Introduction

Bemoaning the deepening fractures in Sino– US relations, Yangyang Cheng (2021), a Chinese-born scholar working in the United States, noted in exasperation that she finds herself ‘at a loss for words’. Cheng was not merely vexed by the mutually reinforcing centrifugal forces of Beijing's growing authoritarianism, which prevented free exchange of ideas both within China and between China and the world, but also by the intensifying (and thinly veiled xenophobic) Western rhetoric that China is either a threat to be managed or a problem to be resolved. While these dynamics backstopped Cheng's immediate concern, her main preoccupation has been with the disregard for the language with which knowledge about China and China's role in the world is produced. She insisted that language is not just a means for communication. It is primarily ‘an instrument of power, a measure of humanity, a map for world-making’. Cheng called for building polyphonic understandings that challenge the linguistic hegemony of knowledge production ‘both in my birth country and my adopted home, [where] English is coded with whiteness and whiteness signals expertise’. In the context of such silencing of ‘other tongues’, what counts as ‘Chinese-ness’ and who gets to define it is never a neutral exercise. Cheng concludes with the poignant observation that the:

It seems that a similar malady of language plagues the analysis of International Relations (IR), especially when it comes to theorizing China's growing prominence on the world stage (Pan and Kavalski, 2018; Nordin et al, 2019). To paraphrase Cheng's concern, is IR able to speak in tongues unyoked from the bifurcating Thucydides Trap and security dilemmas of power transition, which frame the theoretical and policy imaginaries of the discipline? Is it possible to articulate global relations inculcated in connections, ties and interactions rather than in the bromidic division between ‘those who are with us and those who are against us’?

The rapid growth of China's power and influence has become one of the most salient phenomena in world politics today. Particularly since 2012, when President Xi Jinping became China's top leader, China has been viewed as increasingly ‘assertive’ in conducting its foreign relations. Henry Kissinger (2014), in his book World Order, devotes an entire chapter to the complex and subtle relations between China and the international order. As he observes,

Likewise, John Ikenberry (2011: 343), a prominent professor of international affairs at Princeton University, remarks that ‘China is in critical respects the “swing state” in world politics’, which begs the crucial question: ‘Will China seek to oppose and overturn the evolving Western-centred liberal international order, or will it integrate into and assert authority within that order?’

There are three different answers to this question in China as well as in other parts of the world. The first answer is that for the sake of its own interest, China needs to integrate into the existing international order, rather than overturn it, albeit with some reforms (Da, 2021; see also Chapter 7). In his speech in the United States in September 2015, Xi Jinping (2015) pronounced that

Introduction

The development of International Relations (IR) theory is closely bound up with significant events and tectonic shifts in world politics (Acharya and Buzan, 2017: 12). Such watershed moments often prompt IR scholars to recalibrate their frameworks of analysis to better make sense of a changing world. In the 1930s, modern realism emerged ‘as a reaction to the breakdown of the post-World War I international order’ (Wohlforth, 1994/95: 91). In the last decade of the 20th century, the abrupt end of the Cold War saw both a fall in realism's fortune, and the opening of new space for theories from a broadly defined post-positivist persuasion (Lapid, 1989; Smith, Booth and Zalewski, 1996). Emerging out of the ensuing Third Debate between positivist and post-positivist theories (or between what Robert Keohane calls ‘rationalist’ and ‘reflectivist’ approaches, see Keohane, 1988), constructivism has since become a new fixture in the IR theory landscape (Guzzini, 2000). Thus, ‘although indirect, the connection between events and theory was undeniable’ (Wohlforth, 1994/95: 91).

Interestingly, such a supposedly undeniable link is yet to clearly emerge in the case of an ongoing major ‘event’ in contemporary international relations, namely, the rise of China. At one level, there is no denying that China's rise has been one of the most frequently studied and debated contemporary phenomena (Kang, 2007; Lampton, 2008; Kavalski, 2009; Nathan and Scobell, 2012; Pan, 2012; Shambaugh, 2013; Christensen, 2015; Mahbubani, 2020; Breslin, 2021). In the rapidly proliferating literature on China's rise, there has been no shortage of theoretical perspectives being brought to bear on a number of pressing questions: can China rise peacefully? What does it mean for global governance and the rules-based liberal order? Will it seek regional or even global dominance? And can it avoid the so-called Thucydides Trap? But most of these inquiries, instead of allowing for new theoretical explorations, are already underpinned by existing theoretical assumptions. Although a wide range of IR theories such as realism, liberalism, constructivism, power transition theory, and the English School (ES) have shed light on China's rise, their understanding is primarily about applying existing theories to a perceived empirical case in order to explain its policy and practical implications and/or to test the validity of those theories. Very rarely has China's rise been treated as an ‘up-stream’, theory-generating event in IR.

Introduction

Chinese policy makers, scholars and pundits have attempted to ameliorate fears about China's rise by portraying China as a new and friendlier kind of great power. It is claimed that this represents a new way of relating which transcends problematic Western understandings of self– other relations, and their tendency to slip into domination and enmity. Claims along such lines can be seen in President Xi Jinping's official discourse, which portrays the Chinese nation as culturally predisposed to friendly, peaceful and harmonious behaviour abroad, and which lists friendship as one of 12 key terms for his socialist ‘core value system’ at home (People's Daily Online, 2014; Xi, 2014). These claims have been illustrated in various international nation-branding events, often through the Confucian adage that ‘it is glorious to receive friends from afar’ (Callahan, 2010: 2). They have also been an important part of emerging debates over a possible Chinese School of International Relations (IR) (Noesselt, 2015). Famously, Zhao Tingyang claims that Chinese traditions offer a ‘Chinese ontology, the ontology of relations, instead of the western ontology of things’, which enables the peaceful transformation of enemies into friends (Zhao, 2006: 33, 34; for a discussion, see Nordin, 2016a, 2016b), and researchers discuss ‘China's self-perceived role of a friend versus the (often Western) exploiter’ (Shih and Yin, 2013: 81).

Taking such use of the term ‘friendship’ as a point of departure, this chapter suggests that a reintroduction of friendship to IR can and should be a key contribution brought about by the increasing influence of Chinese politics and scholarship in international relations. Rather than merely denoting a personal and private relationship, friendship denotes a way of thinking about the co-constitution of self with other, and theorizes the dynamics of such co-foundation. This chapter brings together and juxtaposes a number of ways of thinking through the language of ‘friendship’ and analyses the implications of different theorizations for thinking about China's rise and world relations.

The first section of the chapter explains how the recent theorizations of friendship in IR that draw on Chinese thought indeed constitute a re introduction. It draws a sketch of how friendship was a central political category for virtue cultivation and co-constitution in both Chinese and European ancient traditions but was transformed under the modern state system into overarching and general forms of community such as citizenship and nationality.

China's international ascent over the past 40 years knows few historical parallels. Nonetheless, as several chapters in this volume have pointed out, Western attempts to understand this phenomenon have mainly relied on theoretical constructs established in the West and based on Western historical experiences. This is especially the case with the theoretical approaches that have informed the crucial debates in Western capitals regarding what China's rise implies for the future of the international order.

Some Western perspectives, such as Constructivist and Marxist ones, have been less prevalent in informing these debates. Rather, discussions have been framed by the two dominant approaches in contemporary international relations (IR) theory: the realist school, including approaches to power transition theory; and the liberal school, especially its liberal institutionalist perspective. The reliance on these two dominant strands of Western IR theory has tended to create opposing points of view insufficiently open to alternative interpretations. China's international ascent, however, represents an epochal event that has the potential not only to prove or disprove existing theories, but also to serve as a crucial case (Eckstein, 1975) that generates and informs advances in IR theory.

The purpose of this chapter is then to contribute to ‘theory building’, especially to give contemporary IR theory a much deeper appreciation of the capitalist dynamics shaping international affairs. As the contributions to this volume elucidate, the failure of China's rise to create a shock to IR scholarship is lamentable. For the first time in modern history a non-Western power is in the process of becoming the globe's largest economy. This should be a paradigm-shattering phenomenon (Kavalski, 2018; Pan and Kavalski, 2018), but so far even the most thoughtful works (cf. Kang, 2007; Lampton, 2008; Christensen, 2015) have primarily concentrated on applying existing theories derived from the modern European experience (Acharya and Buzan, 2017).

Put differently, dominant IR analyses continue to see China's rise through Western lenses, often fitting this case in a pre-scripted narrative (Kavalski, 2018), such as the Thucydides Trap scenario. But this historical event should not just be an object of analysis for already established theories. It should also be fruitful terrain for challenging, expanding and reimagining IR theory (Pan and Kavalski, 2018). The case of China's rise can force us to critically reimagine foundational assumptions and ‘pluralize’ our analysis to move beyond dichotomized debates.

Introduction

The idea behind this chapter is that the English School (ES) provides a distinctive perspective on China's rise, and offers particular insights into the question of whether and how China is a status quo or revisionist power. The ES's main concern is to differentiate international society (a social structure) from international system (a material structure), and to focus on the former. Its principal analytical tool is the concept of primary institutions, understood as deep, evolved practices shared among states (and other political actors) and defining the criteria for both membership of, and legitimate behaviour within, the society of states (Buzan, 2018; forthcoming). Primary institutions include sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, territoriality, nationalism and several more, and are contrasted with the secondary institutions (instrumental, designed regimes and intergovernmental organizations) studied by liberal institutionalists. Primary institutions constitute the normative framing of international society and can be studied either normatively or structurally or both. States are thus embedded in an international society of their own making, and the degree of order within that society can vary across a spectrum from a thin pluralist logic of coexistence (for example 18thcentury Europe) to a thick solidarist logic based on shared values and institutionalized cooperation (for example the European Union). Unlike secondary institutions, which only appeared in the late 19th century, primary ones date back to the beginnings of civilization. In this chapter I will use primary institutions as the principal lens through which to examine the rise of China (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004: 161– 204; 2014a; Holsti, 2004; Hurrell, 2007; Schouenborg, 2011).

The ES is thus in one sense a historical approach, interested in comparative and evolutionary international society. But given its unique set of concepts, it is also a theoretical approach (Navari, 2009). The main claim of the ES to theoretical status is that it sets out a distinctive picture of what the international system/society looks like, and a novel taxonomy of what it is that international relations (IR) should be taking as its principal objects of study.

Introduction

In much of what goes for international relations (IR) theory, the reemergence of China as a major power is interpreted largely in terms of familiar categories – from containment and hegemonic succession on the ‘realist’ side to norm acceptance and integration on the ‘liberal’ side (for example Pan, 2012). The particular attributes of Chinese modernity and their contradictions spark little or no interest. We are seemingly trapped between the universals of theory, on the one hand, and the particulars of China, on the other. Never the twain shall meet. Yet, an argument can be made that the Chinese ‘case’ raises important questions about the universality of international relations theory as presently understood (Agnew, 2017). As the Introduction makes clear, and the chapters in this book provide all sorts of evidence, perhaps the ‘rise’ of China with the attendant difficulties of bringing it ‘to theory’ offers an opportunity both to question the very universality claimed by current theory and to reformulate theorizing in light of the Chinese experience.

Today, China occupies a central place in what can be called ‘a prophetic culture’ – the focus of the field of IR theory on predicting future events rather than explaining current practice (Woodside, 1998: 13). This requires applying a universal calculus to cases such as China in which empirical anomalies are viewed as minor particularities. In this vision, China is rising as either or both a miracle and a threat. As William Callahan (2010: 11) says: ‘China's experience lends itself to hyperbole – both positive and negative. The People's Republic of China has the world's largest population, largest portfolio of foreign exchange reserves, largest army, largest middle class, and the largest diaspora.’ The list of ‘largests’ goes on. Much of this is usually put down to the recent success of the implementation of the East Asian developmental state model as adapted and expanded from the practices of other states in the immediate region. Of course, it is based at least in part on export-oriented manufacturing and integration into the global financial system. So, any Chinese foreign policy decisions must be placed in this context.

Introduction

The study of China's rise in International Relations (IR) is at a crossroads. Every conceivable question about the rise of China seems to have already been asked, and nearly every theoretical perspective has been deployed to shed light on this remarkable phenomenon. In the face of an extremely diverse and still-growing body of literature, one wonders what else may be added to the booming debate on China's rise. To some, the attention should now focus more on rigorous empirical testing of existing competing perspectives (Kang, 2003/04; Chen, 2012: 71). To others, the rise of China demands nothing less than the search for a new vocabulary (Kavalski, 2014) and the further development of IR theories, perhaps particularly from Chinese perspectives (Zhao, 2009; Qin, 2009; 2010; 2016; 2018). Such emphases on further empirical and theoretical investigations are indeed necessary, and many scholars have already contributed interesting findings and stimulating insights (Kang, 2007; Zhu, 2008; Buzan, 2010; Glaser, 2011; Garlick, 2016; Hameiri and Jones, 2016; Pan and Lo, 2017; He, 2021). In this chapter, I take a different approach and turn attention to a hitherto seldom examined aspect in the China debate, namely its ontological underpinnings.

Just as mainstream IR theories are substantialist in their ontological orientations (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 293; Pan, 2021), the dominant approaches to China's rise have been informed by a substantialist ontology. In the otherwise heated China debate, what is rarely questioned is a shared ontological assumption about China as a more or less independent and self-contained entity. This assumption is based on a classical Cartesian/Newtonian worldview, which has not only heavily shaped the development of modern science, but also influenced the ways social scientists understand human society. In the IR context, this conventional ontology assumes that the international system is made up of largely self-contained (though possibly interdependent and/or potentially socializable) units such as sovereign states, each possessing a certain essential and distinctive identity and occupying a more or less clearly demarcated territorial space. With the China debate so far largely silent on the issue of ontology (with the possible exception of Zhao Tingyang's and Qin Yaqing's works, for example Zhao, 2006; Qin, 2009; also Chapter 3), China's rise has been framed primarily within this conventional ontological parameter.

Introduction

Let me begin with an anecdote. Here is a review from the New York Times on Prakash Jha's 2010 film, Raajneeti (Politics): ‘Mr. Jha has said he based the dynastic family at the film's heart on characters from the epic “Mahabharata”, and there are also parallels to the Gandhi clan (generation Sonia). But Mr. Jha's real touchstone seems to be “The Godfather” ‘ (Saltz, 2010). The reviewer just did not get it. Because she knew nothing of the Mahabharata (c. 900 BCE), all she could see were Jha's occasional, filmic gestures to Francis Ford Coppola's series on mafia politics in 20th-century America. She completely missed the Mahabharata's key teaching: that is, power comes to naught without a cosmic sense of morality behind it. ‘Raajneeti’ for her thus turned into a cheesy Bollywood derivative of a great Hollywood classic.

Not simply bad or misled, this review reflects a history of ‘epistemic violence’ (Spivak, 1988) perpetrated on the world, amounting to an ‘epistemicide’ (Santos, 2016). Five centuries of colonialism-imperialism have killed knowledge not only in the global South, but also, I add, the global North. The field of International Relations (IR) sets one example. Like the New York Times review, IR suffers from three epistemic blinkers: (1) it fails to access how millions outside of Westphalia World understand power and politics; (2) it cannot benefit from ancient insights, whether these come from the Mahabharata or elsewhere; and (3) it remains ignorant of itself, especially the field's complicity with hegemony and arrogance from it (Ling, 2017).

Epistemic compassion can deliver us from such myopic violence. Like learning a new language, epistemic compassion opens worlds by crossing boundaries previously thought immutable. More than seeing anew, epistemic compassion helps us to feel anew. Utilitarians cross epistemic borders also but for ‘use’ only and not to reflect. Consequently, utilitarians resist any notion of transformation due to new knowledge whereas epistemic compassion begins with it as a premise. No longer trapped in the ‘tragedy’ of power politics (Mearsheimer, 2001), we can appreciate, instead, the joy (Penttinen, 2013; Sarma 2014), beauty (Ling, 2014b) and potential of discovery that our world-of-worlds can offer (Ling, 2014a).