The absence of a single legal system, according to critics, is one of the three most important dimensions in which further European constitutionalization finds itself stymied. For critics, a constitutional polity must be founded with one common legal system. From this view, if the European Union has no common understanding of the rule of law, it is doomed. Concerns include (1) an unclear role for a Federal Court and its appellate powers, (2) a lack of uniform trans-European procedures for selection of justices, (3) a lack of clear rules for constitutional review, (4) indeterminate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the (Member) States and (5) the unresolved matter of ultimate legal authority itself (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).

In Chapter 1, by way of brief reminder, I introduced the European Union’s historical development, highlighting the constitutional underpinnings of the current successive economic, social and political crises in Europe. After summarizing relevant literature, my goal was to outline and analyse an increasingly constructive series of judicial dialogues in Europe, which I believe has brought to light a number of perceived obstacles to three key demos, civitas and ius dimensions of European constitutionalization.

European constitutionalization continues to advance along the path that has been paved over recent decades. Contrary to the view advanced by many critics, many obstacles revered as insurmountable for Europe on this long journey, are either misconceptions or have been redressed by the Court of Justice to a degree such that they no longer stand in the way of further constitutionalization. However, as discussed at length in Chapter 5, there is one, remaining obstacle to be addressed. One point of contention continues to stand firm: the continuing and notable lack of a common European public sphere. It would be a mistake to view this as a practical or factual issue; rather, it is a legally constructed dilemma and, indeed, it can be addressed in legal ways.

Democracy and the EU have a heated relationship that has been much debated – by legal scholars and the European courts alike. For many, it is inherently difficult – if not impossible – to claim that the EU, as a whole, is reflective of democratic ideas and practices. There are, allegedly, particular areas of deficiency – from the usurping of domestic legislative jurisdiction, to the absence of civic responsibility among the peoples of Europe per se. As this chapter will demonstrate, it is my belief that most of the particular areas of alleged deficiency are not, in fact, serious obstacles to the European constitutionalization process. Rather, many are a natural and predictable occurrence.

PRINCES AND MOMENTS

When asked by GQ magazine which world leader he esteemed most, Nigel Farage answered, “As an operator, but not as a human being, I would say Putin. The way he played the whole Syria thing. Brilliant. Not that I approve of him politically. How many journalists in jail now?” It was March 2014, around the same time that infamous “little green men”, in reality Russian soldiers, were beginning to pop up in Crimea. But it did not stop Farage from gushing in praise.

Some two years later, months before he was elected, Donald Trump spoke about Russia's strongman in similar terms.

Later, in response to a question in a televized interviewed about whether Putin ought not to be labelled “a killer”, Trump calmly pointed out: “There are a lot of killers. You think our country's so innocent?”

The comments were met with disbelief. Had Putin not just invaded and annexed Crimea? Squashed political freedoms in Russia? Beaten up and assassinated journalists, homosexuals and opposition leaders? Trump's political opponents jumped on the opportunity. Hillary Clinton compared Putin's actions in Crimea to Hitler's in Czechoslovakia. Others followed: Wolfgang Schauble, the German finance minister, Stephen Harper, prime minister of Canada, US Senators Lindsey Graham and John McCain, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite.

Part I of this book focused on EU policy and explored the ways in which crisis politics intensify longer-standing practices of governing migration through which the deaths and vulnerabilities of people on the move are rendered regular and acceptable. Drawing attention to the various policy mechanisms as well as to dynamics of power and violence that constitute this process of normalising death and vulnerability, it situated contemporary practices of governing migration in the context of a modern European tradition of humanism that is embedded in colonial dynamics and that ultimately fails in its attempt to maintain the security of home. By showing how the so-called Mediterranean migration crisis of 2015–2016 was prompted by a series of border deaths in which biophysical violence and processes of ultra-precaritisation emerged in shocking terms, Part I highlighted the abandonment of people on the move to the environmental forces of the Mediterranean Sea and to situations of harm on arrival to the EU as casualties or survivors. Yet, while the ‘Mediterranean migration crisis’ opened opportunities for consideration of the ongoing colonial legacies and the human conceits embedded within a modern European tradition of humanism and manifest in EU practices of governing migration, the political response was at best limited. Showing how the situation provoked a further toleration of biophysical violence and ultra-precarity on the part of EU governing authorities, Part I argued that EU practices of governing migration rest on the engagement of a form of humanitarian government in which appeals to human dignity reflect longer-standing racialised hierarchies between worthy and unworthy lives. Nevertheless, it also hinted at the importance of moving beyond a critique of humanism, humanitarianism and human dignity, to explore how alternative responses to border deaths challenge a divisive politics grounded in concerns to secure home. Part II thus shifts attention from the mobilisation of dignity by governing authorities to its mobilisation by allies of people on the move, exploring how different pro-migration activist interventions have emerged in terms that produce solidarity and hope for those embroiled in a so-called crisis. Each chapter in Part II examines a specific intervention in its material and discursive dimensions and considers how – and to what extent – the intervention contests the policy mechanisms and dynamics of power and violence through which death and vulnerability are normalised. As such, Part II not only undertakes an analysis of three different interventions in their own right, but also considers their potential – as well as their limitations – in mobilising the concept of dignity towards the creation of alternative horizons of solidarity and hope.

THE HOME STRAIGHT

On 17 January 2017, days before Donald Trump would stride into the White House, Xi Jinping rose to the Davos lectern to address a dejected audience of global business leaders at the annual gathering of the World Economic Forum. Globalization would continue, Xi argued determinedly, if not under US stewardship then under that of his own. “The global economy is the big ocean that you cannot escape from”, China's strongman said, picking his words carefully. “Any attempt to cut off the flow of capital, technologies, products, industries and people between economies, and channel the waters in the ocean back into isolated lakes and creeks is simply not possible.”

The conference hall packed with the great and the good of global capitalism found itself in violent agreement with the Marxist leader. And when he had finished, it broke into applause worthy of a Communist Party clapping frenzy.

Xi was no liberal, but globalization had powered China's rise for 40 years, and its demise would spell disaster. For Trump, globalization seemed a dead end, but for Xi it was the path to regaining China's strength. Smashing the world's architecture would be destructive. What was needed was a new global order, one that would supplant the old structures of the West. There was much to be said for Trump's new politics of strength. But he needed to make sure this brand of politics did not spell the end of globalization.

It turned Xi into the unlikeliest of Davos's heroes. Since his elevation to general secretary in 2012, he had only acted in the best of strongmen traditions, solidifying his personal hold on power by jailing rivals under the guise of anti-corruption campaigns. He had unleashed a brutal policy of cultural assimilation on China's Uighur population in the western province of Xinjiang.

EUROPE's COMING OF AGE

History is about epochal change, and with hindsight we may be able to say what the change was, what our “age” was about and when it started. In the storm of time this is a difficult and often impossible task. The historian is able to connect effect to cause because he already knows the outcome. The politician still has to feel his way at the intersection of past and future, not knowing what great change is being forged. Bit by bit, this is how he discovers, and defines, what his age is, and where he can and cannot tread.

Politics is improvisation, Niccolo Machiavelli taught, and improvisation involves going forward without knowing exactly where you are going, or even what you are doing. In its encounter with the strongman this is precisely what Europe is doing. It is feeling its way forward in unfamiliar surroundings, and it does so by taking small but concrete steps.

This process of improvisation is not random. Events and encounters are pushing the continent into one particular direction. Europe is discovering a certain path, delineating the outlines of a new era. The more of the path it travels, the clearer it becomes where it is leading, and what needs to be done to complete the journey. Minerva's owl only takes flight at dusk, said Hegel. “The vision thing”, as US President George H. Bush once called it, becomes easier the further we advance.

Can we already see where Europe is headed? The answer, I believe, is that we can, although not with the precision that may be demanded from us. Europe is discovering the allure of strength. It is looking for ways to find a place for strength in the world of rules it has crafted. What Europe is feeling its way towards, in other words, is the status of a sovereign power, acting independently on the global stage.

That transformation is driven by events and encounters, and by the realization that unfortunately the world is dominated less by rules than by strength. In such a world what alternatives are there for Europe's disparate nations?