The paper analyses how perceptions of government quality – in terms of impartiality and efficiency – impact on attitudes to taxes and social spending. It builds on data from the European Social Survey 2008 from 29 European countries. The paper shows a large degree of congruence between expert-based judgments and the general public's perceptions of the quality of government. It also shows that the quality of government has a clear, independent effect on attitudes to taxes and spending, so that people who perceive institutions as efficient and fair want higher taxes and spending. But government quality also conditions the impact of egalitarianism on attitudes to taxes and spending: in high-quality-of-government egalitarianism has a clearly stronger impact on these attitudes. It is concluded that government quality is an important and so far neglected factor in explaining attitudes to welfare policies.

Drawing on the original data collected during a period of university student protest in Greece, we explore whether the expected gains from the act of protesting itself influence an individual's decision to participate in collective action. More particularly, we investigate the extent to which the process incentives qualify the weight individuals attach to the primary elements of the original cost–benefit equation of rational choice theory as well as other considerations in their decision-making process. Our findings point out that the magnitude of the effect of the process incentives is very strong and its inclusion in a rational choice model improves our understanding of students’ participation in protest activities. Turning to indirect effects, we show that process incentives behave as a first stage precondition for the students’ decision to participate in collective action. In the absence of perceived benefits associated with the process of protesting, the importance of attaining the public good becomes much less important in their decision-making process.

Active labor market policies consist of a diverse set of policy tools with which to address joblessness and the degree to which governments invest in various policies as a response to rising unemployment varies widely. Fleshing out the determinants by policy type holds the promise of illuminating more clearly contestation over activation. To this end, this study analyzes the role of partisanship as well as welfare state regimes and the economy on spending patterns. We begin by detailing a theoretical framework for understanding variation in active labor market policies. Bonoli categorizes active labor market policies according to their market orientation and emphasis on human capital investment. In a study of social service reforms, Gingrich explains how all parties employ market-based reforms to empower some groups over others. These theories are then used to derive partisan hypotheses for direct job creation, training, labor market services, and employment incentives. Hypotheses for the four main types of active labor market policies are tested with regression analysis of 22 countries between 1985 and 2008. High spending on direct job creation, a non-market oriented policy type, is marginally significantly higher in the social democratic regime and by left governments prior to the activation turn. Left parties spend significantly more than other parties on training policies and after the activation turn these policies also become a distinct feature of the social democratic welfare state regime. The same trend exists for employment incentives. Center-right parties and those within the Christian democratic regime also spend marginally significantly higher on training policies before the activation turn, which is explained by results for deindustrialization. No partisan or regime effects are found for labor market services, which supports the view that all countries rely on these policies. The literature also suggests that a composite measure masks political conflict since this policy type encompasses diverse policies.