We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
To understand the European Union (EU)'s path to being involved in Afghanistan's development, it is essential to contextualize its growing role in Afghanistan. Conterminous with EU marginalization, Ambassador Dr Klaus- Peter Klaiber was appointed European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in December 2001. Under a political mandate, Klaiber sought to support the new interim government, ensure the rights of women and minorities were upheld, fight the trafficking and production of drugs and ‘convince Afghanistan's neighbours that their interference in this process was unwelcome’ (Klaiber 2002). Under an economic mandate, the EUSR's role was to represent European- level interests and reassure Afghanistan that European cooperation would be sustained over the long term. Following an international conference in Tokyo, the EU pledged USD 1 billion in humanitarian aid over the next five years, making it the largest donor at the conference and continuing its humanitarian role from the 1980s and 1990s (Klaiber 2002).
With the EUSR based in Kabul, Klaiber would often need to explain the EU's role and the nature of its action, which was often misunderstood. Before the Bonn Agreement was enacted, the EUSR attempted to persuade the interim Afghan Authority that various political measures should be adopted. Ambassador Klaiber detailed that early on, the most important of these was ‘impressing the importance of a Human Rights Commission, a political assembly, a judicial commission to consider the new constitution and a new legal system’ (Klaiber 2002). Klaiber was able to lobby EU Member States for a more active political role rather than simply making financial contributions (Gross 2009a, 2009b). Yet, with Germany taking responsibility for training the Afghan police force, British counter- narcotics efforts, and French leadership establishing a constitutional committee, this was unheeded. In addition, the EUSR was to act as a voice for Afghanistan in Europe and ensure that Afghanistan did not slip down the political agenda of Member States. The EUSR's ability to speak with ‘one voice’ was especially helpful in furthering international coordination efforts and European integration, both of which were needed given that the EU was a marginalized international actor in a crowded and complex environment dominated by the United States (US). By the time Klaiber left the role of EUSR in June 2002, the EU predominantly remained a humanitarian actor with limited influence.
‘We’re facing a new and painful reality on the ground in Afghanistan. Let me let me speak clearly and bluntly. This is a catastrophe, a catastrophe for the people, for Western values and credibility, and for international relations. … What has happened raises many questions about the West's twenty years of engagement in the country and what we were able to achieve. … We have been doing a lot in order to build the state in Afghanistan … today twenty years on, we can say that we … failed. We have to ask ourselves some difficult questions to understand why this was possible. And why what has happened has happened.’
Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
In August 2021 the Taliban, an ultraconservative Islamic fundamentalist group, recaptured the Afghan capital of Kabul after being removed from power 20 years earlier. This was a poignant symbol of the failure of Western powers in Afghanistan. Having been international pariahs when they emerged in the 1990s, the Taliban came to rule Afghanistan and formed a close connection with al Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for thousands of deaths in New York, Washington, DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001. Triggering a military response, the Taliban were quickly removed by a United States (US)- led international coalition with the support of many Afghans, who tacitly supported the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Spread across a landmass twice the size of Germany, Afghanistan's population of 35–40 million found themselves under foreign occupation, even if the reach of foreign troops was inhibited by Afghanistan's mixed geographical terrain. What started as a counterterrorism operation soon evolved into a more ambitious plan to rebuild an Afghan state and transform it into a stable functioning democratic system that would eliminate the possibility of the country being used as a sanctuary for terrorists in the future.
As the US, and increasingly the European Union (EU) and its Member States, sought to stabilize Afghanistan through economic development and transformational governance, they found themselves facing a growing insurgency.
El presente artículo aborda los alcances y limitaciones del reconocimiento obtenido por el Pueblo Tribal Afrodescendiente Chileno en el proceso constituyente iniciado en Chile luego de la revuelta social de 2019 y, particularmente, en las deliberaciones de la Convención Constitucional que sesionó entre 2021 y 2022. Además de analizar la presentación y votación de normas relacionadas con el Pueblo Tribal Afrodescendiente, el principal foco está puesto en los discursos de los/as convencionales constituyentes relacionados con dichas normas. Mediante un análisis crítico del discurso, se identifican tres ejes discursivos que enmarcaron el apoyo o rechazo de iniciativas en torno al reconocimiento afrodescendiente, vinculados al significado de la categoría jurídica de “pueblo tribal”, a la cuestión de la preexistencia y a la extranjerización. El artículo concluye con una discusión de las posturas adoptadas por diferentes sectores de la Convención, identificando algunos imaginarios que comportaron límites para la inclusión del pueblo afrochileno en la propuesta constitucional.
‘The Afghans do not have a history because anarchy has none.’
A French ethnologist in the late 19th century (in Crews 2015, 3)
‘We thought it was a tabula rasa, and we could implement our ready- made development solutions to build a modern state.’
Author's interview with senior EU official
Contemporary assertions that Afghanistan could be treated as a ‘blank slate’ uncomfortably echo 19th- century imperialist assertions that ‘Afghans do not have a history’. These reverberations raise questions about historicity and the need for sociohistorical inquiry, but also whether Western attitudes and discourses towards Afghanistan have significantly changed across three centuries. Overt norms of European imperialism may have formally ended, but the idea that Afghanistan and its people can be stripped of their history has a long afterlife. It is within this context that European Union (EU) policy makers’ assertions that they engaged with Afghanistan as if it were a ‘blank slate’ should not be seen as neutral, but rather as part of an attempt to diffuse EU norms.
Although EU policy makers have openly stated that they proceeded on the basis that Afghanistan is a ‘blank slate’, it is worth unpacking what is meant by this (Hassan 2023). At conceptual level, it has meant proceeding with EU external action on the basis that the tumultuous history that has shaped Afghanistan's present can be overlooked. At a practical level, it has meant prioritizing technical and managerial models embedded in EU external action, which are designed to create more efficient and stable sovereign states. These models exist primarily in the sphere of development and democracy assistance and are perceived as universally applicable even as they emphasize normative commitments to democracy, the rule of law and gender equality. These models are often portrayed as scientific and ahistorical because they are elevated to the status of being ‘universal’ in appeal and application. Yet, multiple studies have outlined that the EU's ‘one size fits all’ approach, and the unreflexive way EU external action has sought to promote its own model, is based on Europe's historical experience and political practices (Bicchi 2006; Börzel et al 2008; Börzel 2022).
This article explores how populist attitudes are correlated with foreign policy postures at the public level in four European countries: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. We provide first evidence adjudicating between two rivalling perspectives. One perspective focuses on the ideational core of populism and argues that it entails substantive beliefs and values that may inform foreign policy preferences – just like any other ideology. Another perspective focuses on the thin-centredness of populism and argues that no policy implications can be derived from populist ideas. Analysing original survey data, we find strong and consistent associations of populist attitudes with two foreign policy postures, militant internationalism and isolationism, and weaker and less systematic associations with two others, cooperative internationalism and global justice orientations. Importantly, these patterns are independent of host ideologies. We discuss the implications of these findings for the question of how “thick” populism is and what that may mean for the politics of (European) foreign policies in times of a continuing populist Zeitgeist.
Recent research has shed light on the impact of pre-electoral coalitions on government formation in presidential democracies. However, the fact that pre-electoral coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition cabinets has often gone under the radar. In this article, I argue that the importance of pre-electoral pacts for government formation depends on the degree of legislative polarization. When parties are distant from one another in the ideological spectrum, presidents face more difficulties in breaking away from the pre-electoral pact and rearranging their multiparty alliances. Conversely, when polarization is not pervasive, presidents have more leeway to build coalition cabinets different from the ones prescribed by pre-electoral coalitions. Drawing on a dataset of 13 Latin American countries, the results support my claim and suggest that the relationship between government formation and the concession of office benefits for pre-electoral coalition members is more nuanced than previously assumed.
In this paper, we explore the bases of Mexican national identity construction and use an array of conceptions of nationhood to study contemporary attitudes towards foreigners’ sociopolitical rights in Mexico. Rarely is the study of national identity connected with immigration policy preferences in general, and even less so outside advanced countries. We explore the content of Mexicanness and use this content to understand public opinion preferences towards the integration of diverse groups of foreigners in Mexico. We employ 2016 survey data and a survey experiment and find the persistence of xenophobic attitudes towards the Chinese community in Mexico. We also show that civic conceptions of nationhood cannot counter contemporary anti-Chinese sentiment, in great part because the civic belonging of the Chinese was defined on racial terms. Lastly, we show that these processes of national identity construction, based on the marginalization of certain groups, are persistent and shape todays’ attitudes and preferences towards the incorporation of different groups of foreigners. It remains to be explored whether material interests associated with the recent Chinese “going out” policy may be able to counter deep-seated anti-Chinismo
During the last decades, political distrust has seemingly become a common trend across Latin American democracies, however, differences in the levels of confidence among groups have also been identified. This article considers the potential effects of ethno-racial structures and their interactions with other forms of socioeconomic inequalities on political trust. Building on data from four waves of the Latinobarometer project and contextual measures from different sources, we analyze these relations and find that both socioeconomic and ethno-racial inequalities affect political trust and impact on the formation of different relations with the political system across Latin America. Furthermore, in particular it is found that at the individual-level interactions between inequalities shape political trust differently depending on the particular ethno-racial identification. These findings contribute to the understanding of ethnicity and race and its associations with other structural inequalities in shaping mass political culture.
Since the so-called war on drugs began in Mexico in 2006, the military has been the leading actor in charge of the government’s public security policy, undertaking tasks that should be carried out by the police. Analyses of this security strategy are based on quantitative methods and have focused on its results: e.g., an increase in the homicide rate or the committing of human rights violations. In contrast, based on in-depth interviews, this article explores the testimony of military personnel to understand what they experience in the field. Contrary to what the existing literature argues, which maintains that the military acts with a logic of war, this article shows that the situation is far more complex: they act in a scenario characterized by improvisation, facing the dilemma between acting and being accused of human rights or not acting and being accused of disobedience.
What is the relationship between clientelism and political participation in popular urban neighborhoods? This article addresses the question based on qualitative research in two popular neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, drawing on participant observation and interviews with residents, activists, and party brokers. Adding to a growing literature on “participatory clientelism,” we argue for greater attention to the urban context through which this unfolds. To date, research into participatory clientelism has predominantly considered specific practices—participatory innovations or contentious politics—and been limited to the survival of the urban poor and the demand for political support by party brokers. While these are crucial practices, they are not exhaustive of the relations that sustain participatory clientelism, particularly in contexts of territorialized politics. Based on the socio-spatial approach of Henri Lefebvre, influential in urban studies, we define three interconnected dimensions of participatory clientelism and identify them in the cases under study.
There has been a significant growth of social media as a means to inform oneself about politics. This article explores the consequences of this trend on the credibility audiences attribute to news exposing corrupt politicians and on their willingness to penalize the exposed politicians in elections. The study focuses on ten Latin American cities and employs a randomized control trial using experimental data embedded in a survey. Through this method, credibility and penalization levels are compared between state communications, newspapers, named journalists on social media, and anonymous journalists on social media. The article’s key findings demonstrate that corruption reports published on social media are deemed less credible than those published by state auditors and newspapers. This effect is exacerbated when the source of the report is anonymous. In addition, reports on corruption published on social media by anonymous sources have a negative effect on voter penalization of corrupt politicians.
While elections are an instrument to hold politicians accountable, corrupt politicians are often re-elected. A potential explanation for this paradox is that citizens trade-off integrity for competence. Voters may forgive corruption if corrupt politicians manage to deliver desirable outcomes. While previous studies have examined whether politicians’ competence moderates the negative effect of corruption, this paper focuses on voters’ priorities and directly assesses what citizens value more: integrity or favourable outcomes. Using a survey experiment, we assess citizens’ support for politicians who violate the law in order to improve the welfare of their community and, in some cases, benefit personally from these violations. The results indicate that citizens prefer a politician who follows the law, even if this leads to a suboptimal outcome. However, voters are more likely to overlook violations of the law that benefit the community if these do not result in a personal gain for politicians (i.e., in the absence of corruption). These findings suggest that the mild electoral punishment of corruption may be due to the public’s unawareness of private gains from malfeasance, or to the delay in these private benefits becoming apparent by election day.