This chapter engages with the normative implications of the grand narrative developed in this book, as well as its methodological choices. It gets at the questions of where macro-historical narratives can go wrong by sympathetically discussing scholars at the end of turn of the twentieth century who attempted their own versions of such macro-histories of Asia and Eurasia: Kencho Suematsu, Ziya Gökalp and George Vernadsky, on the one hand; and Arnold J. Toynbee, Karl Wittfogel and Owen Lattimore on the other. It concludes by offering a spirited defence of the use of macro-history in IR theorising. If we dismantle Eurocentric grand histories that have animated our modern international order without replacing them with anything but micro-oriented work, those macro-historical accounts that we think we have dismantled will simply live on as zombie common-sense versions of themselves, filling in the blanks wherever there are some, and every account has blanks.