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With the decline of public funding and new strategies pursued by interest groups, foreign private foundations and donors have become growing contributors to the European human rights justice system. These groups have created their own litigation teams, have increasingly funded NGOs litigating the European Courts, and have contributed to the content and supervision of the European judgements, which all have direct effects on the growth and procedure of human rights. European Human Rights Justice and Privatisation analyses the impacts of this private influence and the resultant effects on international relations between states, including the orientation of European jurisprudence towards Eastern countries and the promotion of private and neo-liberal interests. This book looks at the direct and indirect threat of this private influence on the independency of the European justice and on the protection of human rights in Europe.
In their fight against the debt crisis, the European Union and its member states took measures that have profoundly changed the euro. It now differs fundamentally from when it was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. Surprisingly, this change has come about with hardly any formal amendment to the Union's 'basic constitutional charter', the Treaties. How, then, to understand it? This book argues that the constitution of the EU has transformed, which occurs when constitutions change without amendment. The transformation is characterized by a broadening of the currency union's stability conception from price stability to also financial stability. Using solidarity as a lens, the book conceptualises the unity of the member states and analyses how this was preserved during the crisis. Subsequently, it explains how that changed the currency union's set-up and why the European Court of Justice could not turn against the change in Pringle and Gauweiler.
One of the most fundamental obstacles to EU constitutionalization is said to be the lack of a European demos, which is seen as a precondition for any constitutional system.The term ‘demos’ originally referred to the common people of an ancient Greek state. Today, demos can describe the populace of a democracy, as a political unit. European Member State courts, such as the GFCC, have raised prominent concerns that further constitutionalization is constrained by the absence, in Europe, of a common attachment as an entity; they emphasize that there is no ‘European people’ and no future possibility thereof, meaning that the final say in constitutional matters will always rest with each European Member State.
In both the court of public opinion and modern legal scholarship, our Europe of today appears to lurch from crisis to crisis. These crises are political, cultural, social, environmental and now also economic. A severe financial crash has sent shockwaves around the continent, exposing the fault lines in Europe’s institutions and constitution. After the near-collapse of Greece’s national economy, the EU focused heavily on inventing new mechanisms to provide economic stability for the euro-currency countries. However, deeper issues with the broader European project, which had festered in the dark for years, were revealed and thrown into stark relief by the financial floodlights.
The absence of a single legal system, according to critics, is one of the three most important dimensions in which further European constitutionalization finds itself stymied. For critics, a constitutional polity must be founded with one common legal system. From this view, if the European Union has no common understanding of the rule of law, it is doomed. Concerns include (1) an unclear role for a Federal Court and its appellate powers, (2) a lack of uniform trans-European procedures for selection of justices, (3) a lack of clear rules for constitutional review, (4) indeterminate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the (Member) States and (5) the unresolved matter of ultimate legal authority itself (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).
In Chapter 1, by way of brief reminder, I introduced the European Union’s historical development, highlighting the constitutional underpinnings of the current successive economic, social and political crises in Europe. After summarizing relevant literature, my goal was to outline and analyse an increasingly constructive series of judicial dialogues in Europe, which I believe has brought to light a number of perceived obstacles to three key demos, civitas and ius dimensions of European constitutionalization.
How does elite communication affect citizens’ attitudes towards trade agreements? Building on a growing literature on context factors influencing public opinion about trade and trade agreements; we argue that citizens rely on cues provided by political elites, especially political parties, when forming their views towards these agreements. Such cueing effects are most likely for citizens with little information about a trade agreement and for citizens receiving cues from trusted elites. In addition, citizens exposed to cues from non-trusted elites should exhibit a source-opposing effect. Our key contribution is to test these expectations relying on a survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) carried out in Germany and Spain. The findings from our experiment support the existence of elite cueing effects, although to a limited degree. Overall, the paper contributes to a better understanding of public opinion towards TTIP, trade policy attitudes, and public opinion more generally.
European constitutionalization continues to advance along the path that has been paved over recent decades. Contrary to the view advanced by many critics, many obstacles revered as insurmountable for Europe on this long journey, are either misconceptions or have been redressed by the Court of Justice to a degree such that they no longer stand in the way of further constitutionalization. However, as discussed at length in Chapter 5, there is one, remaining obstacle to be addressed. One point of contention continues to stand firm: the continuing and notable lack of a common European public sphere. It would be a mistake to view this as a practical or factual issue; rather, it is a legally constructed dilemma and, indeed, it can be addressed in legal ways.
Democracy and the EU have a heated relationship that has been much debated – by legal scholars and the European courts alike. For many, it is inherently difficult – if not impossible – to claim that the EU, as a whole, is reflective of democratic ideas and practices. There are, allegedly, particular areas of deficiency – from the usurping of domestic legislative jurisdiction, to the absence of civic responsibility among the peoples of Europe per se. As this chapter will demonstrate, it is my belief that most of the particular areas of alleged deficiency are not, in fact, serious obstacles to the European constitutionalization process. Rather, many are a natural and predictable occurrence.
The process of European constitutionalisation is met with extensive scepticism in current national legal and political spheres and in broader circles of public opinion across Europe. By shedding light on these concerns, this book reveals a widespread misunderstanding of constitutional federalism, which permeates the Member State courts, popular media, and many academic communities. A failure to address confusion over this fundamental concept is leading us towards impoverished development of the EU's 'Second Constitution', and even ensuring that the role of both domestic and international European courts in enriching the constitutionalisation process is overlooked and undervalued. In a bid to avoid such consequences, this book explores how federalism and further constitutionalisation - rightly understood in a dialogue of the European courts - may actually change this process and allow a clearer advance toward Europe's Second Constitution for, but also with, the people of Europe.