Beyond Straight-Line Evolution

The traditional approach to European integration is inspired by a unilinear evolutionary image. This notion of orthogenesis (as biologists call straight-line evolution) emerged at a time when the EC comprised a small group of fairly homogeneous West European states. In the early stages of the integration process it was not unreasonable to assume that the European Community would necessarily evolve, sooner or later, into a politically integrated bloc, perhaps even into something like a nation (see chapter 2). That assumption is no longer tenable in a Union of twenty-seven, or more, members at vastly different stages of socioeconomic development, with different geopolitical concerns, and correspondingly diverse policy priorities. Under present conditions, not orthogenesis but evolution with several side-branches seems to be the appropriate model. As a matter of fact, surveying the general pattern of European integration since the end of World War II, one can see several distinct branches – a number of, often overlapping, state groupings established for purposes of cooperation in a variety of fields: political, economic, protection of human rights, security, science, and technology. An important example is the Council of Europe founded in 1949, which at present has more than forty member countries. The Council may concern itself with all political, economic, and social matters of general European interest and thus has an even broader mandate than the European Union. True, it does not have the power to make binding laws. The two instruments at the Council's disposal are non-binding resolutions, and conventions effective only between the states that ratified them.

Delegation of Powers

Informed observers like the American international lawyer D. E. Rosenthal, whose critical comments on the political powers of the non-elected Commission were quoted in chapter 1, find the extensive delegation of powers to supranational institutions one of the most striking features of the constitutional architecture of the EC/EU. The member states of the EU, Miles Kahler writes, ‘have delegated more important and extensive functions to European institutions than has been the case with the members of other international or regional institutions. The Commission, for example, surpasses even the strong secretariat of an international organization’ (Kahler 1995: 85). Indeed, the Commission's monopoly of agenda-setting – arguably the key provision of the classic Community Method – is unique. Such broad delegation of powers presupposes a fiduciary relationship between the principals, the member states, and their agents, the European institutions. Hence the progressive restriction of the scope of delegation should be an indication of growing mistrust between national principals and supranational agents. This is actually the case, but before reviewing the evidence a few general comments on the logic of delegation might be helpful. For a more detailed discussion of this topic the interested reader is referred to a previous work (Majone 2005: 64–82).

Why do political principals choose to delegate some of their powers to agents rather than exercise those powers themselves? A number of reasons have been debated in the literature, ranging from delivering private benefits to favoured constituencies to avoiding making unpopular choices. However, the most significant reasons for delegating powers – and the ones to be considered here – are two: first, to reduce decision making costs, for instance by taking advantage of executive-branch expertise; and…

The Question of Standards

Everybody familiar with the European treaties will readily admit that the processes of collective decision-ma king in the EU do not satisfy democratic principles – even basic principles taken for g ranted a t the national level. As argued in chapter 1, t he Community Method – not t he sole method of decision- making in the EU, but the most important one for economic integration – is the classic example of the sacrifice of democracy on the altar of integration, and as such it will also be referred to repeatedly in the following pages. However, agreement ends with the acknowledgement of a serious, possibly irredeemable, ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU and its policy-making institutions. One reason for the absence of agreement about t he nature and possible remedies of the EU's democratic deficit is that different critics generally rely on different evaluative standards. The conceptual confusion is compounded by the failure to distinguish between standard-setting and standard-using : between de fining new norms, and searching f or solutions satisfying current norms (Majone 1998). Standard-using is the relatively straight forward process of assessing various dimensions of performance against given benchmarks; whereas standard-setting is a process of deliberation where it is open to anyone to put forward a proposal as to what the standards should be, and to use persuasion to influence others to accept the proposal (Urmson 1968).

The imposing structure of European laws, institutions, and policies has been erected on the basis of a few operational principles that have remained mostly implicit, but nevertheless have shaped the political culture of the European Union. These principles – which taken together form what may be called the operational code of the EU – are not mentioned in official documents, nor discussed in the academic literature, but I submit that it is impossible to understand the current predicament of the European project – the EU's legitimacy crisis and the growing alienation of the citizens from the European institutions – without starting from them. Arguably the most important of these implicit operational principles says that integration has priority over all other competing values, including democracy. Hence the monopoly of legislative initiative granted to the non-elected European Commission – a sacrifice of basic principles of representative democracy on the altar of integration. The rationale of this rule, the key element of what came to be called the Community Method, will be explained in later chapters. A second principle enjoins EU decision-makers to follow, wherever possible, the strategy of the fait accompli – the accomplished fact which makes opposition and public debate useless. This was, according to insiders, Jean Monnet's approach: ‘since the people aren't ready to agree to integration, you have to get on without telling them too much about what is happening’ (Pascal Lamy, cited in Ross 1995: 194).