Preface

When we started working on this book in early 2011, the euro crisis was in full swing. At the same time, we had practically no idea whether European integration would remain untouched and how the euro crisis would impact the central theme of this book – namely, the Europeanization of public spheres. Would Europe relapse into various nationalisms, would we see an increased politicization of European affairs (as some hoped and others feared), or would the European Union (EU) evolve into a full-fledged transnational community of communication?

Three years later, when this book went into production, European integration seemed to have survived the attacks of financial markets for the time being, but Southern Europe was still not out of the worst economic crises in decades, experiencing enormous (youth) unemployment. Regarding public spheres, the authors in this book agree that we observe growing politicization of European issues everywhere. However, we do not have consensus on the possible consequences (see, e.g., Chapters 6, 8, 9, and 10 in this volume).

An underlying concern that motivates much normative and empirical research on the Europeanization of public spheres is its crucial importance for democratic decision making. The empirical findings of this book conclude that, indeed, there is evidence of such Europeanization in the form of political contestation about matters European. Several authors point to the present debates surrounding the euro crisis as a particularly illustrative case in point (see Chapter 2). Indeed, the euro debates underscore the need to better understand the intricate conceptual and causal linkages between four different elements of these debates: the nature of these political and quasi-constitutional conflicts; discussions of their causes and solutions in public arenas by elites and citizens; contested democratic standards and ideals; and appeals to the need for a shared European identity, at least for solutions to this and other crises. How should we assess these trends of Europeanization of public spheres? What are their implications for European integration or Euroskepticism, for the prospects of a “European identity,” and for the contours of a more legitimate and democratic European Union (EU)? Specifically, what is the significance for democracy and for the future EU of increased politicization in the sense of contestation in various public spheres among political parties about the European polity and regimes – including the territory and competencies of the EU – as addressed by Risse (see Chapter 6), Pfetsch and Heft (see Chapter 2), and others in this book (see also De Wilde 2011)?

This final chapter considers some of these linkages from the vantage point of democratic theory. Is such contestation about “constitutional” issues as those raised by the euro crisis evidence of regrettable Euroskepticism, which in turn indicates the absence of a European identity (see Chapter 7)? Should a European identity be fostered so as to motivate increased solidarity among EU citizens and their member states – for example, in response to the euro crisis? If so, is such a shared identity best identified as or promoted by a grand project that commands consensus, as European Commission President Barroso recommended (Barroso 2005)? Or is identity better fostered by more contestation?

In this chapter, we link the debate on the emergence of a European public sphere (Wessler et al. 2008; Koopmans and Statham 2010a; Risse 2010) to current transformations of political conflict in Europe and the politicization of the European integration process. Our starting point is the assumption that the transnationalization of public spheres is both an “enabling condition” for the politicization of European Union (EU) politics and its product, as the premise of this book argues. The crucial questions, then, are as follows: Who are the driving forces and beneficiaries of this politicization? Which actors make most effective use of these new discursive opportunities? What are the most likely consequences of this politicization of European integration? Most authors agree that an expansion of the European public sphere and a politicization of the integration process are necessary preconditions for the further development of the EU political system. Normative approaches to European integration assume that politicization will have mainly positive effects on the integration process because it gives cosmopolitan supporters of the “European project” better opportunities to articulate their views and to mobilize European citizens (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Beck 2006; Habermas 2006a, 2011; Beck and Grande 2007; Eder and Trenz 2007). In these arguments, the link between politicization and European integration is crucial, although our knowledge on its constitutive factors, causal relationships, and dynamics is still insufficient. Against this background, this chapter explores empirically the link between politicization and European integration. Based on a dynamic framework of political structuring (Grande and Kriesi 2012), we analyze two factors that have been decisive in shaping this link: (1) the structure of political conflict produced by the recent politicization of the European integration process; and (2) the actors and actor constellations responsible for this structuring of political conflict.

At first glance, the euro crisis has brought out the worst stereotypes in the public spheres that Europeans might imagine about one another. Greek street posters depicted German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a Nazi uniform with the European Union (EU) stars around the swastika. A German news magazine portrayed Aphrodite giving the finger with the title “Crooks in the Euro-Family” (note, however, that the Eurozone is still portrayed as a “family”). Europeans appear to fall back into nationalism and to advocate nationalist responses to the worst crisis the EU has ever faced. It is no wonder, then, that former Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti warned about the “psychological breakup of Europe.” Yet, his warnings represented transnational communication because he made his comments in the German magazine Der Spiegel.

There is no doubt that the euro crisis has politicized European affairs and the EU, probably like no other previous event in the history of European integration. How to respond to the euro crisis is being hotly debated across borders. Austerity programs and stringent budget cuts are being proposed (and imposed on the EU’s southern tier), and others advocate (Keynesian) economic-growth strategies to avoid long-lasting recessions and growing unemployment in the Eurozone. At the same time, public-opinion polls reveal that majorities of Europeans agree that European rather than national solutions to the crisis are the best way and that European integration will increase rather than decrease as a result (European Commission 2011).

If anyone still had any doubt, the euro crisis put the increasing politicization of the European Union (EU) and its policies in plain sight. Research on the Europeanization of public spheres had previously pointed out that if there is a European public sphere deficit, it certainly does not consist of a lack of media attention for European affairs (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2010a). However, high degrees of visibility and politicization alone are not sufficient to provide the communicative underpinnings for a viable European polity. If politicians and institutions in the EU or other member states appear only as targets of claims by domestic actors and never as speakers in their own right, then media consumers will never have a firsthand view of the opinions and arguments of actors beyond their own national boundaries; they will learn only how domestic actors view the outside world. Similarly, if domestic actors never appear as the targets of claims by actors from the European level or other member states, ordinary citizens will never hear the opinions and arguments that prevail among domestic actors in the critical light of opinions from beyond their own national boundaries. If this were the predominant shape that the politicization and increased visibility of European affairs takes, transnational public-opinion formation could not occur, a genuine understanding of the motivations and interests of nondomestic actors could not arise, and – consequently – there would be no basis for transnational consensus formation or solidarity. Politicization of Europe that takes such a nationally centered shape would not advance beyond the preceding era of depoliticized European politics behind closed doors, and it would have destructive rather than constructive impacts on the European project.

Despite the numerous studies about the Europeanization of public spheres that have appeared in recent years, we still lack a reliable answer to the question of the shape that the politicization of European affairs is taking. Is this politicization of the type that is an integral part of domestic politics and, therefore, a healthy sign of a normalization of European public debates? Or does politicization take the parochial shapes previously described and does it threaten rather than support further progress in European integration?

A comprehensive examination of the European public sphere must consider Europeanization from below, of, and by civil society. As Jürgen Habermas argues, civil society has a key role to play in a democratic public sphere: civil society actors at the periphery of the formal political arena have the potential to bring new groups of citizens into the political debate and to highlight problems that may become central to the agenda (Habermas 1996c). If this potential were undermined, it would seriously exacerbate the democratic deficit in the European Union (EU) (Habermas 2006c). This chapter takes stock of the European public sphere with a focus on organized civil society and civil-society actors’ digital communication beyond the mass media.

Earlier studies have found that civil society is weakly represented in the European public sphere, leading to concerns about the lack of broad public engagement or citizen-level political contention. When the capacity of the (national) mass media to employ Europeanized frames and attend to transnational issues or actors is analyzed, the picture that emerges is an issue-driven European sphere in which a few issues or claim makers may reach different national media using similar frames during common periods. However, there is little civil society in this picture: claims are overwhelmingly made by elites who communicate to largely passive audiences. For example, when the European financial crisis erupted in 2010, national papers across the EU were filled with similar pronouncements from various officials, including national leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and EU officials such as the head of the European Central Bank. Civil society tends to be sketched in terms of voters in Greece or demonstrators in Spain, with few concrete authoritative claims attached. Beyond demonstrations and elections, there is little in the way of media characterizations of broader public engagement with the crisis and other policy issues that cut across both EU and national-governance processes. The question is whether civil society engagement in European public spheres is weak in itself or whether it is simply not captured in these analyses of mass-media content. We suggest that part of the answer may be the latter possibility. To analyze civil society dimensions of European public spheres, it makes sense to look beyond the mass media to the increasingly common alternative forms of public communication that civil society actors utilize.