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On 23 November 2015, Wajih Awad, a 14-year-old from the Qalandiya refugee camp and her 16-year-old cousin Norhin Awad, entered West Jerusalem Mahane Yehuda market armed with scissors, with the intent to stab Israeli civilians. Wajih lightly wounded an elderly man and attempted to stab another civilian before the girls were both shot by an Israeli security officer. Wajih Awad was killed after being knocked on the ground by a passerby and then shot at point blank range by a security officer. Her cousin recovered from two bullet wounds in her stomach and is serving a 13-year prison sentence in Israel. Wajih, the 14-year-old ‘terrorist’, was apparently seeking revenge for the death of her brother, who was killed by Israeli soldiers after being shot at close range with a rubber bullet to the neck while protesting at a checkpoint. Her 16-year-old cousin claimed that she was accompanying her and did not intend to hurt anyone. Armed with scissors, these girls did not pose a serious threat; only the one man was slightly injured. However, within Israel, the shooting of the girls was considered fully justifiable. The attack by the teens was not an isolated case but was rather one of hundreds of incidents involving Palestinian youth seeking revenge against Israeli civilians subsequent to the 2014 Gaza war and ongoing realities of life under the military occupation. Because so many of the incidents were perpetuated by Palestinian youth lightly armed with scissors, screwdrivers, or knives, the wave of violence during 2015–2016 has often been referred to as the ‘knife’ or the ‘children’s intifada’.
Within an internal violent conflict where civilians are not far removed from combatants, children may engage as activists or perpetrators of violent acts, and they can volunteer or be coerced into conducting suicide missions. Although there is much literature on children’s vulnerability regarding the effects of war and exploitation (Slone and Mann, 2016; Wessells, 2019), there is far less research into children as perpetrators of violence. Most of the research on children as violent perpetrators has focused on child soldiers abducted and trained by armed groups. Recent research has noted that modern armed conflict has increased the use of child soldiers (Nyamutata, 2020). Violent groups have practical reasons for targeting children for terrorist activities, which include attaining cheap soldiers and increasing the longevity of the groups.
This appendix explains the fundamental principles behind mechanism design, why it works, and how we can use the revelation principle to describe what must be true for equilibria within certain classes of games.
‘Children shape global politics’, reflected Lee-Koo (2020: 22). This chapter explains how different representations of migrant children shape global migration politics. In the last decade, children became more visible in migration/refugee studies. Different categories of migrant children, including unaccompanied children (those that cross an international border alone), separated children (those that cross an international border accompanied by an adult that is not their legal guardian), and children left behind (those that remain in their origin countries when their caretakers migrate), were employed to study the movement of children across borders.
Children, generally defined as people under 18 years old in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), have rights independently of their migration status (right to non-discrimination – Article 2). The Convention also guarantees children’s specific rights connected to migration, such as the right not to be separated from their family (Article 9), the right to have their best interests as a primary consideration (Article 3), the right to family reunification (‘family reunification shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner’ – Article 10), and the right to asylum (Article 22). Besides that, human rights courts, including the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have employed the UNCRC in cases involving children to recognize and guarantee their rights.
In a nutshell, international law obliges states to guarantee child migrants’ rights which could mean that the general concept of children (as rights holders) could restrain conservative migration politics. Since children are an internationally protected group and children traditionally perceived as innocent victims that deserve protection (Josefsson, 2017b), states willing to stop the entrance and permanence of child migrants in their territories have to adopt discursive strategies to justify the denial of child migrants’ rights. Lind (2019: 337) explains that ‘children’s rights are increasingly mobilised for governing and controlling, rather than enabling, vulnerabilised migrant children’s territorial presence and mobility’.
In recent years, with the increasing number of children migrating alone, politicians and researchers have started to understand that children are decision-makers in their migration processes and have agency in migration (Bhabha, 2014), which has motivated discourses focusing on child migration.
Research on intra-coalition control shows that monitoring increases with the ideological distance between coalition partners. However, the focus of scholarship has been primarily on parliamentary regimes, not mixed regimes. In mixed regimes, intra-coalition control becomes more complex due to a dual executive. Parties must simultaneously monitor each other and the directly elected Head of Executive (HoE). This article examines intra-coalition control in mixed regimes by analyzing parliamentary questions from 21 German city councils. The German local level resembles a mixed regime. The executive consists of the coalition cabinet supported by the council majority and the directly elected mayor as the HoE. The results show that the division of governmental responsibilities affects intra-coalition control. When a coalition party is aligned with the HoE, the balance of power within the coalition is affected, and the other partners intensify controlling the aligned party. Additionally, policy divisiveness and issue salience are driving factors for intra-coalition control.
El presente artículo examina el fenómeno del homicidio en Colombia y busca comprender las condiciones de vulnerabilidad que afectan al homicidio en las ciudades colombianas. A través de un enfoque teórico y metodológico basado en la vulnerabilidad se analizó dicha relación entre la violencia homicida con los mercados ilegales, los mercados laborales pauperizados y la repartición de la riqueza. La muestra se compuso de las treinta y dos ciudades capitales departamentales de Colombia. Se usaron herramientas estadísticas multivariadas (PLS-SEM) para analizar la relación entre estos factores y el homicidio. Los hallazgos sugieren que los bajos ingresos, la falta de empleo, la desigualdad y la violencia están asociados con un mayor riesgo de homicidio.
Ministers may be powerful policy initiators, but they are not equally powerful. Cabinet control mechanisms have become a crucial part of cabinet governance, which can serve to contain agency loss and consequently constrain ministers in the policymaking process. However, empirical studies have not focused on the impact of such control mechanisms on individual ministers’ political outcomes. I turn attention to certain cabinet committees as intra-cabinet control mechanisms and argue that members of these enjoy a policymaking advantage compared to nonmembers. Analyzing ministers’ number of laws proposed to parliament in Denmark from 1975 to 2022, I look beyond parties as unitary actors and provide evidence for this causal relationship. Membership of the Economic Committee increases ministers’ legislative activity. Thus, even within parties in cabinet, ministers have unequal possibilities to act as policy-seeking. These findings offer new insights into political parties in governments, cabinet governance, policymaking, and legislative processes.
When international courts are given sweeping powers, why would they ever refuse to use them? The book explains how and when courts employ strategies for institutional survival and resilience: forbearance and audacity, which help them adjust their sovereignty costs to pre-empt and mitigate backlash and political pushback. By systematically analysing almost 2,300 judgements from the European Court of Human Rights from 1967–2016, Ezgi Yildiz traces how these strategies shaped the norm against torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. With expert interviews and a nuanced combination of social science and legal methods, Yildiz innovatively demonstrates what the norm entails, and when and how its contents changed over time. Exploring issues central to public international law and international relations, this interdisciplinary study makes a timely intervention in the debate on international courts, international norms, and legal change. This book is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter begins by looking at Waltz’s other political ordering principle, hierarchy – which, like anarchy, is not in fact an ordering principle. Saying that a system “is hierarchical” merely indicates that it has some unspecified set of relations of stratification and functional differentiation. “Hierarchy,” rather than a structural ordering principle, is a residual category of non-anarchic orders (that, like most residuals, obscures the diversity of the “things” lumped together). And, as the preceding chapters have shown, most international systems, which by definition are anarchic, are also hierarchical. Therefore, even if anarchy and hierarchy are ordering principles, international systems do not have singular ordering principles. The remainder of the chapter looks critically at recent efforts by Ryan Griffiths and by Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, and Michael Zurn to develop alternative accounts of political ordering principles. I conclude that the problem is not that Waltz has misidentified the ordering principles of international systems but that international systems do not have ordering principles.
This chapter identifies the several factors (such as precedent, congressional deference, and Supreme Court decisions) that have allowed the executive branch to dominate American foreign policy making.
Why are progressives often critical of US foreign policy and the national security state? What would a statecraft that pulls ideas from the American left look like? Grand Strategies of the Left brings the progressive worldview into conversation with security studies and foreign policy practice. It argues that American progressives think durable security will only come by prioritizing the interconnected conditions of peace, democracy, and equality. By conceiving of grand strategy as worldmaking, progressives see multiple ways of using foreign policy to make a more just and stable world. US statecraft – including defense policy – should be retooled not for primacy, endless power accumulation, or a political status quo that privileges elites, but rather to shape the context that gives rise to perpetual insecurity. Progressive worldmaking has its own risks and dilemmas but expands how we imagine what the world is and could be.
This chapter considers the current foreign policy debate among elites and between elites and public, the prospect of a new policy consensus, and three possible alternative directions for the future.