This chapter introduces the micro-sociological lenses to the study of peace talks. The chapter discusses how bodily and facial interaction shapes peace diplomacy and its potential for generating social bonds between participants. The chapter maps six different spaces in peace diplomacy: formal negotiations, informal space, formalized informal space, shuttle diplomacy space, press conferences, and virtual space; and how these make the character and dynamics of interaction possible in peace talks. The chapter shows that under the right spatial and interactional circumstances, peace talks can generate social bonds between the involved parties. However, the leaders of the respective parties often do not take part in peace talks and thus they are not the ones generating social bonds. The chapter further discusses the importance of interpersonal trust versus trust in the process, as well as how the social bonding being generated at the peace table is transferred to the society at large.

How can states resolve problems with uncertainty? The most basic way is simply to ask. This chapter shows the unfortunately inherent limitations of such a strategy. If types were to reveal their private information truthfully, weaker types would receive fewer concessions. In turn, those types have an incentive to misrepresent themselves as stronger. Such a desire to take advantage of cheap talk communications continues when mediators are involved, though mediators with their own private information and the right type of bias may see some success.

This chapter introduces micro-sociological lenses to the study of international meetings showing how a micro-sociological study can produce insights into the workings and dynamics of concrete, inter-bodily interaction in international meetings. The chapter analyzes micro-sociological dynamics of rapprochement, conflict, domination, and low-intensity interaction in international meetings and dives into specific cases of international meetings, including in the UNSC, the EU, and bilateral meetings. The chapter further discusses and exemplifies the micro-sociological significance of gender; that is, how macro-political structures of male domination are manifested in concrete situations as well as how female diplomats often have a larger room for maneuver. The meetings analyzed in the chapter raise critical questions about frontstage/backstage aspects of international encounters, micro-sociality versus performativity, as well as the interplay between in-meeting dynamics and structural conditions/effects of the meetings. The discussion of these questions in the chapter will illustrate the complex nature of micro-dynamics in international meetings.

This appendix describes the implicit function theorem and how it is useful for drawing comparative statics for equilibria that we cannot describe with an explicit functional form.

This book has grounded peace and conflict in concrete interactions and developed a micro-sociological lens that can be added to the methodological and theoretical toolbox of peace research. In a nutshell, the framework put forward in this book sheds light on micro-interactional and micro-social dynamics of peace and conflict. Throughout the book, I have shown how phenomena of violence, nonviolent resistance, conflict transformation, peace talks, and international meetings can be understood differently within this framework. Here, the book contributes with empirical insights about various cases from the Arab Uprisings to the Colombian peace process. With the aim of inspiring others to apply the micro-sociological framework, I have unfolded the methods and methodology of micro-sociology in peace research; in particular, how the video data analysis (VDA) method can contribute to capturing micro-interactional, rhythmic, and generative dynamics of world politics. In essence, this book makes three main arguments.

This chapter investigates how both direct and structural violence unfold in concrete situations. Analyzing examples from Palestine, I show how structural violence is enacted in concrete situations of domination and, building on empirical research from the Arab Uprisings, I develop a micro-sociological model for direct violence. The chapter shows how violence is difficult because it goes against the human tendency to become attuned and fall into each other’s bodily rhythms. Hence, violence usually happens from afar or when a victim is dominated. Once violence is initiated, however, it attains its own rhythm and momentum, making it difficult not to respond to an attack with another attack. The chapter further discusses how violent situations are not only shaped by inter-bodily dynamics but also by embodied habitus, emotional energy, and material availability. Coupling this with insights regarding micro-interactions of violence, I develop a micro-sociological model of violent situations.

This chapter explores an underappreciated component of the risk–return trade-off with incomplete information. A central determinant of a state’s willingness to make risky proposals is how much it must overpay weaker types to obtain stronger types’ compliance. When this "peace premium" is large, riskier proposals look more attractive. However, given the right type of uncertainty, increasing the costs of war or decreasing a state’s resolve can counterintuitively increase the probability of war. We also explore a new type of uncertainty: how much value the winner of the war will receive.

This chapter introduces the micro-sociological approach to the study and practice of conflict transformation. Unlike traditional conceptions of conflict resolution and transformation, the micro-sociological approach does not seek to address the root causes of a conflict in the sense of “that which the conflict is about,” but rather to change the interaction patterns and the larger web of relations sustaining and making up the intergroup or international conflict. Rather than a tree with deep roots, conflict is envisioned as a system of rhizomes; that is, a web of interactions. The chapter discusses how antagonistic interaction can be disrupted and transformed with the assistance of a mediator or through social activities, and how rituals of apology and reconciliation can restore relationships. Moreover, the chapter analyzes the micro-sociological significance of turning points, shared laughter and domination in processes of dialogue. Finally, the chapter discusses the challenges to conflict transformation.

This chapter introduces the second general class of bargaining failure: information problems. If one side does not know how costly the other side views war, it may make an onerous demand. Opponents that have low costs reject, leading to war. Although this explanation for conflict is well known, many of its implications are misunderstood. The remainder of the chapter dispels some of them, showing that the probability of war can change as a function of the distribution of power and that more information might cause more conflict.

This chapter introduces the canonical crisis bargaining model. Two states negotiate over a zero-sum good. If they fail to reach an agreement, they fight a costly war. The key insight is that, due to those costs, a range of settlements mutually preferable to war always exists. Thus any good theory of war must first explain why states did not reach one of those negotiated settlements.

This chapter applies the commitment problem logic to situations where it seems unrelated. More specifically, it applies when states can take more of the bargaining good than agreed to, when the size of the bargaining pie depends on pre-war investments, when the bargaining object cannot be cleanly divided, when the parties have risk-acceptant preferences, and when they can incur debt to gain an advantage in war.