This chapter analyzes the regional and sectoral differences in how cities and municipalities engage in climate change networks. Over the past 20 years, an increasing number of cities, regions, companies, investors, and other non-state and subnational actors have voluntarily committed to reducing their GHG emissions. Such actions could help reduce the implementation gap. Along with the increase in commitments and the growing number of venues through which non-state actors can cooperate in order to govern climate change, it is necessary to track and evaluate such efforts. This chapter assesses the voluntary commitments made by Swedish municipalities, regions and multistakeholder partnerships to decarbonize by reducing GHG emissions. It finds large differences in which cities and municipalities that engage in networks. Large and urban municipalities in the south and along the eastern coast are well represented, whereas more rural municipalities along the Norwegian border are less represented in the data. The findings are discussed in terms of climate justice, highlighting the importance of having everyone onboard to create acceptance and reduce inequality in the transformation toward decarbonization.

Collaborative climate governance has emerged as a promising approach to address the urgent need for decarbonization. Here, we summarize the book’s findings on the complex interplay between states and non-state actors in the pursuit of climate goals, using Sweden as a case study. Collaborative governance can effectively engage industry, cities, and other stakeholders in climate politics, yet it falls short in achieving transformative change. The success of collaborative climate governance is influenced by broader political, economic, and social context and calls for a critical examination of its applicability in diverse settings. Looking beyond Sweden, we identify three main research avenues. Firstly, we emphasize the need to engage with the challenge to institutionalize and sustain climate commitments. Secondly, we encourage scholars to explore democratic innovations to address contestation within collaborative governance. Finally, we call for a deeper exploration of how external shocks and crises serve as catalysts or barriers to decarbonization.

This chapter examines Sweden’s emissions trends and the evolution of climate policy in an international perspective by focusing on its role and interdependent relationship with climate action in the EU and with international climate coalitions. The chapter examines the assumption that Sweden is a front-runner and role model in setting and implementing ambitious climate policy. The emission trends across sectors suggest that Sweden has been able to swiftly reduce its emissions, in particular from industry and energy conversion, but that current reduction rates are insufficient to reach its decarbonization target. Reducing emissions in agriculture and transport poses perhaps the greatest challenges for the Swedish state. The chapter also discusses the limits and possibilities for the State to implement its decarbonization target while being dependent on the climate policies in the EU, notably the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). It also looks at Sweden’s role in international climate governance by zooming in on its role in international climate collaborations and clubs. Finally, the chapter provides three reasons for caution when it comes to Sweden’s reputation as a role model. First, that the rate of GHG reduction has declined significantly. Second, that consumption-based approaches to counting GHG emissions demonstrates that Sweden remains a high-emitting country. Third, that Sweden’s consumption-levels are far above the global average and its current consumption patterns should not be emulated by other countries.

The COVID-19 pandemic unquestionably disrupted established norms and procedures. Climate networks in Sweden and the associated actors had to adapt to and navigate this dramatic and unpredictable situation. The chapter provides initial insights into how the pandemic affected a business network, a government-led multi-stakeholder platform and a social movement. Arguing that COVID-19 can constitute both an opportunity and a risk for non-state climate action, we investigate whether or not the pandemic created a window of opportunity for non-state actors to achieve their voluntary pledges or push the state to adopt more ambitious action, and whether or not the state has been able to mobilize non-state actors, or if it has made it harder for them for them to mobilize. Our findings indicate that thus far, the pandemic has not led to deeper changes, either in the climate debate in Sweden or in the climate work of individual actors. The members of climate networks have changed their working procedures and modified their communication strategies when it comes to climate action. However, the pandemic affected the ability of social movements to carry out their main activity, at least in the short term, that is, to go out on the streets and demonstrate.

A special regime is a subpart of the international legal system. This is why, in international legal discourse, there are several different conceptions of a special regime. For the same reason as lawyers disagree about the proper definition of the concept of international law, not only do they have different conceptions of an international legal system but they also assume different definitions of the concept of a special regime. There are considerable differences among the different conceptions of a special regime. This observation raises questions about their relative utility. Chapter 1 suggests the adoption of the conception that characterizes special regimes as communities of practice – as it helps to manage and control the effect of legal fragmentation compared to other conceptions.

This chapter employs narrative analysis to examine how people who live in the shadow of carbon-intensive industries imagine a just transition to net-zero emissions. The analysis rests upon an interview study with local politicians, civil servants, union representatives, and citizen groups in the Swedish west-coast city of Lysekil, home to Scandinavia’s largest oil refinery. By mapping stories of climate (in)justice told in view of Sweden’s efforts to decarbonize, this chapter illustrates the cultural dimensions of carbon lock-ins and why some people resist transformative change. In the city of Lysekil, the refinery is not only an important source of local employment but also deeply entangled with community identity and sense of place. However, the chapter also points to the multiple interpretations of just transitions to climate neutrality and the power of narrative to open-up possibilities for decarbonized futures.

In its case law the International Court of Justice has repeatedly suggested the idea that rules of customary international law (CIL) do not operate in a vacuum but, instead, are to be understood against the background of other rules of the international legal system. This observation, although somewhat unsurprising, shows that the sources of international law exist in close interconnection – something that is also visible if one looks at the rules of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Accordingly, ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ must be taken into account, together with the context, when interpreting treaty provisions. The question addressed in this chapter is whether or not the same can be said of the interpretation of customary rules. In other words, if we look at the practice of international courts and tribunals, is it possible to reach the conclusion that CIL rules, too, must be interpreted with the cognizance of any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties?

Chapter 3 addresses the suggestion that for a special regime to exist, there must be a mutual engagement of community members. As the chapter argues, in the context of international law, a mutual engagement among a group of international law specialists can be inferred from their participation in a distinct legal discourse, and from their further specialization and distinct way of ascribing functions to legal agents. More specifically, it can be inferred from: the publication of specialized international law journals; the way of organization of conferences and workshops; the creation of inter-governmental organization; the work of NGOs; the specialized research profile of international scholars and description of chairs; their separation of tasks and division of labour; and the function that they ascribe to the judiciary and to the international legal scholar.

This chapter addresses the suggestion that for a special regime to exist, community members must be engaged in a joint enterprise. In the context of international law, to claim that a group of international law specialists is engaged in a joint enterprise is to assert that they do what they do based on the idea that some certain state of affairs is desirable. As Chapter 4 argues, in the context of international law, the existence of such a presupposition can be inferred from the actual pursuit of those specialists of a distinct state of affairs, and the way in which they perform assignments.

This chapter examines the role of the state in collaborative governance as well as the mix between hard (regulation) and soft modes of governance (orchestration) to achieve decarbonization in Sweden after the adoption of the 2017 Climate Policy Framework. The chapter focuses on state-led transformation and critically examines Sweden’s progress toward its overarching goal to become the first fossil-free welfare state by 2045. It investigates Sweden’s national strategies and governance modes to achieve decarbonization and overcome carbon lock-ins through institutional, economic, technological, and behavioral transformation. It concludes that Sweden’s path to decarbonization – like many other countries – resembles more of an incremental transition limited to certain sectors rather than the wholesale transformation toward achieving a fossil-free society.

The ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law asserted that the proliferation of special regimes poses a threat to the unity of the international legal system. Chapter 6 challenges this assumption. It builds on the distinction made in epistemology between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. The idea of a special regime as a community of practice makes it a system of knowledge-how. As such, it is compatible with all of the legal positivist’s, legal realist’s and legal idealist’s conceptions of an international legal system, which either see it as a system of knowledge-that or a combination of a system of knowledge-that and a system of knowledge-how. In the former case, in no way does the proliferation of special regimes affect the unity of the international legal system. In the latter case, the unity of the international legal system is indeed affected, but only in a positive sense, as it increases the efficacy of international law relative to the assumed legal ideal.