Until recent years, scholars of modern China had generally assumed that in the Cultural Revolution violence of 1966–68 young people were almost arbitrarily joining one or the other of the opposing Red Guard groups. Only within the past few years have researchers begun to unveil the antagonism among students early in the Cultural Revolution over “class” issues and the resulting differences in the composition, tactics and goals of the Red Guard factions.

Studies on China's birth planning programmes have elicited certain variations and themes of the First Campaign (1954–57) and the Second Campaign (1962–65). Birth planning activities have rarely been reported during the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–69). From my earlier analysis of China's health and population policy it is evident that both the First and the Second Campaigns coincided with the bureaucratic ascendance of the Ministry of Public Health and the dominance of the professional model of health system. However, inadequate organization and co-ordination was evidenced by the lack of one single central agency, either as a supra-agency above the Ministry of Public Health or as a bureau agency under the ministry for birth planning work. In addition, the rationale for birth planning, especially during the Second Campaign, was for maternal and child health alone. Thus, the impact of both campaigns, in demographic terms, was limited.

This paper is intended to serve as a contribution to the study of school textbooks in the People's Republic of China, and, in particular, as a first look at such books since the Cultural Revolution and the death of Chairman Mao Zedong. Because of the nature of the sample it makes no claim to being definitive. But the near-impossibility of obtaining such books abroad and the dominant role they play in the Chinese classroom give the subject some importance.

Dawa Norbu's contribution to these pages (“The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation,” The China Quarterly, No. 77, March 1979, 74–93) bears a significance beyond its purely academic insights and its subsequent expansion of our knowledge of a major event in Sino-Tibetan history. Mr Norbu's presence among the scholarly ranks represents a noteworthy turning-point in the direction the historiography of this field of study is heading and consequently how future scholars will view Sino-Tibetan history. Before commenting directly on his article, I would like to make some observations on the state of the discipline itself.

The People's Republic of China has recently embarked upon a giant programme of modernization, and in the formulation of policies concerning, this industrial development, its leaders have repeatedly stressed the raising of the scientific and technological level of the personnel involved in Chinese industry as a prerequisite to the successful attainment of the desired goals. While the education of scientists and engineers in universities has been the subject of much attention in western studies, the widespread dissemination of scientific and technological information, a fundamental issue in the process of training personnel for industry, has been discussed mainly by the Chinese policy-makers themselves.

No nation begins anew – with or without a political revolution – without building upon and carrying forward selective aspects of an inherited past. Nor for that matter, is any national policy implemented without reference to past experience and accumulated resources. Despite claims of revolutionary transformation and self-sufficiency, no nation has developed a modern medical system either overnight or in isolation.

The notion of a great power triangle composed of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and PRC, and the “card games” played within this geometric configuration, are now particularly prevalent in the field of international politics. It is the purpose of this analysis to study the relevance of the great power triangle concept for Chinese foreign policy. A primary assumption will be that an understanding of Beijing's previous policies in a tripolar system will be a useful guide to the policies and problems of the present. Therefore we will begin with a review of the development of tripolarity and China's past attitudes. We will then concentrate on some crucial aspects of the triangle, the difficulties facing the Chinese leaders, and some possible policy options derived from our focus on the great power triad.