I. Role and Functions

The JCM shall:

• 1. Assist the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) in addressing cross-sectoral and cross-pillar issues at the Senior Official’s level in the following aspects:

  • a. Providing recommendations to the ASEAN Community Councils, ACC and ASEAN Summit in addressing strategic cross-cutting and ASEAN community-building issues, as well as challenges/ obstacles to the community-building process;

  • b. Promoting policy coherence and effective coordination among the ASEAN Community pillars, including through identifying a lead implementing sectoral body to coordinate the implementation of cross-pillar matters where appropriate, and work closely with ASEAN Member States who serve as coordinators on specific issues where applicable; and

  • c. Following up on the implementation of decisions by the ASEAN Community Councils, ACC and ASEAN Summit on cross-sectoral and cross-pillar issues.

• 2. Support the ACC to prepare for the meetings of the ASEAN Summit in the following aspects:

  • a. Identifying and prioritizing strategic cross-cutting and ASEAN community-building issues, and preparing the necessary documentation, for the discussion and decision by the ACC and the ASEAN Summit, in consultation with the relevant ASEAN Organs. Only in specific cases where coordination and a common decision among the three pillars of the ASEAN Community is required, the JCM may submit its recommendations to the ACC for consideration.

  • b. Assisting in the coordination of outcome documents for submission to ACC and ASEAN Summit, including documents to be noted, issued, adopted, or signed by the ASEAN Summit.

  • c. Promoting cross-sectoral and cross-pillar coordination through the placement/assignment/secondment of AEC and ASCC officials from ASEAN Member States to their respective Permanent Missions to ASEAN in Jakarta.

  • d. In line with the foregoing, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) and the ASEAN Secretariat will assist the JCM in the implementation and monitoring of the implementation of Leaders’ decisions on cross-sectoral and cross-pillar issues.

II. Composition and Chairmanship

• 3. The JCM shall comprise all Members of the ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting (ASEAN SOM), Senior Economic Officials’ Meeting (SEOM), Senior Officials’ Committee for the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council (SOCA) and Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR).

• 4. The JCM shall be chaired by the Chair of the ASEAN SOM.

• 5. In the absence of the JCM Chair, the Member State holding the ASEAN Chairmanship shall designate an alternate of Senior Official rank to serve as the Chairperson.

Introduction

Although Indonesia’s relations with Australia are not as important to it as its relations with the ASEAN states, it is clear that Indonesia has been concerned with Australia. This has become particularly evident after the “liberation of West Irian” (now Irian Jaya) and more recently, since the annexation of East Timor. Two issues have coloured Jakarta-Canberra relations — the East Timor problem and Indonesia’s policy towards Papua (i.e. eastern) New Guinea (PNG). This chapter examines recent relations between Indonesia and Australia during the New Order period, especially after the annexation of East Timor, and also considers Indonesia’s relations with PNG.

Indonesia-Australia Relations

Early relations between Jakarta and Canberra were cordial. Australia was among the few Western nations which were sympathetic to Indonesia’s claim for independence. The relationship began to cool once Jakarta adopted a militant foreign policy. Indonesia’s campaign to “liberate West Irian” caused tension between Jakarta and Australia because Canberra was concerned with the security of Papua New Guinea, then Australian “territory”. Australia was suspicious of Sukarno’s policy as the Government feared he might not stop in West Irian. Australian suspicions were strengthened by Indonesia’s konfrontasi policy with Malaysia. Relations between Indonesia and Australia began to improve after the fall of Sukarno and the emergence of Suharto, before the East Timor problem became the major issue between Jakarta and Canberra.

In 1974, Portugal underwent a “revolution” which resulted in its decision to grant self-government to its colony, East Timor. The decolonization process was far from smooth. Internal conflict and the emergence of the left-wing Fretilin were perceived by Suharto’s Indonesia as a threat to Indonesian political stability. Jakarta was afraid that an independent East Timor under Fretilin might become the Cuba of South east Asia. In addition, Indonesia also saw the East Timorese as their “lost brothers”. As a result, Indonesia intervened and eventually incorporated the Portuguese ex-colony into the Republic.

In 1974, when Labor Prime Minister of Australia, Gough Whitlam, visited Indonesia, Suharto sounded him out on the East Timor issue. It was reported that Australia would have no objection if the territory was peacefully integrated into Indonesia. When Indonesia annexed East Timor by force, however, the Australian public was not willing to accept the situation. Even the Labor Government was critical of Indonesia’s action and Australia criticized Indonesia in the United Nations.

Singapore’s home affairs and law minister, K. Shanmugam, is generally an unflappable man. Yet, twice in 2021, his composure appeared to be affected by a series of racially inflected incidents that captured the public’s attention. The first was on 6 June when he expressed that he was “not so sure anymore” that Singapore was “moving in the right direction on racial tolerance and harmony”. His remarks were triggered by a viral Facebook video of a Chinese Singaporean man berating a young couple for their interracial relationship. In the clip, the man—later identified as a sixty-year-old local polytechnic lecturer—told them that that it was “racist that an Indian prey on Chinese girl”, while insisting that people should only date within their own race. (Shanmugam sounded more optimistic four days later, however, when he asserted in an interview that Singapore has made “tremendous progress” as a multiracial country.) Just over a month later, the minister conveyed that he was “quite sad” to hear a particular question raised during a forum co-organized by the government’s feedback unit and Lianhe Zaobao, Singapore’s main Chinese language broadsheet. An attendee had asked why the Chinese community—the country’s largest ethnic group—“shouldn’t have the right to decide on Singapore’s direction, such as education, [and] language”, instead of having to defer to ethnic minorities.

These events were not isolated. Accounts circulated in social media through the year about racial incidents. An ethnic Chinese lady was filmed repeatedly hitting a gong in front of her Hindu neighbour’s door while the latter was conducting his “five-minute, twice-a-week” ritual prayers (which involved ringing a small bell). There were two separate racist incidents against ethnic Indians in the first week of May alone: the first involved a man making offensive remarks at an Indian family after confronting one of them for not wearing a mask, while the second involved an assault against a fifty-five-year-old Singaporean Indian lady who had worn her mask below her nose while brisk walking.

These incidents arose despite the country’s heavy emphasis on the ethos of multiculturalism and the numerous laws regulating racial harmony. The Singapore government has certainly not been shy in resorting to legal sanction when necessary to penalize offensive speech, including relying on the colonial-era Sedition Act (originally introduced to safeguard British rule from local anti-imperial resistance) in the 2000s and early 2010s.

Setting the Scene: The Decade of Reforms Ends

By seizing power by force on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military—or Tatmadaw—effectively put an end to the decade of political and economic liberalization that had been initiated with the establishment of a semi-civilian government following elections in November 2010. Conducted under the 2008 constitution, the 2010 elections were the first since the ones in 1990 that saw the rise of the National League for Democracy (NLD).

The decade from February 2011 to February 2021 were remarkable for Myanmar, a country that had been under some type of military rule and isolated economically since the 1960s. The transition to a hybrid political structure where democratic groups cohabited with the armed forces was accompanied by structural reforms aimed at promoting a market-led economy connected to regional supply chains and the global financial system.

The economic and business reforms were especially impressive under President Thein Sein, the retired general from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), who led the first government of that decade from February 2011 to February 2016. Notably, his liberalization of the telecommunications sector epitomized the shift away from a state-led economy, while his suspension of the Myitsone hydropower dam project signalled the willingness of Myanmar to break away with its political and economic dependence on China.

The NLD government that took power in February 2016 also pursued economic and business reforms, and intended to expand and accelerate them after its re-election in November 2020. Still, the NLD faced criticisms during its first term, including from some local businesses and foreign investors, that it did not go fast or big enough with its reforms, especially when compared with the Thein Sein administration. It is true that the NLD took months, if not the entire first year of its term, to become acquainted with the bureaucracy; some of its decision-making and its initial economic appointments were indeed disappointing. The Rohingya crisis from 2016 onwards also affected the NLD’s focus as well as the economy. Nevertheless, the NLD government did continue or initiate significant structural reforms aimed notably at promoting transparency in public finances and procurement.

I. Background

• 1. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee is established under the ASEAN Coordinating Council pursuant to the decision of the 17th ASEAN Summit on 28 October 2010 and as espoused in the Ha Noi Declaration on the Adoption of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity.

II. Purposes

• 2. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee shall work to ensure the effective implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity to:

• • promote economic growth;

• • narrow development gaps;

• • enhance ASEAN integration and community-building process;

• • enhance competitiveness of ASEAN;

• • promote deeper social and cultural understanding and mobility of people; and

• • connect ASEAN Member States within the region and with the rest of the world.

III. Roles and Functions

• 3. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee shall:

  • a) Monitor, evaluate and review on a regular basis, or as appropriate, the implementation of the strategies, actions and projects of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity;

  • b) Coordinate with the National Coordinators, the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN, relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies and subregional arrangements to ensure that the implementation of the strategies, actions and projects are in line with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity;

  • c) Identify issues and challenges, which arise from the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, and make appropriate recommendations to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council;

  • d) Coordinate with ASEAN Dialogue Partners, multilateral development banks including various international and regional financial institutions. Adopted by the ASEAN Coordinating Council 17 January 2011 two international organizations, private sector and other relevant stakeholders to promote the implementation of Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity and mobilize all possible sources of funding;

  • e) Evaluate and recommend additional strategies, actions and prioritized projects to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Coordinating Council;

  • f) Liaise with the National Coordinators to carry out outreach activities and consultations with stakeholders to raise awareness of ASEAN Connectivity;

  • g) Explore strategies to strengthen connectivity between ASEAN and other regions including East Asia and beyond; and

  • h) Undertake other activities as instructed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council.

IV. Composition of the Committee

• 4. The ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee shall comprise the Permanent Representatives to ASEAN or any other special representatives appointed by ASEAN Member States.

Introduction

The previous chapter considered the role of the military in Indonesia’s foreign policy. It showed that initially the President was passive with respect to foreign policy matters. After the 1982 general election, however, Suharto became more active in foreign policy-making as he was interested in projecting a higher foreign policy profile for Indonesia. This chapter focuses on the assertive role of Suharto after the 1983 presidential election. Some examples will be provided, but the main focus will be on the East Timor issue, including the Dili Affair, in which Suharto has played a decisive role.

Suharto and a Higher Foreign Policy Profile

After the 1982 general election, Suharto became more confident. Golkar had scored a landslide victory in the election and, unlike the previous general election, there had been no violence or student demonstrations prior to the polling, signifying that there was no longer any opposition. During the 1983 presidential election, Suharto was nominated by the three parties (Golkar, PPP and PDI) as the only candidate for the presidency. In the previous presidential election, the PPP had only agreed to nominate Suharto at the last minute. In the 1980s also, the East Timor problem was under control. Suharto might have thought that it was time for Indonesia to play an active role again in foreign affairs. Indeed, a number of events from 1984 onwards demonstrate this trend.

The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Afro-Asian Conference

In 1985, Indonesia decided to host the thirtieth anniversary celebration of the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung. About one hundred Afro-Asian states were invited (including the PRC). At the meeting, however, the participants were not able to agree on any major international issues. As a result, no resolution was issued. Some commentators have argued that it was a non-event. From the Indonesian point of view, this was the first step for Indonesia in becoming active again in the international arena.

Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and APEC Summit

In 1987, President Suharto sent his Vice-President, Umar Wirahadikusumah, to attend the Non-Aligned conference in Zimbabwe, Africa. Umar was instructed to express Indonesia’s desire to be the chairman of the next Non-Aligned conference. The offer was turned down. Apparently, the Non-Aligned Movement, which was dominated by pro-Soviet states, did not agree to Indonesia’s leadership.

Insistence on ASEAN Centrality an Offshoot of Post-Colonialism and Cold-War Stigma

I believe that there is a historical explanation of why Member States which make up ASEAN have acquired an almost obsessive desire to insist on ASEAN Centrality in their dealings among themselves and their external partners. Wary of their past colonial experience of being dictated on in what they can and cannot do, say or think, and having become the arena on which major powers have flexed their military and political muscles in the not-so-distant past, ASEAN has used the principle of centrality as some kind of a mantra or antidote against repeating this bitter part of their colonial past. However, the awareness of insisting on ASEAN Centrality has not found itself in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, except for a general reference to the avoidance of “external interference” in a preambular paragraph. It was only much later, after forty years, that it was spelled out and became preeminent in the ASEAN Charter which was adopted in 2007, particularly as a response to ASEAN Member States’ growing self-consciousness of weaning themselves away from foreign influence in the post-Cold War era. I can attribute this to the fact that in 1967 when ASEAN was established, the Cold War was still raging and the original ASEAN 5, although trying hard to remove the vestiges of the Cold War stigma that has divided them in earlier attempts at regionalism, have not yet totally weaned themselves from these predispositions. Still in the infancy of their regional experiment, they had not yet discovered their unique brand of multilateralism which, they would discover later on, could serve as an alternative to the push-and-pull pressure of their former colonial masters and the big powers that are raring to once again use this arena in flexing their political and military muscles. In recent times, with a long queue of external partners desiring to engage it, ASEAN has found its niche and has tried to shake off these vestiges of colonialism and Cold War by insisting on ASEAN Centrality as a foundational principle of its existence and a guaranty of its sustainability and relevance in the web of complex power-play in the region.