1. See for example, Richard Louis, Edmonds, Patterns of China's Lost Harmony: A Survey of the Country's Environmental Degradation and Protection (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 188–190.Google Scholar

2. Although we recognize the critical constraint imposed by water shortages in China, we have deliberately chosen not to focus on this issue, since it is examined in detail elsewhere in this volume. The most recent apocalyptic prediction for water shortages in China is that of Lester R., Brown and Brian, Halweil, “China's water shortage could shake world food security,” World Watch (1998), pp. 10–18.Google Scholar

3. “The role of sustainable agriculture in China: environmentally sound development,” Seventh Report for the Fifth Conference of the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development (CCICED) presented in Shanghai, 23–25 09 1996, p. 3 suggests that the current rate of land losses would, if continued unchecked, result in a 10% reduction in arable area by 2045.Google Scholar

4. In the words of a famous slogan which still enjoys wide currency in China, “agriculture is the foundation of the economy; grain is the basis of that foundation.”Google Scholar

5. Ministry of Agriculture (Planning Department), Nongye jingji ziliao, 1949–83 (Materials on the Agricultural Economy, 1949–83) (no publisher: internal document), p. 120.Google Scholar

6. Problems of statistical analysis and interpretation make it difficult to set this figure in its historical context. One perspective is provided by an authoritative estimate, indicating a total “mainland” arable area of 102.25 million hectares in 1933. (Ta-Chung, Liu and Kung-Chia, Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development, 1933–1959 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965)Google Scholar, p. 129). For other estimates of arable area in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see Xu, Daofu (ed.), Zhongguo jindai nongye shengchan ji maoyi tongji ziliao (Statistical Materials on Agricultural Production and Trade in Modern China) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), especially ch. 1.Google Scholar

7. Ministry of Agriculture (Planning Department), Materials on the Agricultural Economy, 1949–83, p. 120. Note that increases in areas under paddy and dry crops shared in the arable land expansion between 1949 and 1957Google Scholar (Ibid).

8. Ibid

9. Official Chinese statistics suggest that increases in arable area have been recorded in eight out of 39 years (1958–1996): 1960, 1964–1965, 1978–1979, 1990 and 1995–1996 (Ibid and Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo nongye fazhan baogao (China Agricultural Development Report) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe), 1995, p. 179; 1996, p. 179; 1997, p. 111.Google Scholar

10. The institutional framework within which land is used has also changed dramatically since 1978. At the end of the Mao period (1976), 5% of the total arable area was stated-owned, 6% was absorbed by peasants' private plots (ziliudi) and 89% was collectively-owned and collectively-worked (Ministry of Agriculture (Planning Department), Materials on the Agricultural Economy, 1949–83, p. 122). By the mid-1980s, the disbanding of the collective sector and its replacement by household-based farming via production responsibility systems had laid the foundation for a much greater degree of autonomous farm decision-making (including land use), albeit practised in the context of predominantly collective land ownership.Google Scholar

11. In net terms, the level of arable land loss in 1986 remains worse than in any other year, except 1985, since 1978. Indeed, the extent of such losses in 1985 and 1986 combined was almost as great as during the previous five years.Google Scholar

12. Most notably, in the south-east (Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan), where in contrast to the loss of over 200,00 hectares in the previous four years, 1995–1996 saw the disappearance of a mere 3,270 hectares (data from Ministry of Agriculture, Zhongguo nongye nianjian (Chinese Agricultural Yearbook) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe), various issues).Google Scholar

13. Some 2.5 million hectares of arable land disappeared during 1981–1985; a further 1.2 during the second half of the decadeGoogle Scholar

14. The regional breakdown used in this paper is as follows: north-east [NE]: Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang; north [N]: Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Beijing, Tianjin; centre-east [CE]: Hunan, Hubei Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Shanghai; south-east [SE]: Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan; south-west [SW]: Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet; and north-west [NW]: Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang.Google Scholar

15. In 1995–1996, the north and centre-east accounted for 86% of the gross decline in national arable area.Google Scholar

16. Until 1984, centre-eastern provinces contributed the biggest share of incremental grain production throughout China. See Ash, Robert F., “Grain self-sufficiency in mainland China: a continuing imperative,” in Ash, Robert F., Richard Louis, Edmonds and Yu-ming, Shaw (eds.), Perspectives on Contemporary China in Transition (Taipei: National Chengchi University, Institute of International Relations, 1997), p. 62.Google Scholar

17. In terms of crop value-output per hectare of arable land in 1996, centre-east China (20,796 yuan) was second only to the south-east (26,844 yuan). The national figure was 14,340 yuan, while that for north China was 13,875 yuan (estimates derived from Guojia tongjiju (State Statistical Bureau), Zhongguo tongji nianjian (Chinese Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Tongji chubanshe, 1997), p. 369; and Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 1997, p. 287.).Google Scholar

18. With 12% of China's arable area, the south-west was responsible for 14% of those losses.Google Scholar

19. We also are aware that some abandoned cultivated land was marginal agricultural land.Google Scholar

20. In a personal communication, James Harkness rightly warns against merely assuming that new additions to farmland in recent years have been uniformly low-quality. Even in the north-west, government and multilateral donor investment in major projects has facilitated the reclamation of high-quality irrigated land. For a discussion of contradictions in irrigated land statistics see Nickum, James E., Dam Lies and Other Statistics: Taking Measure of Irrigation in China 1931–91 (Honolulu: East-West Center Occasional Paper, 1995).Google Scholar

21. On this question, see also Hou, Jiandanet al. (eds.), Zhongguo gengdi dijian wenti de shuliang jingji fenxi (An Economic Analysis of the Progressive Decline in the Amount of China's Arable Land) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1992)Google Scholar, especially ch. 2; Ziping Wu and Alan W. Kirke, Farmland in China: Quantity, Quality and Potential (mimeo); Crook, Frederick W., “Underreporting of China's cultivated land area: implications for world agricultural trade,” in United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), International Agriculture and Trade Reports: China (Washington, DC: USDA, Economic Research Service, 07 1993), pp. 33–39; Edmonds, Patterns of China's Lost Harmony, p. 42 et passim.Google Scholar

22. The first survey of rural industrial pollution was undertaken in Shandong in 1989.Google Scholar

23. For example, Wu and Kirke note that the area of ridges and roads accounted for 11.7% of the national cultivated area, as measured by the National General Land Census (1985).Google Scholar

24. Lack of data makes it impossible to include detailed information for years before 1985 and explains the periodization used in the table.Google Scholar

25. A further 300,000 hectares were lost to the same source during 1980–1984 (Ministry of Agriculture, China Agricultural Development Report 1997, p. 100).Google Scholar

26. By way of comparison, during 1972–1974 (the only years for which we have found such data) basic capital construction by the state and by commune and brigade authorities accounted for about 35% of arable land loss. See Ministry of Agriculture (Planning Department), Materials on the Agricultural Economy, 1949–83, p. 121.Google Scholar

27. On the basis of production growth estimates for 1984–1995, a recent report by the World Bank (At China's Table: Food Security Options (Washington: World Bank, 1997), p. 14), takes the view that the effect of natural disasters on rice production in southern China and corn production in the north has been less serious than that of changes in input-output prices and labour prices. The dynamic multi-sector output response model employed by the World Bank suggested that for corn production in north China, erosion-salinization was a more significant negative factor influencing growth than natural disasters, whereas the reverse was true for rice production in southern China. It is a pity that the World Bank report provides no details of how this model was constructed nor how these conclusions were reached.Google Scholar

28. As Table 9 shows, this impressive record owes most to improvements made in the second half of the 1980s. They no doubt contributed significantly to the role of the north-east as a major source of national incremental grain production during this period.Google Scholar

29. Kueh, Y. Y., Agricultural Instability in China, 1931–1991: Weather, Technology, and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995)Google Scholar, p. 112, draws attention to the differentiation, in Chinese disaster data, between shouzai (“covered”) and chengzai (“calamitously affected”). Chengzai refers to agricultural land which has lost 30% or more of its crop and is included within the larger shouzai category. Kueh weights the chengzai category as averaging 60% crop loss and the shouzai area minus the chengzai area category as averaging 15% crop loss. Huang, Jikun and Scott, Rozelle (“Environmental stress and grain yields in China,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, No. 77 (1995), pp. 856–57) found that there was an increase in the area classified as yilao (“easily flooded and drought damaged”) during the late 1980s. Yilao means that an area cannot withstand floods or drought with a frequency of once in three years without suffering a reduction in yield.Google Scholar

30. The minor role played by state and (especially) village construction as a source of land loss in the south-east is at first glance surprising. Part of the explanation may lie in the activities of overseas entrepreneurs in parts of south-east China and it would be interesting to know how much farmland has disappeared in Guangdong under the impact of the cross-border re-siting of Hong Kong and Macau factories and associated developments.Google Scholar

31. By contrast, information on the immediate impact of such disasters on sown area is readily available in Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook and State Statistical Bureau, Chinese Statistical Yearbook. A valuable compendium is State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo zaixing baogao, 1949–1995 (Report of Disasters in China, 1949–1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995).Google Scholar

32. This figure is significantly smaller than what would appear to be the corresponding figure shown in Table 7. Part of the explanation may lie in different sources that have been used in order to compile the two tables. A more important factor is likely to be that the contribution of “structural adjustment,” as revealed by Table 7, includes land converted to fishponds, whereas such land transfers are captured in the residual (under “other”) in Table 11.Google Scholar

33. Vaclav Smil cites data showing that between 1987 and 1995, 59% of national arable land loss resulted from conversion to forest, pastures, orchards and ponds (“China's agricultural land,” mimco).Google Scholar

34. Recent studies in English include: Lester, Brown, Who will Feed China? Wake-up Call for a Small Planet (London: Earthscan, 1994)Google Scholar; Vaclav, Smil, “Who will feed China?” Perspectives on the Long-Term Global Food Situation, No. 2 (1996), pp 1–8; Dawn Stover, “The coming food crisis,” Popular Science (08 1996), pp. 49–54; and Fan Shenggen and Mercedita Agcaoili-Sombilla, “Why do projections on China's future food supply and demand differ?” (Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute, Environment and Production Technology Division Working Paper 22, 1997).Google Scholar

35. Brown, Who will Feed China? especially ch. 4.Google Scholar

36. For such reasons, Smil has argued that fishponds and orchards ought to be included as part of China's farmland total (see Smil, “China's agricultural land”).Google Scholar

37. A point ignored in this paragraph concerns the quality of land lost to, and newly brought under cultivation.Google Scholar

38. By contrast, the north, containing a quarter of all arable land, accounted for less than 5% of newly-added land during the same period.Google Scholar

39. In 1995, cropping GVO per arable hectare was 7,520 yuan – 53% of the national level (data derived from State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook 1996, p. 369; Ministry of Agriculture, China Agricultural Development Report, 1995, p. 1 and 1996, p. 1; and regional arable area estimates, as given in Appendix Table A).Google Scholar

40. In terms of cropping GVO per arable hectare.Google Scholar

41. Note too that only in the north-east and north-west did state-sponsored reclamation contribute more than marginally to total reclamation. Relevant data can be found in Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook, as detailed in the sources to Table 10.Google Scholar

42. See Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook, p. 299.Google Scholar

43. In 1957, the total sown area was 157.24 million hectares. Sown area time series data are available in Ministry of Agricultural (Planning Department), Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan (1949–86) (A Compendium of Chinese Rural Economic Statistics, 1949–86) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989), p. 130.Google Scholar

44. The multiple cropping index is a measure of the extent to which a piece of arable land can be used in order to raise more than one crop in a year. Sown area differs from arable area by the extent to which such multiple cropping is practised.Google Scholar

45. See Walker, Kenneth R., “Trends in crop production” in Kueh, Y. Y. and Ash, Robert F. (eds.), Trends in Chinese Agriculture: The Impact of Post-Mao Reforms (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993). esp. pp. 162–67Google Scholar; and Ash, R. F., “Agricultural reform since 1978,”Google Scholar in Ash, R. F. and Kueh, Y. Y., The Chinese Economy Under Deng Xiaoping (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), pp. 77–82.Google Scholar

46. In the first half of the 1980s, only the north and south-west experienced increases in the multiple cropping index.Google Scholar

47. The single, marginal exception to this trend was the north-east. Consideration of the regional dimension of changes during the early post-1978 years is provided by Ash (see “Agricultural reform since 1978,” p. 78).Google Scholar

48. It has been argued that in the early 1980s, higher costs associated with high multiple cropping indices had an adverse effect on farm incomes and incentives – such factors encouraging a reduction in the multiple cropped areaGoogle Scholar (see Ash, Ibid).

49. Chemical fertilizer use has more than quadrupled since 1978, whereas irrigated area has expanded by 7.8%.Google Scholar

50. In the mid-1980s, a multiple cropping index of 156% to 158% was considered optimal. In their projections for the 1990s, studies carried out under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences anticipated the re-establishment of a MCI at the 1977 level of 155: see “Woguo liangshi he jingji zuowu de fazhan” (“A study of the development of food grains and economic crops in China”), in Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Research Group for the Development of Food, Grains and Economic, Crops, Zhongguo nongcun fazhan zhanlüe wenti (Strategic Issues Relating to China's Rural Development) (Beijing: Nongye kexue chubanshe, 1985), p. 395.Google Scholar

51. Relevant data can be found in State Statistical Bureau, Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1997, pp. 380–82.Google Scholar

52. Huang, and Rozelle, , “Environmental stress and grain yields,” pp. 860–61Google Scholar. They suggest that “[e]nvironmental degradation may have cost China as much as six million metric tons per year during the late 1980s.” Remedial measures proposed by Huang and Rozelle include continued research into new techniques and the possibility of new labour mobilization schemes. The latter suggestion seems to be echoed in the massive afforestation projects of the 1990s. A literature is also emerging which suggests that the reforms of the 1980s have sped up environmental degradation of agricultural land. For example, see Muldavin, Joshua S. S., “The political ecology of agrarian reform in China: the case of Heilongjiang province,” in Richard, Peet and Watts, Michael J. (eds.), Liberation Ecologies (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 227–259Google Scholar; Muldavin, Joshua S. S., “Impact of reform of environmental sustainability in rural China,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1996), pp. 289–321;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Richard, Smith, “Creative destruction: capitalist development and China's environment,” New Left Review, No. 222 (1997), pp. 3–39.Google Scholar

53. The figure is taken from “The role of sustainable agriculture in China,” p. 10. See Table 20 for revised arable area. The “Strategy and Action Project for Chinese and Global Food Security: Final Report of the February 18–19, 1998 Working Meeting” (Washington, DC: unpublished draft report of 21 April 1998, p. 14), points to a much worse situation in its suggestion that 163 million hectares are affected by water erosion (especially in eastern China and in Sichuan) and 122 million hectares affected by wind erosion We share the cautionary note struck in the draft report – notably so in the case of wind erosion – to distinguish between human-induced and “natural” erosion.Google Scholar

54. Note, however, that the estimates provide no measure of the extent to which each factor reduces agricultural productivity. It would, for example, be wrong to assume that erosion has caused more yield reduction than pollution.Google Scholar

55. In a survey of the 287 counties and municipalities conducted in 1985, Huang Zhanbin and Zhang Ximei found that average grain yields on the Loess Plateau were 4,470 kg per hectare (298 kg per mu) compared with a national average of 5,460 kg per hectare (364 kg per mu). Counties on the Plateau with low yields (below 3,000 kg per hectare or 200 kg per mu) were concentrated in the hilly, eroded central portion (“Huangtu gaoyuan diqu zhuyao zuowu shengchanli ji tigao tujing de chubu fenxi” (“Preliminary analysis of productivity and realization approaches of main grain crops on the Loess Plateau”), Xibei shuitu baochi yanjiu jikan (North-west Soil Erosion Research Quarterly), Vol. 10 (1989), p. 168). It is significant that virtually all cultivation was on land with a slope of more than 10 degrees. Li, J. and Cheng, K. (“The erosion process in the middle and upper reaches of the Yangtze River,” International Association of Hydrological Science Publication: Erosion and Sedimentation in the Pacific Rim, No. 165 (1987), p. 486), cite an investigation based on north-east Guizhou along the Wu River, which indicated that farming on slopes of 30–35 degrees resulted in all the topsoil being washed away within five or six years.Google Scholar

56. See Appendix Table C. The view expressed here is shared by Scott, Rozelle, Huang, Jikun and Zhang, Linxiu, “Poverty, population and environmental degradation in China,” Food Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1997), pp. 233–34.Google Scholar

57. “The role of sustainable agriculture in China,” p. 10.Google Scholar

58. Bi, Yuyun, Zhongguo gengdi (China's Cultivated Land) (Beijing, Zhongguo nongye chubanshe, 1995), p. 129.Google Scholar

59. In theory, topsoil can wash down from slopes and have a positive impact upon lowland soil fertility. Equally, poor quality soil can wash down and have a negative impact. “The Strategy and Action Project for Chinese and Global Food Security” points out that half of all wind erosion causes a loss of topsoil, whereas 43% causes terrain deformation (p. 14).Google Scholar

60. Lindert, Peter H., Joann, Lu and Wu, Wanli, “Trends in the soil chemistry of south china since the 1930s,” Soil Science, Vol. 161, No. 5 (1996), pp. 339–340CrossRefGoogle Scholar suggest that losses of topsoil do not directly correspond to reductions in organic matter levels nor amounts of nitrogen, phosphorous or potassium in soils in China's rice growing regions between 1930 and 1980. They propose that increases in cropping intensity could be more important. Similarly the same authors found that during the same period, changes in organic matter and total nitrogen levels showed no significant trend in north China. Total levels of phosphorus and potassium appear to have increased significantly except in the Shaanxi-Shanxi winter wheat and millet region. (See “Trends in the soil chemistry of north China since the 1930s,” Journal of Environmental Quality, Vol 25, No. 4 (1996), pp. 1168–1178.) The authors again express doubts about the impact of erosion upon cultivated soil fertility loss. Goder van Lynden's report is summarized in “The Strategy and Action Project for Chinese and Global Food Security,” pp. 14–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

61. Huang and Rozelle, “Environmental stress and grain yields,” p. 856.Google Scholar

62. Huang, Jikun, Mark, W. Rosegrant and Scott Rozelle, “Public investment, technological change and reform: a comprehensive accounting of Chinese agricultural growth,” working paper (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1996) as reported in Rozelle, Huang, and Zhang, “Poverty, population and environmental degradation in China,” p. 235.Google Scholar

63. Chang, William Y. B., “Human population, modernization, and the changing face of China's eastern Pacific lowlands,” China Exchange News, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1990)Google Scholar, p. 4, estimated the damage to be 10,000 million tonnes per annum with a loss of fertility equal to about 80,000,000 tonnes of chemical fertilizers. Bi Yuyun (China's Cultivated Land, p. 128) gives a figure of 40 million tonnes of nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium equivalent lost through soil erosion annually. For more on general erosion conditions see Edmonds, Patterns of China's Lost Harmony, pp. 62–72. While erosion levels have remained lower in the Chang River valley and the south in general compared to, say, the Loess Plateau, the soil layer above bedrock in much of the Sichuan Basin is very thin (less than 20 centimetres) and the red soil hilly region of south China centred on Jiangxi also has particularly serious erosion problems. Soil erosion in the exposed red soil hills causes a serious loss of nutrients – in particular nitrogen (277.94 kg per hectare) and phosphorus (2.981 kg per hectare). In the mid-1990s, China started the second phase of a red soil reclamation programme with a total investment of 2,500 million yuan which included a World Bank loan. According to “Unproductive red soil reclaimed,” Beijing Review, Vol. 39, No. 51 (1996), p. 27, over 58,000 hectares of red soil land are to be reclaimed, but not all of it will be used for agriculture since forestry, animal husbandry and fishpond development are also part of the plan. In the mountainous areas of the south-east, the outwash of boulders and debris from the mountains has affected the agricultural potential of existing farmland. Although generally not a problem, erosion in the north-east can be quite serious in the spring and summer if melting snow is accompanied by heavy rain and examples of serious erosion already exist.Google Scholar

64. Bi, Yuyun, China's Cultivated Land, p. 129, states that according to the second national soil survey, some 24.85% of eroded cultivated land in China was located in the Loess Plateau region, and 22.39% in the south-west Plateau region. Eroded arable land in these regions accounted for 71.30% and 52.53% of the cultivated areas respectively. After these two regions the north-east and the North China Plain experienced the most serious problems of cultivated land erosion.Google Scholar

65. In every region except the south-east, erosion covers an area greater than the cultivated acreage.Google Scholar

66. Bi, Yuyun, China's Cultivated Land, p. 129.Google Scholar

67. Rozelle, Huang and Zhang, “Poverty, population and environmental degradation in China,” p. 249, suggest that in some parts of rural China where population pressure is intense, there is insufficient time available to implement appropriate institutional changes that would encourage sustainable agriculture. They argue that areas where local leaders have controlled population growth and sought to raise incomes have had better success at controlling the rural environment than those which have focused on environmental clean-up.Google Scholar

68. Chinese sources indicate that desertified land (including “latent desertified land” – i.e. land which has the potential to become fully desertified in the near future) accounts for 15.9% of the national cultivated area. According to Guo, Huancheng, Wu, Dengru and Zhu, Hongxing (“Land restoration in China,” Journal of Applied Ecology, No. 26 (1989)Google Scholar, p. 790), and Han, Chunru (“Recent changes in the rural environment of China,” Journal of Applied Ecology, No. 26 (1989), p. 805), desertification threatens the livelihood of nearly 55 million people and 3.9 million hectares of cropland, in addition to 10 million hectares of pasturage, 4.9 million hectares of rangeland and more than 2,000 kilometres of railway lines. Lindert, Lu and Wu (“Trends in the soil chemistry of north China,” p. 1176), found that topsoil loss in cultivated portions of the desert-steppe region was insignificant between the 1950s and 1980s. Inner Mongolia did experience a reduction of total nitrogen and total organic matter. In contrast, phosphorus and potassium levels rose in Inner Mongolia during the same period. See also Rozelle, Huang and Zhang, “Poverty, population and environmental degradation in China,” pp. 232–33, who suggest that while revegetation programmes such as the Three Norths project (Sanbei fanghulin) have alleviated dust problems in northern China, the situation continues to deteriorate overall.Google Scholar

69. Jiang, Wandi, “Will sand drift to our doorstep tomorrow?” Beijing Review, Vol. 40, No. 28(1997), pp. 24–25.Google Scholar

70. Kōno, Michihiro, “Chūgoku ni okeru sabakuka to sono bōchi ni tsuite no gakusho” (“A note on desertification and its counterplan in China”), Chirigaku hyōron (Geographical Review of Japan), Vol. 61, No. 2 (1988)Google Scholar, p. 187. Other causes and the proportion of area affected are overcutting of forests 31.8%, overgrazing 28.3%, misuse of water resources 8.3%, industrialization and urbanization 0.7%, and wind-blown sand dune encroachment 5.5%. Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (ed.) (Grasslands and Grassland Sciences in Northern China (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992), pp. 14–15), states that “in the mesic eastern regions, inappropriate conversion to agriculture is probably the leading cause” of grassland degradation in northern China. Wood-harvesting and overgrazing are more serious in the north-west.Google Scholar

71. In grassland areas of Inner Mongolia, creation of reservoirs to offset water deficiencies has led to a further reduction of agricultural land and pasturage, thereby increasing the pressure on remaining land. In some areas such as northern Shaanxi, the extent of degradation on cultivated lands is intensifying rather than the areal extent of the affected area expanding so that land is being removed from cultivation. Elsewhere in China, the evidence points to yield reductions rather than land being taken out of cultivation.Google Scholar

72. Zhang, Yun, “Renkou qianru yu Gansu, Qinghai jingji fazhan” (“Immigration of population and economic development of Gansu and Qinghai Provinces”), Jingji dili (Economic Geography), Vol. 11, No. 2 (1991), p. 30, states that attempts to institute cultivation on fixed and semi-fixed dunes in Gansu between 1958 and 1990 resulted in 20,000 sq. km reverting to shifting dunesGoogle Scholar

73. “Ties benefit animal husbandry sector,” Beijing Review, Vol. 40, No. 41 (1997), p. 28.Google Scholar

74. This is the target contained in the Ten-Year China National Action Programme to Combat Desertification, initiated in 1991.Google Scholar

75. The 1995 official industrial wastewater releases were 37,285 million tonnes. By contrast, in 1994 rural small-scale industries were reported to have released 4,300 million tonnes.Google Scholar

76. This process is often referred to as secondary salinization. Salinization and alkalization occur naturally in areas with a high water table, bad drainage and a high evaporation rate For consideration of salinization-alkalization in pre-reform China, see Vermeer, Eduard B., Water Conservancy and Irrigation in China: Social, Economic and Agrotechnical Aspects (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1977), pp. 205–236. Huang and Rozelle (“Environmental stress and grain yields,” p. 857) cite officials in Henan and Hebei to the effect that large increases in salinized land in their provinces during the 1980s were attributable to the reduced efficiency of irrigation systems – allegedly due, in part, to the waning influence of collective leaders.Google Scholar

77. See Rozelle, Huang and Zhang, “Poverty, population and environmental degradation in China,” pp. 234–35.Google Scholar

78. Note, however, that the estimates shown in Table 19 omit data for some provinces, while figures for others seem suspect (for example, estimates for Sichuan in 1985 and 1990 are identical). Lindert, Lu and Wu (“Trends in the soil chemistry of north China,” p. 1173–1174) checked for alkalinity and discovered no increases in northern China between the 1950s and 1980s in areas of prevalent alkalinity. In contrast, they found that alkalinity had fallen along the Bohai and northern Jiangsu coastline. Salinity proved too difficult to test.Google Scholar

79. Chinese soil surveys suggest that most arable land lacks nitrogen, 59% is deficient in phosphorus and 23% is lacking in potassium. Note, however, the suggestion in Lindert, Lu and Wu (“Soil chemistry of south China”), that between the 1960s and 1980s there were significant differences in the levels of organic matter, phosphorous and potassium in tilled soils between different regions of southern China. Their calculations suggest that the rise in organic matter content was largest in the south-western rice-growing region (Yunnan, Guizhou and western Guangxi). Nitrogen levels also rose in this region, but declined overall. In contrast, against the background of a rising trend elsewhere, phosphorus declined in the south-western rice-growing region. While accepting the rigorous nature of the methodology used by Lindert, Lu and Wu, we would also warn against extrapolating too readily from past trends in trying to assess current conditions.Google Scholar

80. Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 1996, p. 434. See Appendix Table D. Also useful is Bruce Stone, “Basic agricultural technology under reform,” in Kueh, and Ash, (eds), Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture, pp. 311–360. Chemical fertilizer use rose by more than 400% between 1978 and the mid-1990s. Some of the highest doses of nitrogen fertilizers are in areas which also have large human populations or high animal stocking rates. This suggests that part of the fertilizer pollution problem arises from the excessive application of human and animal wastes rather than just application of chemical fertilizers.Google Scholar

81. Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 1996, p. 433. Johnson, Todd M., Liu, Feng and Richard, Newfarmer, Clear Water, Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Century (Washington: World Bank, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 90. Hollomon, D. W., Zhou, Mingguo and Lu, Yuejian (“Fungicide and bacterial resistance in plant pathogens in China,” China–E. C. Biotechnology Centre Newsletter, No. 14 (1997), p. 10–11) cite an annual consumption of 850,000 tonnes of pesticide in China, of which 600,000 tonnes were insecticides and 110,000 tonnes were fungicides. Extensive use of pesticides and fungicides in the past means that pests have developed resistance to chemicals formerly used and this has encouraged the development of newer and stronger pesticides. Nanjing Agricultural University recently has established a centre for research in pesticide resistance monitoring. “The role of sustainable agriculture in China” (p. 5), recommends only two legal measures for China at this stage: protection of crop land and compliance with the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Sale of Pesticides. The same source (p. 11) notes that approximately 75% of domestically-produced pesticides are highly toxic and persistent insecticides.Google Scholar

82. The uptake of chemical fertilizers by plants is influenced by the type of fertilizer (i.e. urea versus ammonium sulphate), method of application (i.e. ammonium bicarbonate is recovered to a higher level if it is incorporated into the soil than if it is broadcast on the surface), the soil type (i.e. a considerable amount of ammonium sulphate is lost by volatilization of ammonia if applied to the surface of calcareous soils), levels of soil moisture and other factors.Google Scholar

83. Biogas, methane produced by the decomposition of organic matter, was often held up as a partial solution to both the solid waste and the energy shortage problems and there were 6.02 million biogas reactors in use as of the end of 1996 with 1.93 million of these in Sichuan alone. The residual sludge from this process is organic and can be used as a pest-free fertilizer. The main purpose of these reactors is to produce energy – a topic covered elsewhere in this volume by Vaclav Smil. Suffice it to say that the transformation to the family farm has hurt the production of biogas and the use of wastes as fertilizer is likely to increase further through direct application of manure on fields.Google Scholar

84. “The role of sustainable agriculture in China,” pp. 11–12 notes that ten applications with dosage rates three to four times the recommended level to vegetables which normally should only get two to six applications is not unusual. The average fertilizer application rate is almost three times that of the U.S. Such excessive usage rates may also raise crop production costs up to threefold.Google Scholar

85. Institute of Soil Science (ed.), Soils of China (Beijing: Science Press, 1990), p. 660, notes that during the 1980s more than half a million hectares of land were polluted from irrigation with polluted water and application of urban or industrial sludge. Further problems include the use of plastic sheeting in farming which, when left in the soil, can reduce crop growth by impeding root growth and water penetration. This problem was especially serious in the 1980s when most sheeting was turned over into the soil after the harvest, thereby adding pollutants to the soil. In the 1990s, there have been campaigns launched to urge farmers to recover plastic sheeting. We cannot, however, take the levels of sheeting used as a direct sign of soil pollution. Nonetheless, even if the sheeting is removed, its disposal in rural areas still poses a long-term pollution problem. From official statistics for 1996 (Ministry of Agriculture, Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 1997, pp. 287, 433), we have calculated that the north-west region had the greatest percentage of plastic sheeting on cultivated fields (10.64%), followed by the south-west (9.62%), north (8.24%), centre-east (7.71%), north-east (4.70%), and the south-east (3.57). This suggests that use of the plastic sheeting is primarily to retain moisture and secondarily to retain heat.Google Scholar

86. See Appendix Table E.Google Scholar

87. “Beijing residents protest against garbage dump,” China News Digest, GL97-098 (07 1997), item (4). The officially estimated proportion of arable land covered by industrial solid wastes is rather low (see Appendix Table E), although the considerable annual fluctuations which characterize such figures suggest that official figures should be used with caution. Provinces with the highest percentages in 1995 were those undergoing rapid development (Hainan and Guangdong), near to areas of rapid development (Anhui) and the largest coal base (Shanxi).Google Scholar

88. Vermeer, Eduard B., “Management of environmental pollution in China: problems and abatement policies,” China Information, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1990), p. 43, cites a report from Guangdong for the late 1980s which assessed air pollution losses as 61% in forestry, 26% in crop losses and 13% in damaged farmland.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

89. This is the finding of Cao, Hongfa, “Air pollution and its effects on plants in China,” Journal of Applied Ecology, No. 26 (1989), p. 767, based on data from the Baotou, Chongqing and Liuzhou areas.Google Scholar

90. Any pH value for precipitation which is below 5.6 can be considered to be polluted by acids.Google Scholar

91. Johnson, , Liu, and Newfarmer, , Clear Water, Blue SkiesGoogle Scholar, p. 27; and Gu, Geping [sic.] (Qu Geping), “China's industrial pollution survey,” China Reconstructs, Vol. 37, No. 8 (1988), p. 17. Sulphur dioxide concentrations were positively correlated with yield reductions to varying degrees in wheat, barley, cotton, potato bean (Phaseolus vulgaris L., caidou), Chinese cabbage or pe-tsai (Brassica pekinensis Ruper., dabaicai), rice and maize. Long-term exposure to low concentrations of sulphur dioxide appears to reduce the rate of photosynthesis in soy beans, rice, potatoes and winter wheat. Exposure to sulphur dioxide and hydrogen fluoride can increase stomatal resistance, potassium leakage, superoxide dismutase and peroxidase activity and reduce chlorophyll and photosynthesis.Google Scholar

92. The acid problems in the north are less serious because the soil pH is generally more alkaline (greater than pH 7) and the positive ion exchange rate, levels of airborne ammonia and the rate of base absorption is generally higher, which means that the north is better able to deal with higher levels of acids. In addition, coal burned in the south generally has a higher sulphur content.Google Scholar

93. “China enters a warm weather stage,” Beijing Review, Vol. 39, No. 47 (1996), p. 31.Google Scholar

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95. Zhou, Xin, “Advantage of climate changing to warm,” Beijing Review, Vol. 40, No. 23 (1997), p. 18. The fact that such arguments appeared in an article in the Beijing Review suggest that there is a political agenda underlying this debate. China is likely to contribute more than any other country to future emissions of so-called “greenhouse gases” and it is useful to argue that many developing countries may benefit from global warming.Google Scholar

96. Han, Mukang, “Sea level rise on China's coastal plains,” Tiempo: Global Warming and the Third World, No. 6 (1992), pp. 17–21.Google Scholar

97. Johnson, Todd M., Junfeng, Li, Zhongxiao, Jiang and Taylor, Robert P., China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control (Washington: World Bank, 1996), p. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

98. Yang, Guishan (“Relative sea level rise and its effects on environment and resources in China's coastal areas,” Chinese Geographical Science, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1995), p. 106) notes that the area susceptible to inundation in China could be greater than 125,000 sq. km and affect a population of more than 73 million. Johnson et al. China: Issues and Options, p. 11 points out that overall, fishery yields would be reduced, especially in the Chang River valley, where temperatures would be lower in winter and more storms and flooding would affect fish breeding.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

99. Cai, Yunlong, “Vulnerability and adaptation of Chinese agriculture to global climate change,” Chinese Geographical Science, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1997), p. 296–97. Many writers have drawn attention to serious under-investment and misuse of funds in agriculture. See the work of Scott Rozelle, Carl Pray and Jikun Huang, “Agricultural research policy in China: testing the limits,” (paper presented at the China Workship – Global Agricultural Science Policy for the 21st Century, Melbourne, Australia, 26–28 August 1996) as cited in At China's Table (Washington, DC: World Bank), p. 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

100. Although industry accounts for about three-quarters of Chinese CO₂ emissions, agriculture itself is responsible for some of the country's greenhouse gas production – possibly as high as 20% of China's total. Methane production accounts for 13% of China's greenhouse gases and comes largely from paddy filled with water (5%), herd animals (3%) and organic agricultural wastes. See Johnson et al. China: Issues and Options, p. 13. Coal-bed methane accounts for 4% of total emissions and some also comes from landfills. Fertilizers also contribute to the production of N₂O, although it is difficult to estimate by how much.Google Scholar