This chapter sets up theoretical framework for the entire book. The effectiveness of China’s own development and its engagements in Africa cannot be plausibly explained by the existing theories on the China Model. Researchers’ efforts to define tenets and patterns of “Beijing Consensus” all fail to grasp the dynamic complexity in practice. By analyzing the implication of Chinese pragmatism in the market reform, this chapter points out that the essence of modern development, in the form of industrial capitalism, lies in shifting from traditional cultural and religious values to the pursuit of sustainable productivity growth. The change of societal targets requires comprehensive sociopolitical transformation to enable sophisticated division of labor and massive market distribution. However, the simultaneous changes of numerous factors in a society tend to create a chicken-egg dilemma, hindering smooth structural transformation. China was able to escape this trap by having the whole country experiment flexibly and gradually to achieve synergism of development. The coevolutionary pragmatism has also been adopted in China’s cooperation with Africa. Aiming at achieving overall economic growth for partners, Chinese government and enterprises do not stick to definite models, but have open attitude to promote commercial practices in Africa’s diverse conditions.

We were seated around a banquet table at a restaurant in the old part of Yangzhou, a canal city northeast of Nanjing, a couple of professors, a labor inspector, and myself. My interview notebook lay largely untouched, as the revolving tray at the center of the table spun around, delivering dishes. The talk focused on the hot topics of the moment – protests in Hong Kong, China’s economic slowdown, but not what I had come to discuss: the state’s supervision of labor relations, particularly in this region, Jiangsu’s portion of the Yangtze River Delta. Then, toward the end of the meal, the labor inspector suddenly launched into a passionate defense of the YRD’s approach to governing workplaces as compared to the region’s competitor further south, the Pearl River Delta. As he put it: “Thinking may be more open in the PRD by several years, may have felt more influence from the West, but there is better management in the YRD. In the north, politics tend to be more important … Things are more balanced” (Group Interview 54). When I asked the inspector about the Jiangsu government’s attitude toward labor civil society in particular, he continued, “In the YRD, the overall capacity to control is stronger than in the PRD – in terms of services provided, in terms of coordination, and in terms of containment” (Group Interview 54).

Chinese investments in Africa’s manufacturing sector are a relatively new phenomenon apart from a few old aid projects. Since 2010, the number of Chinese factories in Africa have grown rapidly for several reasons. Some were attracted by the opportunities in Africa’s market, which has less competition than other regions. Others process the raw materials in Africa to export. Rising labor costs in China also force manufacturers to relocate their production bases to African countries. A major challenge facing the manufacturers in Africa is the limited supply chain. Unable to find upstream and downstream support locally, producers have to look for input and output in foreign countries. The accompanying logistics burden, delay, and financial risks seriously affect factory operations. Stagnating manufacturing sector in turn discourages the investments in upstream and downstream industries, causing a vicious circle. Field research reveals that clustering of numerous small and medium-sized Chinese investors, particularly those targeting at Africa’s local market, fosters linkage between Chinese projects and local economy, facilitating synergetic growth along the value chain. The coevolution of market and production can more effectively contribute to broad sustainable growth of the manufacturing sector in Africa.

Before we can examine the consequences of China’s rising worker resistance, we must explore the recipes for resistance that drive it. Why and how Chinese labor mobilizes have already been the focus of a rich body of literature. In this chapter, I will first very briefly summarize the key characteristics of Chinese industrial relations and then review the scholarship that has been conducted to date, emphasizing how perspectives on workers in China have changed over time, from pessimism to guarded optimism and back again, while highlighting certain key themes in the research, such as extreme exploitation, workplace arrangements that facilitate and frustrate organizing, the unique constraints and opportunities of migrant workers, and concerns over informal and flexible work. Then, I will introduce a fresh typology of different forms of activism distinguished by the varying level of pressure that they bring to bear on the state. Specifically, I will identify certain combinations of demands, tactics, and organizations as contained, boundary-spanning, or transgressive. Next, I will provide evidence that boundary-spanning and transgressive mobilization are on the rise. Strikes, protests, and riots are increasing more quickly than formally adjudicated employment disputes; workers are claiming more than the bare minimum of what Chinese law guarantees them, and new organizations, such as movement-oriented labor NGOs and leftist student networks, are entering the fray.

The previous chapter on the Yangtze River Delta began with a short anecdote concerning a dinner party. The Pearl River Delta, in contrast, requires at least two stories to start things off. The first takes place in a very different setting: the backstreets of Zhongshan, a manufacturing center across the mouth of the Pearl River from Shenzhen and abutting the gambling center of Macau. I made two brief trips to Zhongshan in the spring of 2015. The reason for my trips: employees of a Japanese-owned handbag factory in an outlying district of the city had become frustrated at their low wages and lack of social security contributions and, moreover, were concerned that cutbacks in their work hours might portend layoffs. As they had before when they came up against otherwise unresolvable grievances, the workers responded by going on strike. Unlike in their previous mobilizations, however, the workers were met with a violent crackdown. On my initial visit to the handbag factory, a worker chatting in a convenience store across the street explained to me what happened: “People were beaten … They were beaten by people in military-style uniforms. I don’t know if they were police or mafia. [It happened] when we were all gathered outside, [and] the police and labor bureau people just laughed at us. How can you not do anything for people and then just laugh at them? It was so cruel!” (Interview 60). Nor apparently was it just workers who had been attacked. I read online that NGO activists who had gone to the strikers’ aid were brutalized by plainclothes policemen. One subsequently had to be treated for a lumbar disc protrusion. On my follow-up visit to the factory, workers were streaming out of negotiations with factory management. The discussions had already dragged on a month. But the intimidation continued. The workers pointed out a thuggish individual loitering outside the plant’s gates: “That man with the phone there was responsible for beating people up; he takes revenge on people” (Group Interview 61).

China has a long history of evolving engagements in Africa’s agricultural sector, from establishment of large-scale state farms to technical cooperation and commercial investments. Since 2006, more than twenty agricultural technology demonstration centers have been built in various African countries, aiming to ameliorate knowledge transfer and skill training through sustainable business practices. Although Chinese have constantly modified the operational manners to address problems encountered in the practice, most of the agricultural projects still fail to achieve their expected results. As subsistence farming dominates Africa’s rural area, multiple factors, including immature market mechanism, low productivity, outdated farming behaviors, and politicization of land-related issues, influence each other in an intertwined fashion and hamper effective modernization of the sector. Scattered foreign aid projects and investments can hardly generate substantial and sustainable impacts. The rumors of land grabs proved to be ungrounded and ignorant of the reality. Pilot Chinese enterprises focuses on connecting agricultural production with the development of an industrial value chain in Africa rather than acquiring large pieces of land.