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In America and Western Europe, legislatures preceded democratization and contributed to the establishment and maintenance of democratic regimes in the late 18th and the 19th centuries. In Central and Eastern Europe in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, legislatures and democratic regimes appeared simultaneously. In the first 15 years of post-Communist transitions in 12 countries, attachments to the new regimes have been influenced by their institutional structures, their economic performance, and their records in protecting human freedom, while attachment to the new parliaments have been predominantly influenced by cultural factors related to early life socialization including education, age, gender, social status, and attitudes toward the former communist regime. Attachment to parliament was a product more than a cause of attachment to the new regimes, but the parliamentary system of government created a context that contributed to citizens’ attachment to their new political institutions. In that respect, attitudes toward parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe played a role similar to the role that these attitudes played in an earlier stage of democratization in Europe and North America, the role of attaching citizens to new political institutions.
This paper illuminates a critical stage of the implementation of European law: the transposition of European Union (EU) directives. Directives must be transposed into national policies in order to give effect to European law, yet most national authorities experience considerable transposition difficulties. For this reason, the study of transposition has become a focal point within the broader research agenda on non-compliance in the European Union. Highlighting several popular explanatory variables but noting the sometimes contradictory results that follow from empirical testing, this paper outlines an approach that views transposition as a process taking place largely within ministerial agencies rather than across government systems. By using variables related to these domestic processes in our empirical analysis, the paper shows how such an approach can help to explain the way in which member states transpose EU directives.
A comparison of two referendum campaigns on Europe in France and Ireland shows two different patterns of mobilisation. Focusing on the perceived influence of the European treaties on national legislation on abortion, two different types of Euro-scepticism can be discerned. One is settled in a potentially universal project of ‘enlightenment’ (fearing the ‘criminalisation’ of abortion due to EU (European Union) regulations), the other is concerned with the defence of the nation’s democratic sovereignty against the EU (and fears ‘liberalisation’ of abortion due to the same EU regulations). A discourse analysis of these two different settings establishes the ‘discursive dynamics’ of each campaign: How were actors constituted (into ‘legitimate’ actors) and how could the (differing) interpretations of EU treaty provisions become plausible and constitute into different national discourses? Instead of perceiving social variables (norms, rules, identities) as ‘independent’ factors that explain outcomes, the social process of their constitution is at the centre of this analysis. Understanding how and when certain actors and certain topics (or problematiques) come into being (are ‘constituted’) may, in turn, allow some ‘reasoned claims’ on the character of popular Euro-scepticism.
During the Danish cartoon controversy, appeals to universal liberal values were often made in ways that marginalized Muslims. An analysis of the controversy reveals that referring to ‘universal values’ can be exclusionary when dominant actors fail to distinguish their own culture’s embodiment of these values from the more abstract ideas. The article suggests that the solution to this problem is not to discard liberal principles but rather to see them in a more deliberative democratic way. This means that we should move from focusing on citizens merely as subjects of law and right holders to seeing them as co-authors of shared legal and moral norms. A main shortcoming of the way in which dominant actors in Denmark responded to the cartoons was exactly that they failed to see the Muslim minority as capable of participating in interpreting and giving shared norms. To avoid self-contradiction, liberal principles and constitutional norms should not be seen as incontestable aspects of democracy but rather as subject to recursive democratic justification and revision by everyone subject to them. Newcomers ought to be able to contribute their specific perspectives in this process of democratically reinterpreting and perfecting the understanding of universalistic norms, and thereby make them fit better to those to whom they apply, as well as rendering them theirs.
This paper discusses the hypothesis that democracy hurts economic growth and development, also known as the Lee thesis, and discusses why one could expect dictatorship to be particularly beneficial for growth in the Asian context. Three general theoretical arguments in support of the Lee thesis are then presented. However, the empirical results, based on panel data analysis on more than 20 Asian countries, do not support the hypothesis that dictatorship increases economic growth in Asia. There is no significant, average effect of democracy on growth. Asian dictatorships do invest a larger fraction of their GDP than democracies, but they are worse at generating high enrollment ratios in education after primary school.
To what extent can the conduct of government officials help make unfavourable decisions acceptable to those that are affected by them? To provide an answer to this under-explored question, this paper presents findings from two scenario experiments that allow the conduct of individual officials to vary according to a pre-determined standard, while keeping an unfavourable decision constant in a setting that approaches the real world. There are three main findings. First, both actual conduct and perceived fairness of treatment affect decision acceptance. Second, actual conduct matters much less for decision acceptance than perceived fairness of treatment. Third, citizens’ beliefs about the moral right to a favourable outcome condition the effect of actual conduct (but not of perceived treatment fairness). In particular, morally disappointed citizens are less likely to accept the decision irrespective of how they are treated.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
The late 1990s saw a major change in the comparative growth performance of Europe and the United States. After the Second World War labour productivity growth in Europe outstripped that of the United States, leading to rapid catch-up. This provided a strong foundation for rapid improvements in the standards of living across the continent. However, since 1995 US labour productivity growth has nearly doubled compared to earlier periods, while European growth rates have declined. The slowing growth and faltering emergence of the knowledge economy in Europe led to an ambitious action programme of the European Commission, called the ‘Lisbon Agenda’, aimed at boosting competitiveness and productivity through innovation. It emphasised the need to increase spending on research and development and higher education, and was combined with the aims of completing the single market, opening up sheltered sectors, improving the climate for business and reforming the labour markets while ensuring growth was environmentally sustainable. The urgency was reinforced in reviews of the Lisbon Agenda, in the Sapir report on economic growth in Europe and in various post-Lisbon strategy debates and conferences (European Commission 2004; Sapir et al. 2004).
The purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive analysis of economic growth in Europe over the past three decades that allows an evaluation of progress in achieving the Lisbon goals.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
In this book we have documented and analysed Europe's productivity performance since the mid 1990s and compared it to growth since the 1970s, as well as to the productivity record of the United States. On both counts, Europe's performance has been disappointing as labour productivity growth has seriously slowed since 1995, while it has accelerated in the United States. In this book we have analysed the determinants of Europe's poor productivity performance using a new database on productivity at the industry level, the EU KLEMS database.
While our findings confirm the established view that the growing role of ICT and continued improvements in human capital are important drivers of labour productivity growth, this appears not to be the main reason that Europe has failed to show faster productivity growth. While there are differences across European countries and between Europe and the USA, ICT investment has become a more important source of growth everywhere, as illustrated in Chapter 3. Slower productivity growth in Europe since the mid 1990s has been mainly related to a slowdown in the efficiency with which labour and capital are used, as measured by multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth. Indeed one key finding of Chapter 2 is that European growth could benefit from exploiting the increased potential for productivity growth in market services. In contrast to earlier suggestions in the literature, services industries such as trade and business services may see rapid labour productivity growth, as evidenced by the US experience.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in more detail the industry origins of growth. This involves analysing how the growth of inputs and MFP of each industry contributes to aggregate value added. Thus we not only look at which industries contribute most to productivity growth but also which industries contribute most to the increased use of ICT and skilled labour. In addition, we will provide analyses based on data for twenty-six detailed industries, rather than for broad sectors as done so far. These yield much richer information on the sources of growth than those in earlier chapters as the latter could miss sizeable within-group heterogeneity. As before, we focus on two areas: the performance of the European Union over the period 1980–2005, and a comparison of the EU with the USA for the 1995–2005 period.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the methodology used to determine industries' contributions to aggregate growth. This is based on the direct aggregation over industries approach, outlined in Jorgenson et al. (2005). Section 5.3 examines labour productivity trends at the industry level and analyses contributions to aggregate productivity growth in the EU and USA. In the following sections this contribution is further dissected. In section 5.4 the contribution of input growth in industries to aggregate growth is determined for ICT capital, non-ICT capital and labour composition separately. Section 5.5 is devoted to the contributions from industry-level multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Economic growth is a key factor in the improvement of our living standards and hence of great interest to academics and policy makers alike. This book aims to explain why growth across Europe has been disappointing since the mid 1990s, both compared to earlier periods and compared to the United States, which showed resurgent growth after 1995. In the process we present the EU KLEMS database, a rich data toolbox that can be used to explore these and other growth-related questions. The main message of this book is that an industry perspective on growth and the sources of growth is essential because of the great diversity in the drivers of growth in agriculture, manufacturing and services industries, including trade, transport, financial, business and personal services.
The empirical study of sources of economic growth has a long tradition in Europe, starting as far back as the seventeenth century when William Petty began to construct measures of economic performance including comparisons of output and productivity in industry, trade and transportation. Over the centuries, with the emergence of standardised national accounts and other internationally comparable statistical sources, the measurement of sources of growth has become more sophisticated. During the second half of the last century, growth accounting evolved as a standard methodology. In 1987, Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni published a pioneering study laying out what has become known as the KLEMS approach.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Until recently, internationally comparable studies of the relationships between skill formation, investment, technological change and growth have been hampered by the lack of a readily available standard database covering a large set of countries. As a result, researchers had often to compile their own databases, making replication and comparability of studies difficult. In our analysis of European growth and productivity in Chapter 2 we made use of a new database which can serve as a useful tool for empirical and theoretical research in the area of economic growth: the EU KLEMS Growth Accounts database. This database includes measures of output and input growth and derived variables such as multi-factor productivity at the industry level. The input measures include various categories of capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), material (M) and service inputs (S). The measures are developed for twenty-five individual European Union member states, the United States and Japan and cover the period from 1970 to 2005. The variables are organised around the growth accounting methodology, a major advantage of which is that it is rooted in neo-classical production theory. It provides a clear conceptual framework within which the interactions among variables can be analysed in an internally consistent way.
The data series, publicly available on www.euklems.net, can be used by researchers employing growth accounting to consider sources of output and productivity growth in cross-country comparisons or studies of particular industries and different time periods, such as discussed in the previous chapters.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
After World War II productivity growth in Europe boomed, providing a strong foundation for rapid improvements in the standards of living across the continent. But since the mid 1990s, Europe has experienced a significant slowdown in productivity growth. Average annual labour productivity growth (measured as GDP per hour worked) in the fifteen countries that constituted the European Union up to 2004 declined from 2.4% in the period 1973–95 to 1.5% in 1995–2006. Conversely, productivity growth in the United States significantly accelerated from an annual average of 1.2% in the period 1973–95 to 2.3% 1995–2006. While the USA was able to reap the benefits of the dawning knowledge economy, the European Union seems to have missed the opportunity to revive economic growth. In this chapter we will argue that there are distinct reasons for the European productivity slowdown and US acceleration since the mid 1990s. Our detailed industry-level analysis reveals that traditional manufacturing and other goods production no longer acted as major engines for the European economy. At the same time, Europe has been slow in taking up the benefits from the knowledge economy. In contrast to the USA, productivity growth in market services has not accelerated. We consider various explanations that are not mutually exclusive. The European growth slowdown might be related to long-term trends in the structure of the economy, such as the increasing demand for low-productive services and a gradual exhaustion of the potential for growth based on catching up in traditional technologies.
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands
Marcel P. Timmer, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Robert Inklaar, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands,Mary O'Mahony, University of Birmingham,Bart van Ark, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands