This chapter analyzes the interconnections between energy policy and security and defense policies in Estonia with respect to energy transition. After explaining the key characteristics of energy and security regimes, it examines administrative interaction and policy coherence. The interconnections pertaining to energy transitions and security are visible via three cases: the oil shale phaseout and stability of Ida-Viru County, wind power expansion and the defense radar operation, and the desynchronization of the electricity network from Russia. Russia has formed the prevalent landscape pressure on the energy regime, although other landscape pressures have been noted, for example, climate change. Administrative coordination between energy and security has often relied on informal means, which are employed for agility but lack transparency. The security implications of the expanding energy “niches,” such as solar and wind power, have been little covered, although this has clearly increased via newly emerging attention on critical materials.

This chapter analyzes the interconnections between energy policy and security and defense policies in the UK, zooming in on Scotland. It explains the energy and security regimes and analyzes policy interplay. The links between hydrocarbon energy, energy transition, and security are complex, with relatively fragmented governance in place. While some instances of policy integration were found, broader policy coherence regarding security and the zero-carbon energy transition was lacking. Before 2022, coordination efforts were focused on external, global energy questions instead of domestic energy. Domestic energy security was driven by market-based values. Post-2022, security and energy transition links pertaining to domestic energy production and use became more important in political and policy agendas. Scotland has had a differing worldview on security in relation to energy transition than the rest of the UK, with more focus on the environmental and health security effects of energy policy choices and just transitions, evident, for instance, in its opposition to nuclear power.

This chapter describes the conceptual and analytical premises used in the book’s country case studies. It uses the transition studies’ multilevel perspective as a starting point to begin exploring the diverse ways in which security and defense can be connected to sustainability transitions. It starts by discussing the landscape concept and how it ties into security. The chapter then moves onto outlining policy coherence at the regime level and ends with conceptualizing security in the transition processes of niche expansion and regime decline.

The War of the Pacific (1879-1884) is the war among South American states with the second highest casualty rate in the nineteenth century. This chapter provides a detailed case study of this war while offering a long-term narrative of state building in the South Pacific (i.e., Bolivia, Chile, and Peru). The comparison between Chile and Peru is illuminating, since both countries were comparable in important confounders–e.g., their armies, navy, bureaucracies, and budgets–and were impacted similarly by important economic confounders such as economic booms and crises. In this chapter I depict the evolution of war and the balance between central and peripheral elites from independence to the mid-century. Then I illustrate how preparation for war led to state formation, and looks at the details of the campaign, battle by battle. These two sections already serve the purpose of debunking some myths in this literature, like the idea that Peru did not mobilize for the war, and that the war did not lead to extraction in Chile Finally, I discuss how war transformed state institutions, and determined diverging, long-terms trends in state capacity.

This chapter introduces the reader to the topic studied in the book, factual misinformation and its appeal in war. It poses the main research question of who believes in wartime misinformation and how people know what is happening in war. It then outlines the book’s central argument about the role of proximity and exposure to the fighting in constraining public misperceptions in conflict, and the methods and types of evidence used to test it. After clarifying some key concepts used in the book, it finally closes with a sketch of the manuscript’s main implications and an outline of its structure and contents.

Were nineteenth century war outcomes the main determinant of state trajectories in Latin America? In this chapter I turn from examining whether and to which degree war outcomes affected comparative state capacity levels and try to determining whether war outcomes were the main factor affecting the relative position of Latin American countries in the regional state capacity ranking. Exploring the conditions that predict the rank ordering of Latin American state capacity c. 1900—which has remained virtually the same ever since—has become a standard approach in the literature. In this chapter I explore this comparative historical puzzle by replicating previously used techniques. I use qualitative comparative analysis to show that accumulated victory and defeat throughout the nineteenth century is almost a sufficient condition for states to be in the upper and lower end of a state capacity ranking, respectively. I then use simple correlations to evaluate how war outcomes were related to a broad set of state capacity indicators at the turn of the century. Finally, I discuss case-specific expectations in longitudinal data that will be explored in the case studies.

What was the effect of war outcomes on key indicators of state formation in a post-war phase? In this chapter I demonstrate that victors and losers of war were set into different state capacity trajectories after war outcomes were revealed. I do this using a set of cutting-edge causal inference techniques to analyse the gap in state capacity that was generated between winners and losers in the time-period of most stringent warfare (1865-1913). After substantiating that the outcomes of these wars were determined by exogenous or fortuitous events, I provide a short description of my treatment—i.e., defeat—and outcomes—i.e., total revenues and railroad mileage as key indicators of state infrastructural capacity. My estimator, a difference-in-differences model, shows defeat had a negative long-term impact on state capacity which remains remarkably robust even after relaxing key assumptions. Finally, I use the synthetic control method to estimate how state capacity in Paraguay and Peru would have evolved in a counterfactual world where these countries were spared the most severe defeats in late nineteenth-century Latin America.

This chapter analyzes the interconnections between energy policy and security and defense policies in Norway. It explains the background of energy and security regimes and analyzes policy interplay. Prior to 2022, Norway had barely considered the energy–security nexus due to substantial domestic energy supplies. Some interconnections were, however, visible via three cases: the economic security provided by oil and gas exports, security of hydropower infrastructure, and internal tensions around wind power. Repoliticization of the Norwegian energy policy took place in 2022, and questions of energy sovereignty and energy security also became a part of Norway’s energy policy vocabulary. In 2022, strong degree of securitization was not evident, but, lightly framed, there have been breaks from previous energy political practices – evidenced by new support for offshore wind power and visible military protection of critical energy infrastructure.

This chapter concludes the book and considers its major theoretical and practical implications. It begins by exploring how the book pushes us to think about fake news and factual misperceptions as an important “layer” of war – a layer that has been largely neglected despite the burgeoning attention to these issues in other domains. This final chapter then examines what the book’s findings tell us about such topics as the psychology and behavior of civilian populations, the duration of armed conflicts, the feasibility of prevailing counterinsurgency models, and the depths and limits of misperceptions more broadly in social and political life. It also engages with the practical implications of the book for policymakers, journalists, activists, and ordinary politically engaged citizens in greater depth, exploring how the problems outlined in the research might also be their own solutions. Ultimately, this chapter shows how the book has something to offer to anyone who is interested in the dynamics of truth and falsehood in violent conflicts (and beyond) – and perhaps the beginnings of a framework for those who would like to cultivate more truth.