1. “Teng Hsiao-p'ing fu-chu-hsi cheng tao-tz'u” (Memorial speech by Vice-chairman Teng Hsiao-p'ing) Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily) (henceforward Jen-min), 16 January 1976, transl. in Peking Review No. 4 (23 January 1976), p. 5.

2. “K'ung-tzu - wan-ku ti wei-hu nu-li-chih ti szu-hsiang-chia” (Confucius - A thinker who stubbornly upheld the slave system), Jen-min, 7 August 1973, transl. in Peking Review, No. 41 (12 October 1973), pp. 5–10.

3. A useful collection of material on Lin Piao's unsuccessful attempt to seize power has been edited by Kau, Michael Y. M.: The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup (White Plains, N.Y.: IASP, 1975), reviewed below at p. 622.Google Scholar

4. Lin's co-conspirators who, together with him, lost their lives in September 1971 were his wife, Yeh Chün, Ch'iu Hui-tso (head of the PLA General Logistics Department), Huang Yung-sheng (air force chief of staff), Li Tso-p'eng (navy political commissar) and Wu Fa-hsien (air force commander). Ch'en Po-ta was criticized beginning in 1970, and Hsieh Fu-chih died in March 1972. The new members included Li Te-sheng, a military commander, Chi T'eng-kuei and Wei g Kuo-ch'ing, both PLA political officers, Wang Tung-hsing, who is believed to head the security forces assigned to the chairman, Ch'en Yung-kuei, head of the much publicized Tachai production brigade, and three local Party figures - Hua Kuo-feng from Hunan, Wu Teh from Peking and Wang Hung-wen from Shanghai.

5. Military figures in the 10th Central Committee numbered some 32% of the total as compared to 44% in the Ninth Central Committee. Mass representatives (local leaders, model workers and the like) constituted some 40% of the new committee as compared to 29% in 1969, and the percentage of women members increased to 13% from 8% in 1969. See Robinson, Thomas W., “China in 1973: Renewed leftism threatens the ‘new course,’” Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 2–5,Google Scholar and Bennett, Gordon A., China's Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions and Central Committees: An Institutional Overview and Comparison (Austin, Texas: Center for Asian Studies, University of Texas, 1974).Google Scholar

6. Documents from the Congress appeared in Jen-min on 31 August, 1 and 2 September 1973 and transl. in Peking Review, Nos. 35–36 (7 September 1973), pp. 5–33.

7. “You-ch'ing chi-hui chu-i ho K'ung-tzu ssu-hsiang” (Right opportunism and Confucian thought), Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), No. 11 (1973), pp. 41–46.Google Scholar

8. Yang Jung-kuo, “K'ung-tzu,” p. 9.

9. “Yuan-tan hsien-tz'u,” (New Year message), Jen-min, Hung-ch'i, Chieh-fang chün pao (Liberation Army Daily) (henceforward Chieh-fang), joint editorial, 1 January 1974, transl in Peking Review No. 1 (4 January 1974) p. 6. Compare particularly the tasks listed here on page 7 with those set forward in Chou En-lai, “Tsai Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti-shih-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao-ta-hui shang ti pao-kao,” (Report to the 10th Party Congress), Jen-min, 1 September 1973, transl. in Peking Review, Nos. 35–36 (7 September 1973) p. 24.

10. Ibid. p. 21. He went on, “Today, in both international and domestic struggle, tendencies may still occur similar to those of the past, namely when there was an alliance with the bourgeoisie, necessary struggles were forgotten and when there was a split with the bourgeoisie, the possibility of an alliance under given conditions was forgotten.”

11. Hung-wen, Wang, “aTsai chung-yang tu-shu-pan ti pao-kao” (Report to a Central Committee study class) (14 January 1975), transl. in Issues & Studies, Vol. XI, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 94–105.Google Scholar

12. The Central Committee document setting out the lines for this literature is Chung-fa 1974, No. 1 and is translated in Issues & Studies, VoL XI, No. 4 (April 1975), pp. 92–114. These lines were publicized in the article, “Kuang-fan shen-ju k'ai-chan p'i-Lin p'i-K'ung ti tou-cheng” (Broaden and deepen the struggle to criticize Lin and Confucius), Hung-ch'i, No. 2 (1974) pp. 5–7,Google Scholar transl. in Peking Review, No. 7 (15 February 1974). See also Chin Chih-pai, “P'i-K'ung ho liangtao ti tou-cheng” (Criticism of Confucius and the two-line struggle), Hung-ch'i, No. 7 (1974), transl. in Peking Review, Nos. 32–33 (9 and 16 August 1974). I have treated the campaign at somewhat greater length in “China in 1974: ‘Weeding through the old to bring forth the new,’” Asian Survey, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 1–12.Google Scholar Other evaluations are found in Thomas W. Robinson, “China in 1973…,” op. cit.; Moody, Peter, “The new anti-Confucius campaign in China: the first round,” Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (April 1974);Google ScholarGungwu, Wang, “Juxtaposing the past and present in China today,” The China Quarterly (henceforward CQ), No. 51 (March 1975), pp. 1–24;CrossRefGoogle ScholarChang, Parris, “The antiLin Piao and Confucius campaign: its meaning and purpose,” Asian Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 10 (October 1974), pp. 871–886;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Merle Goldman, “China's anti Confucian campaign, 1973–74,” CQ, No. 63 (September 1975), pp. 435–462. See also the issue of Chinese Law and Government entitled “Recent developments in China, interpretations by Hong Kong scholars,” edited by Hsu, William, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1974–1975), and the paper by Donald Koblitz, “‘The future is bright, the path tortured’: on the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius ” (unpublished paper, Stanford University, 1975).Google Scholar

13. “Pa p'i-Lin p'i K'ung ti tou-cheng chin-hsing tao-ti” (Carry the struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the end), Jen-min, editorial, 2 February 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 6 (8 February 1974), pp. 5–7.

14. Although the attack on the Italian film maker, Michaelangelo Antonioni, and his film, “China,” its verbal excesses aside, could be taken to have arisen out of a genuine feeling of injury to national pride (see “O-tu ti yung-hsin, pei-lie ti shou-fa” (A vicious motive, despicable tricks), Jen-min commentary, 30 January 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 5 (1 February 1974), pp.7–10), the attacks on Beethoven, Schubert, Respighi and their “absolute” (as opposed to programmatic) music (see the articles of Ch'u Lan transl. in Peking Review, Nos. 9 and 23 (1974)) are considerably more difficult to rationalize without reference to some external motivation.

15. “P'i ‘k'o-chi fu-li’” (Criticize “restraining oneself and restoring the rites”), Jen-min, editorial, 20 February 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 9 (1 March 1974), p. 7.

16. Peking Review, No. 9 (1 March 1974), p. 5.

17. “Ts'ai ‘p'i ‘k'o-chi fu-li,’” Jen-min, editorial, 15 March 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 12 (22 March 1974), p. 5.

18. These February events give belated credence to Robert S. Elegant's assertion three months earlier that the target of articles in Kuang-ming Jih-pao in the late fall “can only be Chou En-lai and his followers.” See Los Angeles Times, 4 November 1973.

19. “Chung-fa 1974,” No. 21, transl. in Issues & Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 101–105.Google Scholar

20. “Tang shih ling-tao i-ch'ieh ti” (The Party exercises overall leadership), Jen-min, editorial, 1 July 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 27 (5 July 1974), p. 8.

21. “Tsai she-hui chu-i ta-tao shang ch'ien-chin” (Forward along the great road of socialism), Jen-min, Hung-ch'i, Chieh-fang, joint editorial, 1 October 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 40 (4 October 1974), p. 14.

22. “Chi-hsü kao-hao p'i-Lin p'i-K'ung” (Continue to do a good job in criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius), Jen-min, editorial, 28 November 1974, transl. in Peking Review, No. 49 (6 December 1974), p. 5.

23. The Times of London dispatch from Peking in New York Times, 17 December 1974.

24. “Yuan-tan hsien-tz'u” (New Year message), Jen-min, Hung-ch'i, Chieh-fang, joint editorial, 1 January 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 1 (3 January 1975), p. 6.

25. Chang's and Chou's speeches were published in Jen-min on 20 and 21 January 1975 and are translated in Peking Review, No. 4 (24 January 1975), pp. 6–25. The passage cited is from Chang's speech and is found on p. 19. Chou's use of the phrase, to which he added “patriotic overseas Chinese and our compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao” as elements of the united front, is found on p. 23.

26. The press communiqué announcing Teng's election was not made public until after the Congress meeting. See Jen-min, 19 January 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 4 (24 January 1975), p. 6.

27. “Mao Tse-tung's talk to ‘liberated cadres’ and ‘Wuhan cadres’: excerpts of an unpublished CCP confidential document,” Issues & Studies, Vol. XI, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 91–93. In this very interesting talk - one of the very few extended sets of his comments we have from the recent periods - Mao appears to be advocating a return to the front-line/second-line division of responsibility with which he had become so frustrated during the years preceding the Cultural Revolution.Google Scholar

28. Chou En-lai, “Cheng-fu kung-tso pao-kao” (Report on the work of the government), Jen-min, 21 January 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 4 (24 January 1975), p. 23.

29. Loc. Cit.

30. “Hsueh-hao wu-ch'an chieh-chi chuan-cheng ti li-lun” (Study well the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat), Jen-min, editorial, 9 February 1975; transl. in Peking Review, No. 7 (14 February 1975), p. 4.

31. Chou, “Chung-fu kung-tso,” p. 23.

32. “Chia-ch'iang Ma-k'o-ssu chu-i ti li-lun tui-wu” (Strengthen the ranks of Marxist theorists), Hung-ch'i commentary, No. 6 (1974), pp. 5–7, transl. in Peking Review, No. 24 (14 June 1974), p. 5; and “Tsai tou-cheng chung p'ei-yang li-lut tui-wu ” (Train a contingent of theoretical workers in struggle), Jen-min, editorial 18 June 1974 transl. in Peking Review, No. 26 (28 June 1974), p. 5.Google Scholar

33. “Hsueh-hao wu-ch'an chieh-chi,” p. 4. The version of the third comment cited here is given in abbreviated form in this editorial and more complete form in Yao Wen-yuan's subsequent article, “Lun Lin Piao fan-tang chi-t'uan ti she-hui chi-ch'u” (On the social basis of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique), Hung ch'i, No. 3 (1975), pp. 20–29, transl. in Peking Review, No. 10 (7 March 1975), pp. 5–10. The fourth quotation appeared in an editor's note to a collection of material entitled “Marx, Engels and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat,” Jen-min, 22 February 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 9 (28 February 1975), pp. 5–12.Google Scholar

34. The term is Marx's, drawn from his Critique of the Gotha Program, in which he describes the inequalities which arise from the fact that, although, individual labourers vary with regard to their productivity they are nonetheless paid equal amounts on the basis of the time they have spent. See Feuer, Lewis S. (ed.), Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), pp. 117–19.Google Scholar Lenin summarized the concept in State and Revolution as follows: “[B]ourgeois right…gives to unequal individuals, in return for unequal (really unequal) amounts of labour, equal amounts of products.” See Connor, James E. (ed.), Lenin on Politics and Revolution: Selected Writings (New York: Pegasus, 1968), p. 223.Google Scholar

35. “Hsueh-hao wu-ch'an chieh-chi.”

36. Starr, , “Conceptual foundations of Mao Tse-tung's theory of continuous revolution,” Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 6 (June 1971), pp. 610–28;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Mao, Tse-tung's theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the pro- letariat: its origins, development and practical implications” (unpublished dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1971), pp. 167–377.Google Scholar

37. Yao Wen-yuan, “Lun Lin Piao,” p. 6.

38. Ibid. p. 9.

39. Ibid. p. 10.

40. Jen-min, 14 July 1975.

41. Charlotte Saikowsky, “China's industrial push - and new hope,” Christian Science Monitor, 10 July 1975. Teng has more recently been somewhat implausibly accused of having exaggerated reports of labour unrest in Hangchow as a means of isolating Mao from contact with members of the Central Committee and the masses - an accusation which implies, presumably, that Mao was residing in Hangchow during the time of the strikes. See Mainichi Daily News, 28 February 1976.

42. These themes are elaborated in the subsequent literature in the campaign. See, for example, Yen, Chi, “Hsien-chih tzu-ch'an chieh-chi fa-ch’üan te ssu-hsiang wu-p'in” (An ideological weapon for restricting bourgeois right), Hung-ch'i, No. 4 (1975), pp. 30–36,Google Scholar transl. in Peking Review, No. 22 (30 May 1975), which relates the campaign to Mao's comments on the control of the bourgeoisie in his speech at the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949. See also Hsiao, Liang and Pin, Lu, “Fundamental charter for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat,” Peking Review, No. 28 (7 July 1975), pp. 10–13, where the campaign was finally linked to the new Constitution, approved six months earlier.Google Scholar

43. “K'ai-chan tui ‘ Shui Hu’ ti p'ing-lun,” Jen-min, editorial, 4 September 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 37 (12 September 1975), p. 7.

44. “Li-shih-hsing ti guang-hui wen-hsien ” (An illustrious historic document), Jen-min, editorial, 20 May 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 21 (23 May 1975), p. 6.

45. The Chinese statement is found in Peking ReviewNo,1 (2 January 1976), p.7. It was noted, however, that despite these friendly gestures the aircraft in question is still referred to by the Chinese as an armed reconnaissance helicopter (the Soviet Union insists that it was a medical aircraft) and that the Chinese announcement of the pilots’ release was preceded and followed by renewed press attacks on Soviet social-imperialism. See Fox Butterfield's dispatch from Hong Kong in New York Times, 30 December 1975.

46. The report, from Taiwan intelligence sources, was carried in Chung-yang jih-pao and was reported upon in Mainichi Daily News, 12 March 1976. One could also interpret Chou's comment as indicating that he regarded the campaign as directed against himself and thus that the “capitulationism”involved referred to China's policy towards the United States, rather than that towards the Soviet Union.

47. “Ch'uan-tang tung-yuan, ta-pan nung-ye, wei p'u-chi Ta-chai hsien erh fentou” (Mobilize the whole Party, make greater efforts to develop agriculture, and strive to build Tachai-type counties throughout the country): summing up report by Hua Kuo-feng at the National Conference on Learning from Tachai in Agriculture, 15 October 1975, Jen-min, 21 October 1975, transl. in Peking Review, No. 44 (31 October 1975).

48. Ibid. p. 9.

49. “Chiao-yü ko-ming ti fang-hsiang pu-jung tsuan-kai” (The orientation of the revolution in education should not be tampered with), Jen-min, 4 December 1975; “Fan-hsiu fang-hsiu te wei-ta ko-ming” (A great revolution to oppose and prevent revisionism), Jen-min, 9 December 1975; and “Kei wei-ta ling-shou Mao chu-hsi te i-feng hsin ” (Letter to our great leader, Chairman Mao), written by the second group of worker-peasant-soldier students at Tsinghua University on 26 December and published in Jen-min, 30 December 1975.

50. See George Biannic's dispatch for Agence France-Presse in Mainichi Daily News, 29 December 1975.

51. “Shih-chieh wu nan-shih, chih yao k'en teng-p'an” (Nothing is hard in this world if you dare to scale the heights), Jen-min, Hung-ch'i, Chieh-fang, joint editorial, 1 December 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 1 (2 January 1976), pp. 8–10.

52. “Chou En-lai t'ung-chih shih-shih” (Comrade Chou En-lai has passed away), obituary notice issued by the CCP Central Committee et al., Jen-min, 9 January 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 3 (16 January 1976), p. 3.

53. Reportage of the funeral service appeared in Jen-min, 16 January 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 4 (23 January 1976).

54. See, for example, Fox Butterfield's dispatch from Hong Kong in New York Times, 26 January 1976.

55. Heng, Chih, “Kua-chin chieh-chi tou-cheng che-ko kang” (Firmly grasp class struggle as the key link), Hung-ch'i, 1 (1976), pp. 9–14, transl. in Peking Review, No. 6 (6 February 1976), pp. 4–7, p. 24.Google Scholar

56. Reuters dispatch from Peking in New York Times, 13 February 1976.

57. “Yao-hai shih fu-p'i tzu-pen chu-yi” (The danger is that of a capitalist restoration), Jen-min, 17 February 1976.

58. “Fan-an pu-te jen-hsin ” (Reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people), Jen-min, editorial, 10 March 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 11 (12 March 1976), p. 4.

59. “Fan you-ching fan-an, tzu kung-ye sheng-ch'an” (Beat back the right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts, promote industrial production), Jen-min, editorial, 23 March 1976, transl in Peking Review, No. 14 (2 April 1976), p. 4.

60. The Reuters dispatch from Peking describing the incident appeared in New York Times, 6 April 1976. Peking's own description of the event appeared in the article, “T'ien-an-men ch'ang ti fan ko-ming cheng-t'ai shih-wu” (Counter revolutionary political incident at T'ien An Men Square), Jen-min, 8 April 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 15 (9 April 1976), p. 4. See also below pp. 661–62.

61. Texts of the resolutions appeared in Jen-min, 8 April 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 15 (9 April 1976), p. 3, and reproduced below on p. 663.

62. See, for example, the editorial “What does the incident at Tien An Men Square show?,” Jen-min, 18 April 1976, transl. in Peking Review, No. 17 (23 April 1976), p. 12, in which it is argued that the demonstrations are a useful negative lesson illustrating that there are bourgeois elements in the Party, that these elements are colluding with counter-revolutionaries in the society at large, and finally, that attempts at counter-revolutionary activity are foredoomed to failure.

63. A pair of articles touching upon recent events exemplify the tendency of which I am speaking here. See Ch'iu K'ung-yüan, “Observation on the power transitions in the CCP,” and T'ieh, Chien, “The Chiang Ch'ing faction and Peiping's military forces,” Issues & Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1 (January 1976), pp. 1–11 and 12–30,Google Scholar and Tsung, Chao, “P'i-Lin p'i-K'ung tsung-heng t'an” (An analysis of the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius), Chung-hua yüeh-pao (China Monthly), No. 702 (March 1974), pp. 33–38,Google Scholar transl. in Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1974–1975), pp. 49–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

64. Scalapino, Robert A., Asia and the Road Ahead (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 56.Google Scholar

65. Andrew J. Nathan, “A factionalism model for CCP politics,” CQ, No. 53 (January—March 1973), pp. 34–66.

66. Yao Wen-yuan, “Lun Lin Piao,” p. 9.

67. “Chiang Ch'ing's address to diplomatic cadres,” Issues & Studies, Vol. IX, No. 7 (July 1975), pp. 91–96.Google Scholar

68. Mainichi Daily News, 8 March 1976.

69. Among the first to engage in this work was Skilling, H. Gordon. See his article, “Group conflict and political change,” in Johnson, Chalmers (ed.), Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 215–34.Google Scholar See also his collection of essays which he edited with Franklyn Griffiths entitled Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971),Google Scholar particularly the article by Griffiths entitled, “A tendency analysis of Soviet policy-making,” pp. 335–78. For applications to China, see Oksenberg, Michael, “Occupational groups in Chinese society and the Cultural Revolution,” in The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968), pp. 1–44;Google ScholarWhitson, William with Huang Chen-hsia, The Chinese High Command: A History of Chinese Military Politics (New York: Praeger, 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Alternative applications are found in William L. Parrish, “Factions in Chinese military politics,” CQ, No. 56 (1973), pp. 667–69; in Harvey Nelson, “Military forces in the Cultural Revolution,” CQ, No. 52 (1972), pp. 444–74; and in Ting, William Pang-yu, “A longitudinal study of Chinese military factionalism, 1947–1973,” Asian Survey, Vol. XV, No. 10 (October 1975), pp. 896–910. See also, Tang Tsou, “Prolegomenon to the study of informal groups in CCP politics,” CQ, No. 65 (March 1976), pp. 98–114; and Nathan's reply on pp. 114–17 of the same issue.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

70. Lieberthal, Kenneth, “China in 1975: The internal political scene,” Problems of Communism, No. 24 (May–June 1975), pp. 1–10.Google Scholar

71. Chalmers Johnson, “Recent developments in Chinese Communist politics and their implications for U.S. foreign policy ” (unpublished paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1975), p. 6 and Appendix, p. 21.

72. Oksenberg, Michel and Goldstein, Steven, “The Chinese political spectrum,” Problems of Communism, No. 23 (March–April 1974), pp. 1–13.Google Scholar

73. Michael Pillsbury, in a comment on Oksenberg and Goldstein's article rejects their basis for group analysis and reaffirms the utility of a clique-based framework as being one which does not “neglect the human element in Chinese politics.” Pillsbury uses Teng as a case in point and suggests that his personal ties derived from his military, Party and governmental experience would have been more important in predicting his behaviour, had he acceded to Chou's position than would be his views towards the relationship between China and the more highly modernized nations of the west. See “Personal ties and factionalism in Peking,” Problems of Communism, No. 24 (March–April 1975).Google Scholar

74. Harding, Harry, “Leadership succession in the People's Republic of China,” in Symposium Proceedings: Perspectives on National Leadership Succession (Washington, D.C.: Mathematica, Inc., 1975), pp. 82–95. His reference is to Griffiths, “A tendency analysis.”Google Scholar

75. Cited in Feng, Yen, “Na-wo tui-li t'ung-yi ti pien-cheng kuan-tien” (Grasp the dialectical concept of the unity of opposites), Hung-ch'i, No. 9 (1975), pp. 47–50, transl. in Peking Review, No. 51 (19 December 1975), pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

76. A much more extensive argument based on this premise is found in Lowell Dittmer, “Theory and practice of ‘line struggle’ in China, 1957–65” (unpublished paper, Convention of the Association for Asian Studies, Toronto, 1976).

77. Chou, “Report to the 10th Party Congress,” p. 25.

78. Nathan, for example, does so. See, “A factionalism model,” p. 53 and p. 59.

79. Oksenberg and Goldstein, “The Chinese political spectrum,” p. 7.

80. Lieberthal, “China in 1975,” p. 8. A related treatment of Mao's position is found in Barnett, Doak, Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era (Washington: Brookings, 1974)Google Scholar and in Chang, Parris H., Power and Policy in China (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975). Barnett treats the military as an interest group as we have defined that term here, but deals with the question of succession to leadership in terms of a concentric circles model with Mao at the centre, a small number of individuals with access to him as the next circle, and so on through the level of the Central Committee (see pp. 185–244).Google Scholar

81. Chalmers Johnson, “Caesarism in China “(Unpublished paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1976).

82. Ibid. p. 14.

83. See, for example, “Wu-ch'an chieh-chi wen-hua ta ko-ming ti chi-hsu ho shen-ju” (The continuing and deepening of the Great Proletarian Revolution), Jen-min, 6 February 1976, transl. in U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the People's Republic of China Press (henceforward, SPRCP), 6036 (18 February 1976), pp. 28–34; Ch'in Huai-wen, “She-chung chu-i shin hsiu-cheng chu-i ti huang-yung shou-fa ” (Eclecticism is a tactic habitually used by revisionism), Jen-min, 8 February 1976, transl. in SPRCP, 6043 (27 February 1976), pp. 146–150; and Peng, Chi, “Eclecticism represents revisionism,” Hung-ch'i, No. 2 (1976), transl. in U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service (PRC), Vol. 1, No. 26 (6 February 1976), pp. E6–E9.Google Scholar

84. Chi Peng, “Eclecticism represents revisionism,” p. 146.

85. A number of “last testaments” attributed to Chou have appeared in the months since his demise. Among them is one in which Chou calls for a termination of the Cultural Revolution. If that testament is genuine, which, because of the circumstances of its publication first in Japan, then in the Soviet Union, I highly believe it is not, then much of my interpretation of Chou's role in his last months must be revised.

86. Mao, “Talk to ‘liberated cadres’,” p. 92.