceiving that electorates respond to candidate position differences when voting. Analyses of elections during the Iraq and of Senator positions are taken during the Vietnam Wars. Even when national issues dominate headlines, advertisements, and campaigning, all politics remain local – especially wartime politics.

Scott and Pat visited Taiwan a few years ago for a conference. While the discussions were great and our hosts superb, what we remember most is one of Scott's interactions with a graduate student who volunteered to show him around Taipei. On the subway ride to see a temple, she berated Scott for the US position that encouraged strong bilateral economic and military relations with Taiwan but stopped short of recognizing Taiwan as sovereign. She pointed out that Taiwan had all the elements of an independent country, its own government, foreign policy, independent military and a unique currency. “Why”, she asked, “does the US refuse to recognize Taiwan's independence?” She summed up her view by stating definitively: “I am Taiwanese not Chinese!”

When Scott and his Taiwanese guide arrived at the temple, however, and Scott was about to enter into the nearest entrance, the guide suddenly grabbed him: “Stop”, she shouted, “we Chinese always enter temples from the right through the dragon door.” (Hence the phrase, enter the dragon, exit the tiger.) Scott and Pat were struck by the rapid alternation of her stridently affirmed identities.

Many people in Taiwan identify themselves as politically Taiwanese and culturally Chinese. As Pat and Scott discussed this duality in Taipei, they wondered if the perceptions of China's ascendant economic and political power shaped these identities, making them more fluid and multidimensional, and consequently, more manipulable by leaders in both countries? To their delight Yitan and Chin, both of whom have been studying cross-Strait relations, Chinese foreign policy and US–Asia relations, also were interested in exploring these issues and our team and this book project emerged. The outcome of this joint collaboration reflects analytic eclecticism that offers bold, new insights on one of the most nettlesome security challenges in the region.

While this array of seemingly conflicting identities influenced by great power and regional politics could appear obvious to those from Taiwan and the region, it might seem hard for others to understand. But these dynamics are not unique to Taiwan. Around the world, citizen identities that culturally embrace and politically oppose a nation create the need for nuanced diplomacy and a multilayered approach for understanding identity formation (one might see seemingly similar discordant beliefs in an American Southerner's simultaneous declarations of both ribald American patriotism and defence of the Confederate flag).

Looking at the Korean and Vietnam Wars, we evaluate the influence of casualties disaggregated by space/hometowns and time on mass opinion in both the Korean and Vietnam wars and on individual opinion in the Vietnam War. We find a powerful connection between US casualties and public support for a war consistent with our expectations about the importance of casualty trends, the geographic locations of casualty hometowns, and the interaction of these dynamics. Disaggregated casualties are better able to capture variation in mass public and individual wartime opinion than are logged cumulative national casualties – the standard wartime measure employed. We also find that the wartime information-opinion process operates more strongly in the ex ante identifiable early stages of a conflict, and less effectively later in a conflict when casualty expectations (and thus the value of new information) begin to harden. These results strongly support the general notion that casualty patterns act as an observable proxy for our RP/ETC process by capturing information that individuals draw on to generate ETC and formulate wartime positions, improving our ability to understand and predict wartime opinion.

Overview

People in Taiwan increasingly view their identity as separate and different from those on the Mainland. The Taiwanese sense of self in the new millennium is complex, dynamic and relational (Liu, 2016). Cross-Strait relations play a crucial role in influencing how the people of Taiwan view themselves and their relationship with the PRC (Kastner, 2016). In Taiwan, many citizens now feel they have the choice of identifying as Taiwanese, Chinese or both, rejecting the notion that their past dictates their present (van der Horst, 2016; Green, 2017). Furthermore, we saw in Chapters 5 and 6 that a wide variety of factors influence elite and mass identity formation in Taiwan. In particular, the qualitative and quantitative empirical analyses discussed in this study thus far demonstrate that there has been a significant shift in identity formation; Taiwan's democratization process now plays a major role in affecting the preferences of those who see themselves as Taiwanese (Friedberg, 2005).

What is it to be Taiwanese? This is the question that Jacobs and Kang ask in Changing Taiwanese Identities (2018). We start this chapter with an even stronger question, what is it to be only Taiwanese? Our focus here is on the factors that influence someone to identify as exclusively Taiwanese. We are especially interested in building on the survey results of Chapter 6 by examining individual characteristics and contextual conditions that influence identity in Taiwan in addition to the critical factors democracy and the US. In this chapter, we are interested in how beliefs about cross-Strait relations influence an individual's ideational formation as exclusively Taiwanese (Callahan, 2010; Kastner, 2016; Liu, 2016; Li and Zhang, 2017). This focus reflects a priority given the rapid rise of China across a variety of domains, but most especially in the economic domain (Chen, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014a). Doing so can help us gain greater analytical clarity and insights into how and why a ‘Taiwanese only’ identity has evolved on the island.

This chapter unfolds in six additional sections. The second section reviews our theoretical approach. The third section describes the Taiwan National Security Survey Data and the variables developed to address these questions. The fourth section conducts multivariate statistical analyses with a focus on Proportional Reduction of Error (PRE) to explore critical questions about factors influencing Taiwanese identity. In doing so, we focus on Taiwanese–Mainland relational issues, such as the 1992 Consensus.

Overview

This study has focused on Taiwanese identity, the ascent of China, cross-Strait relations and the role of the US in Northeast Asia. An ensemble of methods has been applied in order to learn more about how these items theoretically and empirically impact upon each other. Our method thus draws on the broad-brush approach often employed to think about confusing and conflicted identities and their fundamental ideational questions, such as those posed by King Lear and Wu Hsing-Kuo. The significant difference in time and location for the preceding questions reinforces the point that issues of identity are global and immanent.

What, then, can be said about Taiwanese identity in connection with the ascent of China, cross-Strait relations and US activity in Northeast Asia? A look back at preceding chapters will set the stage for the tasks that remain to be carried out. All of this works towards a sense of where identity stands among the ideal points identified in Table 1.1, which include primarily ideology-or interest-based, along with gradations in between.

We began in Chapter 2 with a historical overview of Taiwan from early times, with emphasis upon the period after the KMT migration in the late 1940s and especially the years in the new millennium. This material created a context for research on our basic question about identity, while also providing a basic background to those who are specialists in neither Taiwan nor Northeast Asia.

Chapter 3 reviewed academic literature on the evolving Taiwanese identity and factors seen shaping its evolution to obtain a baseline model for elaboration through further research. This chapter demonstrates that there is a long, historical dynamic driving Taiwanese identity. Most critically, however, recent and dramatic improvements in China, especially economically, have created disequilibrium in the Taiwanese ideational process, requiring new efforts to capture these shifting systems and to reconcile them with past dynamics.