Using a 2004 survey of over 1,000 children in a multi-ethnic county of Yunnan province, this article demonstrates how household and village assets operate in gender distinct ways to promote school enrolment in an era of economic privatization and skewed sex ratios. As expected, parental and village wealth facilitate enrolment, but parental wealth is far more decisive for girls than boys. Similarly we find a gender difference in the impact of such parental cultural capitals as education and membership in the Communist Youth League. For a daughter, having a father with higher than average levels of education and past membership in the Youth League facilitates enrolment independent of household wealth; for sons the impact of father's cultural capital is positive but less decisive. Having a more educated mother or a mother who was in the Youth League also promotes a child's enrolment but not as significantly as father's assets. In conclusion, the article considers why parents' involvement in the Youth League during their own adolescence but not their current Communist Party membership facilitates school enrolment, and the broader social and political implications for the role of the Communist Party in rural society.

The rise of China as a major power in the world is an indisputable reality of world politics today. Less clear is whether China will abide by the prevailing international rules as it becomes more powerful. This article attempts to gauge China's evolving attitude toward international norms pertinent to domestic governance by studying a popular Chinese slogan – “link up with the international track” (yu guoji jiegui). It examines the rise of the slogan at different levels of the Chinese public discourse, analyses its meanings and applications in the Chinese discourse, and assesses the major controversies over the slogan. This study shows that Chinese thinking about international norms varies across time, secots and issue areas. It suggests the need for greater nuance in our understanding of current and future Chinese attitudes towards international rules.

As an industrial control strategy, Leninism imposed extensive state-party apparatuses in the workplace. After its defeat in China, the émigré Kuomintang instituted party-state infrastructure in the vast public sector inherited from Japanese colonialism to consolidate its grasp on Taiwan. This article traces the rise and fall of Leninist control in Taiwan's state-owned enterprises. Taiwan's Leninist penetration was deployed after the suppression of the 1947 uprising, and hence failed to overcome the pre-existing ethnic divide between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Further, since the 1960s, widespread moonlinghting has enabled Taiwanese workers to be more psychologically and economically detached from the clientelist network of redistribution. As the political environment turned favourable in the late 1980s, a strong current of workers's movements surged and succeeded in dismantling party-state control in nationalized industry. Taiwan's case reveals the importance of societal embeddedness as a variable that explains the trajectory of Leninist control.