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In 1996, the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands intensified to the point where the American mass circulation periodical Time asked: “Will the next Asian war be fought over a few tiny islands?” That such a question could be asked seems incredible given that the Diaoyu Islands, which lie north-east of Taiwan and west of Okinawa, consist of only five small islands and three rocky outcroppings with a total landmass of no more than 7 square kilometres or 3 square miles. Apart from their miniscule size, the islands are uninhabited, are incapable of supporting human habitation for an extended period of time and are unlikely to support any economic life of their own from indigenous resources.
For two reasons the elevation of the law in government policy and political rhetoric in China in recent years inspires great interest and significance. The first is related to the perennial debate on the desirability and possibility of a “government of laws” versus a “government of men” in Chinese history. To what extent does the recent emphasis on the law indicate a movement towards the former from the latter? Given the importance of the issues of institutionalization and power distribution in the analysis of Chinese politics, what is the significance of this development of the law? What is, in other words, the meaning of the recent policy on the “rule of law”? Does it mean something new and what is that newness? The second cause of interest is the mere appearance of the topic itself. Why, and how, is it possible that the recent surge of deliberations on the rule of law occurred at all, if, as is often believed, individual leaders have heavily dominated Chinese politics? In other words, what underlying processes are at work to motivate the leaders to advocate the supremacy of the law, rather than the supremacy of their own authority?
Many peasants misunderstand the Marriage Law. They blindly emphasize that the Marriage Law “liberated” them. This is the case for some women in particular, who have become very unconventional and dissolute in their sexual relations. They have several partners at once, and often switch among them, choosing whichever man appeals to them on that particular day. They also recklessly flirt with many men.
We [provincial authorities] demand the basic-level cadres desist from monitoring adultery and sex, forcing confessions, humiliating and tying people up, hanging, beating, and organizing struggle sessions [against women seeking divorce].
In the past twenty years the People's Republic of China has undergone four marked periods of overheating as measured by output and price rises. While the 1980 bout of inflation was primarily a result of planned price increases, inflation in 1985/86, 1988/89, and 1993–95 increasingly reflected underlying market imbalances as prices had been liberalized and production decisions decentralized. Inflation was experienced as most severe in the 1988/89 period when the inflation rate climbed rapidly to levels – since the early years of the PRC unprecedented – above 20 per cent in mid-1988. Panic purchases in summer 1988 because of expected further price rises spread to several cities and inflation became tantamount to “social instability.” The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee strongly voiced its concern about the “stable and healthy economic development” in a communiqué on 30 September 1988: “At present, our overall economic situation is good, but the difficulties and problems are numerous, the most prominent being the excessively large commodity price rises.” Party and central government in 1988 felt compelled to stop economic overheating in order to prevent further panic purchases and rises in the inflation rate which would endanger social stability.