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When mainstream parties accommodate radical-right parties, do citizens grow more concerned about immigration? Based on a rich literature, we argue that challenger parties’ ability to affect mainstream party positions, particularly on immigration, is associated with greater public salience of immigration and voter positivity towards challengers exists. We use Comparative Manifesto Project and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data in order to show that challenger issue entrepreneurship, and mainstream accommodation are associated with greater public concern for challenger issues. These factors do not result in greater public positivity towards challengers. Our findings thus support the argument that a mainstream party accommodative strategy might not be as beneficial for them as often expected by pundit and political scientists alike. This has implications for understanding the effect of indirect party strategies on public attitudes, since mainstream accommodation changes public concern regarding issues, which may bolster challengers’ positions, including radical-right parties.
Between 1999 and 2016, 20 former first ladies ran 26 times for the presidency, vice presidency, or Congress in Latin America. Despite the growing importance of this unique type of candidate, political analysts routinely describe them as mere delegates of ex-presidents. We argue that this view has overlooked the political trajectory of former first ladies, and we claim that women with elected political experience should be regarded as politicians who use the ceremonial role of first lady as a platform to enhance their careers. We hypothesize that first ladies with elected political experience are more likely to run for office as soon as they leave the executive branch. We test our argument by analyzing the 90 former first ladies who were eligible to become candidates in 18 Latin American countries from 1999 to 2016. The results support our argument, opening a new research agenda in the study of women’s representation.
One of the growing constituencies of populist movements has been those facing labour market risks. These individuals are hypothesized to be the most likely to find themselves in need of government protection or service provision as their occupations face challenges from abroad through global competition, domestically through competition from immigrant labour, or technologically from automation. Nations, however, vary in how their populations experience such risks. Some nations expend greater effort on job placement or retraining programmes. Others provide legislative protections for workers that shield them from the potential of lost employment. Using data from the latest three rounds of the European Social Survey, this paper seeks to examine how individual-level preferences towards populist radical right parties are mediated by the visibility/size of contemporary county-level efforts to ameliorate labour market risk in a sample of 14 West European nations. The analysis distinguishes whether occupational characteristics and/or government policies have a differential impact on supporting populist radical right parties. While labour market policies might be designed to mitigate labour market risk, for many individuals, they have the effect of intensifying support for populist parties.
Why do parties appoint outsiders and experts to ministerial positions? Extant research offers explanations based on institutional arrangements and external shocks (e.g. political or economic crises). We go beyond such system-level variables to argue that the characteristics of ministerial appointees are a function of the portfolio they are being appointed to. Drawing on theories of political delegation, we argue that outsider and expert appointments to ministerial office are affected by a portfolio’s policy jurisdiction, its financial resources and appointment powers, and the partisan leanings of the ministerial bureaucracy. We test these arguments on all appointments of senior and junior ministers in Austria between 1945 and 2020. The analysis shows that outsiders are more likely to be appointed to ministries with greater party support in the bureaucracy, while experts are more likely appointed to portfolios dealing with high-salience issues.
Who has the right to wage war? The answer to this question constitutes one of the most fundamental organizing principles of any international order. Under contemporary international humanitarian law, this right is essentially restricted to sovereign states. It has been conventionally assumed that this arrangement derives from the ideas of the late-sixteenth century jurist Alberico Gentili. Claire Vergerio argues that this story is a myth, invented in the late 1800s by a group of prominent international lawyers who crafted what would become the contemporary laws of war. These lawyers reinterpreted Gentili's writings on war after centuries of marginal interest, and this revival was deeply intertwined with a project of making the modern sovereign state the sole subject of international law. By uncovering the genesis and diffusion of this narrative, Vergerio calls for a profound reassessment of when and with what consequences war became the exclusive prerogative of sovereign states.
Over the past decades international affairs have been increasingly legalized. International law has dramatically expanded into new fields and taken on new challenges. Despite this development, there has been little in-depth scholarship on what impact these changes have had on the field of international legal theory, how it is taught, and where it is going. This volume investigates the major developments in the field and explores the core assumptions and concepts, analytical tools, and key challenges associated with different approaches. An outstanding team of legal academics provides an accessible overview of competing theoretical movements, and a more in-depth understanding of the strengths, preoccupations, insights, and limits of those schools of thought. The contributions provide an authoritative account of current thinking about the theoretical foundations of contemporary international law and will serve as an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and practitioners.
This book aims to connect narratives associated with the past to the international regime that protects property and contract rights of foreign investors. The book scrutinizes justifications offered to sustain practices associated with colonialism, imperialism, civilized justice, debt, and development, revealing that a number of the rationales offered in support of investment law disciplines replicate those arising out of this discredited past. By revealing these linkages, the book raises concerns about investment law's premises. It would appear that the normative foundations for today's regime reproduces discursive practices that are less than compelling. The book argues that citizens deserve something more than historically discredited reasons to justify the exercise of power over them – something more than mere pretext.
Why do rising powers sometimes challenge an international order that enables their growth, and at other times support an order that constrains them? Ascending Order offers the first comprehensive study of conflict and cooperation as new powers join the global arena. International institutions shape the choices of rising states as they pursue equal status with established powers. Open membership rules and fair decision-making procedures facilitate equality and cooperation, while exclusion and unfairness frequently produce conflict. Using original and robust archival evidence, the book examines these dynamics in three cases: the United States and the maritime laws of war in the mid-nineteenth century; Japan and naval arms control in the interwar period; and India and nuclear non-proliferation in the Cold War. This study shows that the future of contemporary international order depends on the ability of international institutions to address the status ambitions of rising powers such as China and India.
Neither war nor preparations for war were the cause or effect of state formation in East Asia. Instead, emulation of China—the hegemon with a civilizational influence—drove the rapid formation of centralized, bureaucratically administered, territorial governments in Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Furthermore, these countries engaged in state-building not to engage in conflict or to suppress revolt. In fact, war was relatively rare and there was no balance of power system with regular existential threats—the longevity of the East Asian dynasties is evidence of both the peacefulness of their neighborhood and their internal stability. We challenge the assumption that the European experience with war and state-making was universal. More importantly, we broaden the scope of state formation in East Asia beyond the study of China itself and show how countries in the region interacted and learned from each other and China to develop strong capacities and stable borders.
Written by an international team of over sixty experts and drawing on over three thousand scientific studies, this is the first comprehensive global assessment of the political impact of the Sustainable Development Goals, which were launched by the United Nations in 2015. It explores in detail the political steering effects of the Sustainable Development Goals on the UN system and the policies of countries in the Global North and Global South; on institutional integration and policy coherence; and on the ecological integrity and inclusiveness of sustainability policies worldwide. This book is a key resource for scholars, policymakers and activists concerned with the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, and those working in political science, international relations and environmental studies. It is one of a series of publications associated with the Earth System Governance Project. For more publications, see www.cambridge.org/earth-system-governance. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter explored the implications of sharing obligations for the determination of shared responsibility, underscoring the relevance of distinguishing between two types of shared obligations throughout this process. After all, the implications of sharing obligations for responsibility relations differ depending on whether the shared obligation breached is of a divisible or indivisible character. Where a breach of an indivisible shared obligation can only result in shared responsibility for a single wrongful act – which entails that the sharing of an obligation that is indivisible always has one inevitable implication for responsibility relations – a breach of a divisible shared obligation has no such automatic implications for the responsibility of states and international organizations concerned. Instead, when a divisible shared obligation is breached, different outcomes in terms of responsibility remain possible. Depending on the circumstances in which the divisible shared obligation is breached, a breach may give rise to shared responsibility for a single wrongful act, shared responsibility for multiple wrongful acts, or may even give rise to the responsibility of only one of the states or organizations that bear the obligation (though it should be noted that, in practice, breaches of divisible shared obligations are likely to occur by multiple duty-bearers).
Throughout this book, the focus has been on developing a concept that captures the practical phenomenon of sharing international obligations, proceeding from the premise that the performance of an international obligation is not always up to only one state or international organization, and that this can have relevant legal implications. In Chapter 1, it was discussed how the idea of shared obligations has been recognized in both scholarship and practice, but comprehensive conceptualization of the notion lags behind. This was placed in the context of an overall tendency to avoid engaging with primary obligations at a more systematic level in the international law of obligations, influenced at least in part by a few fundamental choices made by the ILC during its work on the codification and progressive development of the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility. In particular, the decision to steer the focus of its state responsibility project away from primary rules that define the content of international obligations towards secondary rules1 seems to have left us with the impression that distinguishing between different categories of obligations is normally not relevant in the international law of obligations.
This chapter lays down the foundations for the argument that questions of (non-)performance raised by the practical phenomenon of sharing international obligations can be tackled by a further categorization and systematization of international obligations, since different types of shared obligations can have different legal implications. It starts by introducing the distinction between indivisible and divisible shared obligations, after which the analysis turns to the issue of how to ascertain the nature of shared obligations, as it will not always be apparent at first glance whether a particular shared obligation is to be qualified as indivisible or divisible. It will be discussed how the distinction between positive and negative obligations as well as the distinction between obligations of conduct and result can facilitate the categorization of a particular shared obligation as either divisible or indivisible. The chapter ends with some reflections on the performance of shared obligations, highlighting how both indivisible and divisible shared obligations can have relevant implications for what is expected of duty-bearers (though in different ways), necessitating a more collective approach to performance.
Throughout the years, various legal concepts have emerged that recognize that more than two states (in the form of one duty-bearer and one right-holder) may be involved when it comes to the performance of an international obligation, and that this can have relevant implications for treaty and responsibility relations. In this respect one may think of concepts such as obligations erga omnes, interdependent obligations and jus cogens. This chapter explores and analyses the way in which the international law of obligations, through these concepts, has addressed legal relations that involve more than simply one duty-bearer and one right-holder. By doing so, the chapter aims to illustrate the limits but also the B1:L9
Many areas in applied econometric research within political economy fail to come up with conclusive findings. This is the case, for example, with studies on the determinants of public social spending in Latin America, a key area of research given the impact of social programs on poverty, inequality, and welfare more generally. In this area, as in others, it is hard to identify clear answers regarding the impact of economic processes and political institutions. Two reasons explain this lack of knowledge accumulation. First, each study uses different data sources and analytical models. Second, some of the empirical strategies required to solve various econometric problems may affect the results. This article questions the role of econometric research as the only method to explore political economy questions and highlights the importance of promoting conversations between complementary methods of both quantitative and qualitative traditions.