This chapter argues that in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries the early Ming and the Timurid Empire can very much be thought of as post-Chinggisid polities. Timur (Tamerlane) very deliberately fashioned himself after Genghis Khan, but the early Ming rulers such as Hongwu and Yongle also very much understood sovereignty in the manner of their Chinggisid predecessors. As a result, both the Timurid and the early Ming manifested ambitions of world empire and recognition as well and came close to constructing a world order we may call 'bipolar' in our time. This is the story told in this chapter, as well the demise of this would-be world order in the middle of the fifteenth century – the Timurids lost control over their realm and the Ming jettisoned Chinggisid norms, turning increasingly isolationist. The chapter speculates whether the fragmentation of this world order may have something to do with a period of continental crisis in the middle of the fifteenth century, which caused a coin shortage and disrupted trade flows.

This chapter begins by introducing a number of foundational concepts, which serve as the starting point in the field of public international law. Section 1 of this chapter begins with the notion that states are sovereign equals, which must consent to be bound by nternational law. This section also introduces the critical distinction that international law makes between states and “non-state actors.” Section 2 of this chapter discusses the inevitable comparison of public international law with domestic legal systems, and the significant limitations of this analogy as a means for understanding the field of public international law. Section 3 concludes by explaining this book’s overarching structure, as well as the approach of this book to the introduction of public international law.

The rules of state responsibility are set out in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This chapter introduces the basic features of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, beginning with an explanation of what constitutes an internationally wrongful act. The following section discusses the circumstances precluding wrongfulness that may be invoked by states seeking to avoid responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The chapter then covers the aftermath of an internationally wrongful act, which can involve legal consequences, such as reparations, as well as countermeasures. This chapter focuses specifically on the responsibility of states, rather than the responsibility of international organizations or individuals.

This chapter sketches the development of international human rights law. The legal position of individuals was perceived by states as a domestic affair of the sovereign state, which could effectively treat its citizens as it pleased. It was not until after the Second World War that this fundamentally changed and international law began to grant individuals rights to protect them from the state. The chapter further presents the main categories or generations of human rights and discusses their key characteristics. Human rights are generally organized in three categories or generations: (a) civil and political rights; (b) economic, social, and cultural rights; and (c) collective rights. This chapter will subsequently turn to several matters concerning the scope of human rights norms, including their addressees, their territorial scope of application, and the circumstances under which human rights may be restricted by the state. Finally, this chapter will explain how human rights are monitored and enforced under international law.

This chapter analyses how an international wrongful act accrues from the violation of a due diligence obligation and its consequences. The first part discusses due diligence obligations against secondary rules of ARSIWA concerning the existence of a wrongful act. It is argued that violations of due diligence obligations stem from omissions and that the difficulty of establishing responsibility for failure of due diligence typically concerns the application of rules governing the breach, rather than rules of attribution of conduct. Accordingly, a critical reappraisal of the genealogy of Article 14(3) of ARSIWA and breaches of preventive obligations is undertaken; the chapter argues that the ILC wrongly conceptualised the ‘event’ to be prevented as a secondary rule, this way confusing the relationship between prevention and due diligence. The rest of the chapter examines due diligence obligations against other relevant secondary rules, such as circumstances precluding wrongfulness (specifically, force majeure and distress), the relationship between due diligence and complicity, and how reparation is to be accorded following a breach of due diligence obligations.

To assess the record of early International Relations (IR) scholarship, the conclusion briefly recaps its pioneers’ ambitions at the outset, then summarises their achievements and struggles, and finally discusses some wider implications for the study of IR.

After a sketch of the history of the law of the sea and the traditional freedoms of the sea, this chapter discusses the various efforts to codify the law of the sea during the twentieth century, which culminated in the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982. Subsequently, the chapter examines the legal regimes governing the various maritime zones, as well as two international areas: the high seas and the Area. The chapter then takes up thematic issues in the law of the sea, namely the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the protection of the marine environment, the special interests of developing countries, and the system for the settlement of law of the sea disputes. The chapter concludes by noting that, despite the relatively comprehensive scope of UNCLOS, a number of new challenges have arisen with respect to the law of the sea, especially as a result of human-driven climate change.

This chapter traces the origins of International Relations (IR) scholarship from the outbreak of the First World War to the making of the peace. It follows a set of pioneering thinkers and pressure groups across Europe and the United States to demonstrate both the intellectual roots and the practical infrastructure of the emerging discipline. The chapter begins by reviewing the state of international affairs on the eve of the war which inspired a set of writings on economic interdependence and world order. The second section shows how the conflict itself prompted authors to reflect on the causes of war and the conditions for peace. The third section examines the intellectual preparation of the post-war order within an emerging community of IR experts. The final section reveals how the founders of IR contributed as government advisors to the Paris Peace Conference and, simultaneously, laid the institutional foundations of the discipline. As a result, this chapter concludes, the origins of IR were deeply intertwined with wartime events and inspired by the making, not just interpreting, of international politics.

This chapter will first discuss the main subjects of international law and explain their principal features. Second, this chapter will zoom in on states, the traditional and principal actors in the international legal system. It will discuss the criteria for statehood under international law, the role that recognition plays in this respect, and explain how new states emerge. Finally, this chapter will turn to an analysis of the right to self-determination, a notion that plays an important role in the creation of states and is considered to be the most prominent right of one of the subjects of international law: peoples.

This chapter engages with the normative implications of the grand narrative developed in this book, as well as its methodological choices. It gets at the questions of where macro-historical narratives can go wrong by sympathetically discussing scholars at the end of turn of the twentieth century who attempted their own versions of such macro-histories of Asia and Eurasia: Kencho Suematsu, Ziya Gökalp and George Vernadsky, on the one hand; and Arnold J. Toynbee, Karl Wittfogel and Owen Lattimore on the other. It concludes by offering a spirited defence of the use of macro-history in IR theorising. If we dismantle Eurocentric grand histories that have animated our modern international order without replacing them with anything but micro-oriented work, those macro-historical accounts that we think we have dismantled will simply live on as zombie common-sense versions of themselves, filling in the blanks wherever there are some, and every account has blanks.

Each state enjoys full sovereignty over its territory and therefore has, in principle, full jurisdiction over events and persons within its territory. The term “jurisdiction” is often associated with the power of a court to hear a case, but judicial or adjudicative jurisdiction is just one of three manifestations of jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction is also manifested in the authority of states to prescribe rules (legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction) and the power of states to enforce rules (enforcement jurisdiction). Although the power of states to exercise jurisdiction follows from the principle of sovereignty, this power is not unlimited. Each state has to respect the personality and sovereign equality of other states, and overstepping this boundary entails a violation of public international law. This limitation is most pertinent when a state exercises jurisdiction outside its own territory, for example when it enforces domestic legislation outside of its territory or when it extends the application of its domestic laws to people, property, or events outside its own territory. This chapter discusses the scope of the jurisdiction of states when states exercise enforcement, prescriptive, and adjudicative jurisdiction in relation to persons, property, and acts outside their own territory.