In the course of the development of Hong Kong from an over-populated refuge to an international city of state dimensions, its government and political institutions have seldom been the object of detailed analysis by outside observers. One explanation may be that hitherto foreigners have been interested mainly in the performance of the economy to the exclusion of other considerations; now that external factors are influencing the internal affairs of Hong Kong and affecting prospects for growth, the local reaction to the possibility of hard times may be carefully scrutinized. Another, equally plausible, explanation is that since the government is colonial in style with no political parties mutually contesting at regular intervals to form a new administration, the political scene lacks the punctuation marks which would stimulate outside interest. Further consideration of this latter feature suggests that while senior civil servants and appointed representatives may govern impeccably they perforce avoid public debate, and in their public appearances are in any case no substitute for the charismatic leader when it comes to attracting foreign attention. At home, the Government of Hong Kong and its political institutions do not escape scrutiny so easily. Both universities have scholars working in this field and vigorous popular comment and debate is a daily characteristic of the mass media. From a local vantage point, contrary to what may be the view from abroad of an unchanging government and political institutions, significant changes have taken place as Hong Kong has undergone rapid physical development. Although they are changes within an established tradition of government, and do not therefore constitute a fundamental reform, they represent an important advance in community involvement in the administration of Hong Kong.

Uncertainty about Hong Kong's future has been aggravated by lack of precedent. When before has there been an established date of termination of colonial rule set by treaty? Even more confounding is that the history of the Crown Colony provides so little guidance as to its future. The usual practice in facing uncertainty is to look to the past to chart trends, identify propensities and make projections. All of these standard methods are, however, to no avail with respect to the future of Hong Kong. We are left to the mercy of that purported ancient Chinese saying, “Prediction is exceedingly difficult, especially with respect to the future.”

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began with the publication of Yao Wenyuan's article, “Comment on the new historical play ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’,” which alluded to Chairman Mao's summary dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai six years earlier. The article first appeared in the 10 November 1965 issue of the Shanghai Wen Hui Daily under Chairman Mao's personal direction through the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. The curious unrolling of the Cultural Revolution during the subsequent three years through the consolidating Ninth Party Congress in the spring of 1969, exhibited three essential characteristics: first of all, an unprecedented increase in proselytizing for the Thought of Mao Zedong; secondly, an unprecedented leftist purging of the majority of the Politburo and Central Committee leadership; and finally, an unprecedented infusion of outside youth and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army to fill the vacated leadership posts.

The year 1982 was marked by repeated signs of Soviet interest in improving relations with China. Negotiations to chart a new course in the relationship between these two countries finally began in October. While the fate of these negotiations remained uncertain at the time this article was being written, the onus was largely on the Soviet leaders to show that they were capable of the sort of flexibility that the Nixon Republicans had demonstrated barely a decade earlier in wooing the Chinese. The Sino-Soviet talks provided a test of Soviet tolerance for diversity in international communism and of willingness to take tangible steps towards demilitarization. They also raised questions about the internal process of evaluating conditions in other countries, reporting on them to the Soviet people, and advising leaders on their significance. After 20 years of negative assessments of communist policies in China, what basis could be found for an optimistic outlook in 1982? In the six years after Mao's death what was the role of Moscow's China-watchers in preparing the way for overtures to China's leaders? This article examines the background behind the Soviet initiative of 1982 and the different outlooks found among China specialists.