The chapter continues the analysis of social structure in the transition from the CAPE to the modern era, but looking at the institutions that emerged within the transition period itself. It looks at the synergies and contradictions within the unfolding institutional structure of modernity, and contrasts this turbulence with the relative harmony in the institutional structure of the CAPE era. Each institution is analysed for how it works across the three domains: interhuman, transnational and interpolity/state.

The chapter opens the analysis of social structure in the transition from the CAPE to the modern eras by reviewing the primary institutions carried over from the CAPE era into the transition, seeing which became obsolete, and which adapted to the new conditions and survived. It constrasts the relative simplicity and straightforwardness of the material developments during this period to the complexity, contradictions and turbulence of the social structure.

The chapter draws together the main conclusions from the study. It highlights the implications of this study for how history is analysed and periodised, and how the approach taken in this book offers opportunities to create common ground amongst those interested in ’big picture’ approaches to the study of humankind in Intnernational Relations, Global Historical Sociology, and Global/World History. The chapter also looks at the implications for the English School of extending its analytical scheme in this way.

Binding morality is responsible for the collapse of Germany at the end of World War I. Rationalist account maintains that self-serving elites, even while losing, might inflate their war aims precisely as the battlefield and home front situation are turning against them in an effort to buy off the ordinary public for their sacrifices. This chapter shows instead that as the war dragged on and Germany’s troubles accumulated, the German military, a bulwark of binding morality, raised its wartime aspirations so as to justify the costs of the conflict, adequately compensating the country for the loyal sacrifices of its soldiers. This irrationality is best seen in relief, by comparing the nationalist right not only to the German left but also to the consequentialist and realist ethics of the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, who was eventually swept aside by conservative forces precisely for being willing to concede to reality. A survey panel experiment, conducted on a sample of the Russian public, induces the same inflation dynamics. Those who identify as binding moralists persist for much longer in a theoretical war. Those who stay in the conflict until the very end increase their reservation price over time, even as the Russians are suffering disproportional casualties.

This chapter delves into US relations with the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in the post-9/11 era. The chapter describes the idiosyncratic processes that led Afghanistan to have presidential institutions and Iraq to have parliamentary institutions. It then shows how the different constitutional arrangements in Afghanistan and Iraq changed the dynamics through which the United States interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in the two countries. It analyzes the extent to which the United States was able to exercise leverage over the incumbent leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, given their different constitutional frameworks.

The final chapter rounds up the analysis and summarizes the main findings from all previous chapters. It concludes that the United States is indeed a sheriff, but a shrewd sheriff. The chapter contextualizes the main conclusions in the book within the current debates in academic and policy circles about the upending demise of the US world order. The chapter discusses the prospects of the US world order in light of the status of US domestic politics. That is the decisive debate: at the end of the day, that is where the sheriff gets its mandate. Regardless of whether the US world order is fading into the past or it is bound to endure in the future, the institutional logic of a consensual leadership will remain an original feature of how a democratic nation can manage and enforce a world order.

Recent advances in moral and social psychology have made clear that political ideology has moorings in the same moral foundations thought to have evolutionary roots. A number of different scholars have converged on what Duckitt has labeled a “dual-process model” of political ideology, a two-dimensional framework for explaining the fundamental cleavages in politics. The first dimension captures binding morality, driven by a motivation to protect from threats. The second dimension captures a motivation to provide for others’ welfare, which defines virtue as taking care of others. Since there is no autonomous political sphere, however, we project these same cleavages onto foreign policy. I present evidence from two American and one Russian surveys showing that the two-dimensional models of foreign policy belief systems found to structure foreign policy attitudes in the United States and other countries have moral roots. Militant internationalism, our beliefs about the necessity of carrying a big stick and being willing to use it, are strongly associated with binding moral values, our motivation to protect. Cooperative internationalism, our beliefs about the gains to be had from cooperation and our obligations to others outside our own borders, is strongly associated with the moral motivation to provide.

There is a considerable amount of historical momentum behind the move into deep pluralism. Structural shifts such as the wider distribution of wealth, power, and cultural and political authority, the fading out of superpowers, and the rise of regionalism are hard to stop. Points of historical baggage such as introverted great powers, post-colonial resentment, and the normative crisis of liberalism and its teleology also run deep. The power-shift currently underway is much deeper that just between the US and China. It is about the ending of two centuries of Western-dominated, core–periphery, world order, and the opening of a multi-civilisational one. Although deep pluralism could in principle take a consensual form, under these circumstances it is not all that surprising that at least for now it is taking the contested one. This will happen regardless of whether the US–China rivalry turns out to be global or inter-regional.

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the book. It shows that the conundrum of a consensual world order can be disentangled by analyzing the mechanisms through which incumbents and potential challengers can gain and maintain power. For the United States, the fundamental challenge is to channel the political ambitions of potential successor leaders toward good governance and respect of human rights while avoiding becoming entangled with any specific incumbent in partner nations. Domestic political institutions that foster political successors and allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover make it easier for the United States to attain friendly relations by easing more accommodating leaders into power. In a special twist, institutions that allow for regular and flexible channels of leadership turnover also create domestic political incentives that foster the attainment of better governance and more respect of human rights. In contrast, domestic political institutions that concentrate power in the hands of the incumbents, and curtail political competition, make it more difficult for the United States to exercise influence.

This chapter places the book’s theory into a historical perspective: It describes several ways in which the United States has interacted with incumbent leaders, and their potential successors, in partner nations. From this, the chapter identifies and operationalizes the mechanisms of the book’s theory in respect to the domestic politics of partner countries, differentiating between democratic and authoritarian partners. The chapter also operationalizes four dimensions of the relations between the United States and its partners: (a) the alignment of the foreign policies of the United States and the partner nations’; (b) the likelihood of coups in the partner nations; (c) good governance through the provision of public goods; and (d) the respect of human rights. This chapter, therefore, sets the stage for the systematic empirical analysis of Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

The focus on cosmopolitan humanitarianism obscures the totality of morality in international politics, leaving the empirical study of morality in IR with two central blindspots. First, it focuses on moral conscience – our desire to do good for others – to the neglect of moral condemnation, our response to the perceived unethical behavior of others, not only against third parties but also against ourselves. In both everyday life and IR, the response is generally to morally condemn, and often to punish and retaliate. Second, the IR ethics and morality literature have not come to terms with moral principles that operate at the group level, binding groups together. When “our” group is engaged in conflict with another, we owe the group our loyalty and defer to group authorities out of moral obligation. These “binding foundations” are particularly important for IR since foreign affairs are a matter of intergroup interaction. Together this means that groups, bound by moral commitment, do not compete with others in an amoral sphere in which ethics stops at the water’s edge. Once we cast our moral net more widely, we realize that morality is everywhere, more striking in the breach than the observance.