The grain output in China in 1974 was not only, as Robert Michael Field noted in The China Quarterly No. 65, “ far larger than output claimed for any previous year ” ; it was also far larger than the estimates made by most western economists concerned with China. Such observers, believing that agricultural production in China was “ stagnating,” had estimated Chinese grain output for 1974 as being between 255 and 259 million tons. Peking's announcement that 1974 grain output was 274-9 million tons thus set up a contradiction: either those western economists had been far off the mark in their extrapolations of growth or the Chinese figure was somehow misleading. Field opts for the second explanation.

The first part of this article consisted of a documentary analysis of the implementation of land reform in North and South Kiangsu between 1949 and 1952. What emerged most strikingly were the contradictions inherent in the multiple objectives of the institutional changes taking place and the impossibility of disassociating their economic and non-economic consequences. Specifically, the requirements of restoring production in the industrial sector, where many enterprises were under the control of landlords, while simultaneously redistributing landlords' agricultural land and other resources, gave rise to a serious dilemma which was reflected in different policy emphases during the campaign. Even if this dilemma could have been resolved, there remained a further contradiction: between the social and political desirability of allocating the maximum amount of land to the poorest peasants and the economic benefits to be gained from allowing the middle peasants to share in the fruits of expropriation. The situation was also complicated by the need to protect the efficient rich peasant economy, even at the expense of encouraging “capitalist” development.

The unexpected events in China during the spring of this year - the abrupt dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing following his surprisingly rapid return to a position of power, and the accompanying demonstrations, apparently on his behalf, in the streets of Peking - necessitate at least an interim reassessment of political developments in the People's Republic over the course of the last several years. In the pages which follow I shall attempt to summarize domestic political events in China during the period August 1973 through April 1976, incorporating both those events which were made public at the time and those which have been revealed or subjected to re-interpretation subsequent to Teng's dismissal. During this summary and in the section which follows it, I shall review some of the interpretive and analytical literature. dealing with these political events, focusing this review particularly on the question of the appropriate ways to group participants in the political process in China for analytical purposes. In conclusion I shall attempt to explore the ways in which the material critical of Teng suggests that our interpretations of contemporary Chinese politics may need to be revised and our assessments of future trends may require alteration.

A comprehensive analysis of the recent past must start with an understanding of the major, interrelated issues currently confronting China's leaders. These include- a wide range of economic, national security, and cultural concerns. Another key area involves personnel management. Were the officials removed during the Cultural Revolution justly treated or ought their verdicts be reversed? If so, should all officials be returned or just some? And which ones? More generally, should a regular promotion ladder be established, or should young, exuberant but inexperienced cadres continue to be rapidly, promoted, as during 1966–69? Should service in the bureaucracy and exit from it be made more predictable? This essay focuses on vthe origins and implications of these personnel issues. For, while other issues have also been important, crucial points of debate and struggle since 1969 have been over the rehabilitation of cadres who were removed during the Cultural Revolution and over the role to be assigtfcd to those who rose to power at their expense.

The delivery of the eulogy on Premier Chou En-lai by Vice-premier Teng Hsiaa-p'ing at the memorial service held in Peking on 15 January was described by one China-watching correspondent as “ an impressive demonstration that he is now in charge in China,” As is well known, that was the occasion of Teng’s last official appearance – last, this is, unless his career were to take one more unexpected turn. If subsequent developments caught that correspondent by surprise, he had much company – in official as well as in non-official circles. Indeed, well-placed commentators have asserted that on the occasion of his most recent visit to China, Dr Kissinger had been assured on the highest authority that Teng Hsiao-p’ing would remain in power after Chou En-lai’se xpected demise. Dr Kissinger’s trip to China took place in December 1975, the highest authority in China is Mao Tse-tung, and Dr Kissinger had accompanied President Ford on the occasion of his call on Chairman Mao.

This report is based on a visit to Hua-tung people's commune in Kwangtung province. The visit was arranged as part of the programme of the New York State Study Group on Modern China, which travelled in China during July 1973.