Like opening Pandora's box, Chinese reforms have unleashed institutional and social forces which have led to a variety of production regimes co-existing under the permissive banner of “market socialism.” The industrial scene of Guangdong, which boasts of itself as one of the first, the most and the best reformed provincial economies, bears witness to the profound and wide-ranging transformation in production politics. Compared to the era of state socialism, a restructuring of industrial employment has evidently occurred. The 740 state-owned industrial enterprises in Guangzhou, for instance, now account for only 15 per cent of a total of 4,903 industrial establishments, and the 307,000 employees in the state industrial sector account for one-third of the city's 940,000-strong industrial workforce. Twenty-one per cent and 46 per cent of all industrial employees are found respectively in 2,005 collective enterprises and 2,158 private, foreign and joint ventures. As recently as 1985, the state industrial sector was still dominant, employing 65 per cent of the city's industrial workforce, and producing 68 per cent of industrial output. The composition of the work force has also significantly changed: among the 2.03 million urban (including non-industrial) employees in Guangzhou, 700,000 are “registered” migrant workers, of whom 280,000 work in state and collective enterprises. For the province as a whole, registered migrant workers numbered 3.6 million in 1996, while a generally-accepted estimate for the entire migrant labour population reached a staggering 11 million. In the pre-reform days, this massive pool of rural labour was sequestered in the countryside by the hukou system and the number of those who found employment in state factories as temporary contract workers was estimated to be only about 6 per cent of all employees in urban state enterprises by 1978. Complexity is further induced by a new round of deepening reform measures in the 1990s, targeting enterprise ownership, scientific management and labour laws.

Human capital refers to the skills, knowledge and values that individuals acquire in formal schooling, in the workplace and in other settings that raise their productive capacity. In an increasingly global economy, investment in human capital is seen as one of the major strategies for enhancing the economic competitiveness of firms and nations and a major factor in determining the extent of economic polarization among social groups and nations.

Proponents of Western-style democracy greeted the Chinese “Democracy Movement” of 1989 with great hope and anticipation. Yet the brutal end of this wave of political protest left many in despair. The rulers of the Chinese Communist Party had made it painfully clear that they would not tolerate any movement or organization which posed a threat to their political control. At the same time, however, observers and analysts also began to question the wisdom and effectiveness of the student protesters who had participated in the movement. Perhaps, many wondered, the students' behaviour had also contributed to the movement's unfortunate finale. In particular, many noted the students' disorganization, lack of respect for democratic procedures and inability to present a united position to the government. In addition, some remarked that the students' exclusive, non-integrative mobilization strategy may have weakened their ability to successfully put pressure on the government.

During the 1980s market reforms proceeded more slowly in Shanghai than in other Chinese coastal cities. Bureaucratic procedures had continued to determine employment conditions and few city residents assumed the risks of entrepreneurship. The pace of marketization quickened in the early nineties and, between 1990 and 1995, the percentage of Shanghainese working outside the state or collective sectors grew by a factor of ten. For the first time since the launching of the economic reforms, private sector activity approached parity with Guangzhou (see Table 1).

To the extent that China's population size or population growth rate causes environmental destruction, such damage has already been done over the last several centuries, especially in the most recent 50 years. The impacts of China's large population and continuing population increase are basically irreversible in the medium-term. But in the coming decades, the relatively low PRC population growth rate will be a minor continuing environmental problem. Other environmental effects associated with population will be twofold. First, China's current age structure is strongly skewed toward the working age groups, and the population aged between 15 and 64 will increase dramatically in the coming decade. This contributes to huge unmet current and future demand for employment. Because the legitimacy of the PRC government depends in part on its success in generating jobs, it will continue to endeavour to meet the challenge of employment generation. This imperative, aggravated by the age structure changes, can be expected to take precedence over environmental considerations where these goals conflict. Secondly, the rising living standards of China's population will contribute to further environmental deterioration. When an enormous population rapidly multiplies its per capita income, the impacts can be massive and ecologically destabilizing.

Success in agriculture depends on many factors embracing the natural environment, economic and demographic policy, institutions and technology. China's agricultural resource endowment has long encouraged reliance on land-intensive methods to raise farm outputs. Indeed, the record of agricultural growth in China since 1978 is most remarkable for the overwhelming debt it owes to increases in yields per hectare.

In the post-Mao era, one highly significant dimension of China's official programme of reform and integration into the international economy has been a commitment to legal construction. This commitment has included a sustained effort to fashion a basic corpus of environmental protection law alongside supportive institutions, administrative norms and policies, in order to create a “basic legal system of environmental protection” (huanjing baohu de jiben falii zhidu).' In the eyes of the authorities in the People's Republic of China, such efforts reflect a degree of environmental concern that is unusually strong for a developing society.2 China's achievements, we are often told, must be placed in the context of the considerable difficulties the PRC faces in terms of the pressing need to raise living standards, a serious problem of over-population, a shortage of natural resources, an outdated industrial infrastructure and poor industrial management.3 Of course, viewed comparatively, the PRC's embrace of environmental protection law was somewhat belated,4 only properly commencing after its participation in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm. The subsequent expansion of environmental legislation and enforcement has been some-what erratic. Nevertheless, there appears to be a continuing intent to fashion a substantial body of environmental law, and concern with the construction and revision of this was further enhanced by China's participation in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro. Following this, Premier Li Peng “made a commitment to conscientiously implement resolutions adopted at the Conference”5 and, given the PRC's very substantial size and population, a positive embrace of internationally acceptable standards of environmental welfare is highly significant for future global environmental protection. This article examines the principal features and significance of the PRC's domestic environmental protection law, and considers briefly the implications of the Chinese approach to environmental law for understanding the development of law more generally in post-Mao China.