Western economists who are interested in the analysis of the contemporary Chinese economy are currently confronted with challenging analytical tasks arising from two remarkable events. The first is the new post-Mao government's attempt to reform the economic system of centralized, physical planning that characterized the Mao regime in the direction of a system of decentralized and market-orientated planning (referred to as “reform” policy). Side by side with this systemic reform, the previous development policy of high growth and high investment, which gave top priority to heavy industry, is being replaced by a new one which aims at securing a steady increase in personal consumption and in which investment allocation is weighted in favour of light industry and agriculture. Of these new strategies, the latter is already being rigorously put into force (and even accompanied by a drastic deflatory effect), starting with an interim measure to reduce the over-inflated production of heavy industry in favour of raising that of light industry and agriculture (referred to as “adjustment” policy). The former component for the systemic reform of the economy is still at an experimental stage, but Chinese planners and economists appear to be very busy in discussing and preparing even more comprehensive reforms.

At a meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in March 1961, Professor Bernard Morris read a paper on Sino-Soviet relations which began as follows:

Almost a decade ago, the late Franz Borkenau wrote that a profound conflict between the communist regimes of Russia and China is in the long run as certain as anything in politics. He based his prediction on the strength of two arguments. First, it is in the very nature of totalitarian regimes to establish their absolute control as far as they can; they therefore cannot have genuine allies but must seek to dominate. Secondly, the unity of the communist world movement is axiomatic for every Leninist. Hence it follows that the Kremlin must exert control over all communist parties. This thrust of Soviet totalitarianism, Borkenau argued, is therefore incompatible with Mao Tse-tung's clear desire to be a leader in his own right and to preserve Chinese national independence.

It is difficult to be objective about the Cultural Revolution. Difficulties were encountered during the event itself (which is variously defined as the years 1966–69 or, less usefully, the whole period 1966–76) by its proponents and its victims. With the reversal of the political fortunes of the victims, objectivity seemed even more unlikely. But as 1976 (or 1969) moved further into the past, even in China a more measured assessment of the significance of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath began to be made at all levels (both official and unofficial) of the political public.