6.1 Historical Context: “Insiders from the Outside”

6.1.1 The emergence of the United States in Northeast Asia

The United States and Russia are “outsiders” in Northeast Asia because most or all of their territory is located outside the region. The United States holds no territory in Northeast Asia although it has Guam and the Saipan Islands in the Western Pacific. Russia has held territory along the eastern shores of Northeast Asia (Khabarovsk Krai and Primorsky Krai) and above the Amur River (Amur Oblast) since the late nineteenth century although most of its vast territory and population are located outside Northeast Asia. Yet, both are also “insiders” because they have exercised a massive influence in the region, particularly since the end of World War II, shaping the region's political and economic landscape. The United States and the Soviet Union, Imperial Russia's successor, became the two most important countries leading the capitalist free world and the communist bloc, respectively, and forming their own alliances in Northeast Asia. This chapter discusses these countries’ engagements in Northeast Asia and their profound impact on war and conflicts in the region, beginning with the United States.

The United States, which was still in the process of its own national development throughout the nineteenth century, was a relative late-comer to Asia, initially focusing on missionary operations in China and elsewhere. However, commercial interests drove the United States to follow the path of other European powers by seeking economic privileges from China. The United States signed the Treaty of Wanghia with China in 1844 and secured concessions mirroring those gained by Britain through its treaty with China two years earlier (the Treaty of Nanjing). The treaty included the granting of extraterritoriality—the idea that foreigners operating in China would only be subject to the laws of their home countries. It also stipulated fixed tariffs on trade, opened ports for American traders, and conferred rights to build churches and hospitals therein. The United States also received most-favored-nation (MFN) status, which accorded the United States the same beneficial treatment China gave to other European powers. Thus, the United States could reap the benefits of Europe's exploitation of China while still being seen as the least aggressive Western power. Because the United States did not take initiatives against China, Chinese officials viewed Americans as less of a threat.

Like many countries around the world, Cambodia continued to be hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. Socio-economic impacts resulting from the pandemic and from the government’s responses to it, combined with rising Sino-US geostrategic competition, provided an opportunity for the banned opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) to reactivate its cells inside Cambodia and lobby Western governments in an effort to have the CNRP reinstated as a legal political party. In foreign relations, while 2021 saw ever closer Sino-Cambodian relations, tensions grew between the country and the United States. This chapter analyses the aforementioned challenges in three sections. The first section discusses the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government’s responses, and the subsequent effects on the economy. The second section analyses the efforts of the CNRP to stage a comeback and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s (CPP) reactions. The third section discusses Cambodia’s foreign relations, focusing on the ever-closer Sino-Cambodian relationship and its benefits for Cambodia, US pressure on Phnom Penh over its close ties with China and democratic backsliding, and Japan’s continued engagement to counterbalance Chinese influence in the country.

COVID-19 Pandemic, Government Responses, and Impacts

When COVID-19 infections were confirmed in Cambodia in early 2020, fear among the public mounted given COVID-19’s origins in China and the large numbers of Chinese travellers between the two countries. However, Cambodia was shielded from the pandemic until March 2021, when the number of infections and deaths began to surge. This forced the government to implement strict lockdowns, causing initial public panic and speculation over doomsday scenarios of a public healthcare system collapse. Government opponents claimed that the government’s policies of mandatory vaccination with mostly Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccines was an experimentation with Cambodian lives. When these policies proved successful, many political pundits and government critics attributed the success to random luck.

The pandemic was the first crisis under the CPP’s hegemonic party authoritarianism that began in 2018 following the dissolution of the CNRP. Therefore, the efficacy of the government’s responses to the pandemic would have a significant impact on the CPP’s legitimacy. As such, the government systematically planned the nationwide mobilization of human and capital resources to combat COVID-19 with decisiveness and focus as though the country was at war.

Malaysia’s relations with the United States and China are characterized by asymmetry—that is, inequality in abilities, attention and actions. As the two powers vie for influence, they have at times displayed, intended or otherwise, their capabilities to help or harm the interests of weaker states. In recent years, US-China rivalry has mounted and system-wide uncertainties have deepened across the Indo-Pacific region. These trends will continue in the foreseeable future, with ramifications for weaker states in Southeast Asia and beyond, Malaysia included.

While these asymmetries and their consequences have been recurring themes in Malaysia’s relations with both powers, in 2021 they were amplified because of developments at global, regional and bilateral levels. Malaysia responded to these challenges and opportunities in an uneven fashion: prudent and pragmatic (albeit often low-profile) on some issues, while incoherent, inactive and even inappropriate on others. These mixed patterns were evident not only under the Muhyiddin Yassin–led Perikatan Nasional–plus regime, which took over from the Mahathir Mohamad–led Pakatan Harapan government in March 2020, but also under the current Ismail Sabri Yaakob–led ruling coalition that replaced the Muhyiddin government in August 2021.

We argue that Malaysia’s mixed responses are a result not only of concerns over the systemic action-reaction between the powers but also of domestic complexities that coincided with and were complicated by COVID-19 challenges. Chief among these complexities are the elites’ domestic preoccupations, policy indecisiveness, and bureaucratic inertia vis-à-vis the rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. The rationales of several policy positions were inadequately or ineffectively articulated, resulting in resentment internally and misinterpretations externally.

External asymmetries and uncertainties have intensified at a time when Malaysia faces unprecedented internal changes and challenges on multiple fronts. Following the 2018 general elections that ended the United Malays National Organisation–led Barisan Nastional’s sixty-one-year rule, Malaysia underwent three changes of government in three years, and there are still uncertainties ahead. For a country known for political stability, this is an unusual internal development. Since 2020, as the rest of Southeast Asia and the world fought the COVID-19 crisis, Malaysia’s successive ruling elites have not only been battling the pandemic and attempting to rebuild the economy, but have also been struggling for their political survival.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on Indonesia’s relations with the two superpowers — the United States and the former Soviet Union — as well as the economic superpower, Japan. It examines the importance of Indonesia’s “economic dependence” on the United States and Japan during the early stage of the Suharto period and its impact on Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour. It also looks at the non-economic factors which affected Jakarta-Moscow relations before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In the last section of this chapter, Indonesian relations with major powers regarding regional order and security are also addressed.

Indonesia-US Relations: Convergence of Interests?

Indonesian-American relations were established during the revolutionary period when Indonesia was still fighting for its independence. Active support for Indonesia by the United States was only given after the Madiun Affair in 1948 when the Indonesian Government was under a Communist threat.

During the period of Constitutional Democracy, when the Islamic party, Masyumi, was in power, Indonesian-American relations could be described as close. An agreement on military alliance with the United States was made but it was short- lived. When Indonesian domestic politics moved towards the left and the nation’s foreign policy became even more militant and nationalistic, Indonesian-American relations deteriorated. This was also partly due to such anti-Sukarno, anti-Communist rebel groups that gained the support of the United States in their efforts to topple the central Government. The rebellions were crushed, but, as a consequence, Indonesian-American relations suffered. Meanwhile, Sukarno moved further to the left and made a formal alliance with the PRC. The nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union also became closer. The military group in Indonesia was basically anti-Communist, however, and quietly received support from the United States.

When the 1965 coup failed and the military emerged as the victor in Indonesia, Indonesian-American relations improved. The Indonesian economy before and soon after the coup was on the brink of collapse. Inflation was out of control, reaching 650 per cent annually. It was reported that, in 1966, inflation was as high as 900 per cent. The newly formed Government was aware that in order to maintain political stability, there had to be economic rehabilitation. It was also recognized that stabilizing the economy would be a way to legitimize the Suharto Government.

• a. ASEAN Declaration to Prevent and Combat Cybercrime

• b. ASEAN Declaration on Innovation

• c. Action Agenda on Mainstreaming Women’s Economic Empowerment in ASEAN

• d. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR): Combating AMR through One Health Approach

• e. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Disaster Health Management

• f. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Ending All Forms of Malnutrition

• g. ASEAN Declaration on the Adoption of the ASEAN Youth Development Index

• h. ASEAN Declaration on ‘Culture of Prevention’ for a Peaceful, Inclusive, Resilient, Healthy and Harmonious Society

• i. ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-Responsive Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and Sustainable Development Goals

• j. ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to the 23rd Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP-23)

• k. Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN

• l. ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross Border Transport of Passengers by Road Vehicles

In addition, the following documents were also either issued, signed or adopted:

APT documents

• • Manila Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the ASEAN Plus Three

• • ASEAN Plus Three Leaders’ Statement on Food Security Cooperation

• • ASEAN Plus Three Plan of Action 2018–2022

ASEAN+1 documents

• • Chairman’s Statement of the 5th ASEAN-U.S. Summit to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue Relations

• • Co-Chairs’ Press Statement of the ASEAN-Canada Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-Canada Dialogue Relations

• • Press Statement of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations

• • Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN-China 20th Summit

EAS documents

• • Manila Plan of Action to advance the Phnom Penh Declaration on the East Asia Summit Development Initiative (2018–2022)

• • Chairman’s Statement of the 12th East Asia Summit, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Chemical Weapons, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Countering Ideological Challenges of Terrorism and Terrorist Narratives and Propaganda, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • Chairman’s Statement of the 7th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Manila, 7 August 2017

Optimism derived from the initially successful containment of the COVID-19 pandemic in Brunei was short-lived as new infections hit the country like a tsunami in the second half of 2021. Strict restrictions that had earlier been relaxed were reintroduced.

Amid the ongoing battle against COVID-19, Brunei assumed chairmanship of ASEAN in January 2021. The military coup in Myanmar in February put Brunei in a tight spot as all eyes were on ASEAN’s reaction to the crisis. Although an unusually bold decision was made to exclude Myanmar from the ASEAN Summit in late October hosted virtually by Brunei, on other occasions the ASEAN chair appeared to be lending legitimacy to the military regime.

Apart from addressing the issue of low growth rates as a result of overdependence on oil and natural gas, rising unemployment remains a major concern for the sultanate. In realizing economic diversification, a new blueprint, Towards a Dynamic and Sustainable Economy, unveiled in January, emphasizes the emergence of a strong private sector in Brunei. As a further move, the sultanate plans to nurture a digital economy.

Brunei maintained close security and defence relations with its traditional partners in 2021. The year also marked the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of relations between Brunei and the People’s Republic China (PRC). The PRC is Brunei’s largest foreign direct investor and has pledged to increase its investments, especially under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The COVID-19 Pandemic: The Tsunami of the Second Wave

Brunei began facing the COVID-19 pandemic when the first case was confirmed on 9 March 2020. It was triumphant in restraining the outbreak for much of 2020 and even into at least August 2021. In fact, as of 31 December 2020, Brunei only had 157 cases, with four deaths. For a country with a population of 429,999 (2021), this figure was indeed minuscule and spoke volumes of the government’s impressive efforts in curbing the pandemic. Further evidence of this was the absence of locally transmitted cases of COVID-19 for three hundred days by 4 March 2021. During this period, all infections that were reported in the country were imported cases.

As such, on 7 March 2021, the country’s Ministry of Health announced some relaxations to the restrictions that had been imposed to enable Bruneians to return to the new normal.

Introduction

This chapter identifies a number of factors which influence, if not determine, Indonesia’s foreign policy. These factors include Indonesian leaders’ perceptions of territorial boundaries, Indonesia’s role in world affairs, and the constraint on its behaviour posed by the country’s available resources. Indonesian political culture and elite perceptions of external threat will also be examined because they may throw light on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour.

Indonesia’s Territory and Role in World Affairs

The perception of Indonesia’s territory and role in world affairs by its leaders is important because of its effect on Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour. The difficulty, however, is in determining whose perceptions should be accepted as valid. Should they be those of the foreign policy elite or should they be those of Indonesian leaders in general? It is reasonable to assume that the perceptions of Indonesian leaders responsible for formulating foreign policy are the crucial ones. In the case of Indonesia, however, domestic policy-makers and foreign policy leaders are often the same individuals. This has been reflected in the role of the President, especially during the Guided Democracy and New Order periods.

Indonesia’s history and traditions have been mainly responsible for the perceptions of Indonesian leaders concerning the nation’s territory and role in world affairs. Indonesia, before August 1945, was known as the Dutch East Indies and the country is still defined today by the former boundaries of the Dutch colony. (Since 1976, Indonesia has also included the former Portuguese East Timor.) Most Indonesian leaders, however, especially the pre-war nationalists and the 1945 generation, consider Indonesia to be a continuation of two ancient empires, Sriwijaya and Majapahit.

Before independence, Indonesian leaders debated the boundaries of an independent Indonesia. One view, represented by Mohammad Yamin, a nationalist poet and statesman, for example, subscribed to the “Great Indonesia” concept (Indonesia Raya). He maintained that the height of the Majapahit Empire was the period of greatest glory in Indonesia’s history. Citing the work of Prapanca, a fourteenth century poet of Java, Yamin said that Indonesia, under Majapahit rule, had included the Dutch East Indies, Malaya (Peninsular Malaysia), Borneo, Timor, and Papua (New Guinea). He believed that an independent Indonesia should include the former territory of the Majapahit Empire.

In writing this book, I have benefited greatly from numerous discussions that I have had with many friends and scholars over the last 20 years. I have also profited from various seminars on Indonesia’s foreign affairs given by Indonesian officials, diplomats and academics. Many of these seminars and talks were behind closed doors or off the record, and therefore they cannot be cited. Nonetheless, they have had a strong influence on my study.

Many friends in Indonesia have shared their expertise with me, and in doing so have enriched my understanding of both Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Their names are too many to be mentioned here but I would like to offer all of them my sincere thanks.

A significant portion of the study was conducted between 1988 and 1989 during my sabbatical leave in three institutions: the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (ISEAS), Ohio University and Cornell University. Each possesses an excellent library, and I am grateful to the staff of those libraries for assisting me in my research.

A few friends have read the early version of my manuscript, either in part or in full. I would like in particular to thank Chin Kin Wah, N. Ganesan, Michael Leifer, Jamie Mackie and Nancy Viviani for their useful suggestions. I am also grateful to Triena Ong who has given me editorial advice. Nevertheless, for any mistakes and shortcomings which still exist in this book, I am alone responsible.

Leo Suryadinata

July 1995

Singapore

The remarkable negative shift in American policy against China dominates US policy in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region, one of two top policy arenas of acute US rivalry with China. The other is competition for dominance in the high-technology industries determining which country will be the world’s economic and military leader. In both critical policy areas, the United States seeks to counter Chinese challenges and prevent feared Chinese dominance and its negative impact on American security and well-being.

President Joseph Biden entered office in January 2021 with clear priorities focused on countering the pandemic that ravaged the country amid the national government’s mismanagement, reviving and making more competitive the stalled economy in ways beneficial to American workers, reducing partisan divides that have caused government gridlock and mass protests that undermine the democratic process, and protecting minority rights against unjust law enforcement. Foreign policy was secondary. There was a strong emphasis on a return to close cooperation with allies and partners; cooperation with international groups seeking multilateral solutions to salient global issues involving public health, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation; and a priority on Asia as the most important region for American security, economic and political interests.

President Biden and senior members of his administration came late in endorsing the dramatic negative turn in US policy towards China carried out by senior leaders of the Trump administration and bipartisan majorities in Congress beginning with the administration’s National Security Strategy in December 2017. Candidate Biden disparaged China’s ability to challenge US power. By early 2021, however, the president and senior aides repeatedly warned against major dangers posed by China’s challenges. Biden stressed that China had reached a stage, through predatory economic practices, where it challenged the United States for leadership in high-technology industries that provided the foundation for US economic and military leadership, thereby threatening US domination by China. Meanwhile, the president’s countering of Chinese expansionism in Asia showed repeatedly in his meetings with key allies and partners, giving high importance to the four-party Quad grouping involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States to advance US interests in the region in contrast to China’s ambitions for dominance and control.

Over the course of the last decade, Cambodia’s relations with China have gone from strength to strength, deepening across every field imaginable, and at a pace that gives new meaning to the phrase “breakneck speed”. While the COVID-19 pandemic slowed—and for a brief period entirely halted—the constant stream of official and business delegations from China, Phnom Penh has been expecting their rapid return (some more eagerly than others) when normalcy and regularly scheduled flights resume. The sheer scale of Chinese engagement with Cambodia was well encapsulated by one Cambodian official who noted to the author that the number of official visits to his department was so high they could barely keep up—with at least one group arriving every week. At the same time, the vast amount of Chinese aid and foreign direct investment is omnipresent—hundreds of miles of new roads (of varying quality) built under the ambit of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), new Phnom Penh skylines dominated by Chinesebuilt office buildings and condominiums, and once-sleepy provincial towns and suburbs packed to the gunwales with Chinese-owned factories and shophouses. A visit to the port city of Sihanoukville, constantly touted as the kingdom’s “New Shenzhen”, regularly yields the inevitable joke by Cambodian colleagues when entering the city: “Did you remember your passport? We’re in China now.”

While English remains the second language of choice for the kingdom’s elite, professional class and students, one can easily live and work in Cambodia fully ensconced in putonghua—a far cry from the early 2000s when “Chinese language” meant Chaozhou and Hokkien, and traditional rather than simplified characters on shop signs. Confucius Institutes abound, including branches at various ministries (including the Ministry of Defence), and the kingdom’s Chinese language media regularly trumpets in laudatory terms a daily drumbeat of new initiatives demonstrating the unbreakable ties of Sino-Cambodian friendship. The appointment of Chinese-born, naturalized Cambodian businessman Chen Zhi—chairman of the Prince Group conglomerate—as advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen last year demonstrated to many observers the incredible depth and new reality of Sino-Cambodian relations.