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This list of books received at The China Quarterly during the period stated is intended to serve as an up-to-date guide to books published on imperial, modern and contemporary China.
This article uses theories of industrial policy to analyse the growth of China's telecommunications equipment industry over the past 20 years. It highlights the role of the Chinese government in shaping the sector, by first utilizing imported equipment, then promoting Sino-foreign joint ventures and finally fostering domestic companies. Significantly, the government encouraged market competition, and avoided the pitfall of monopoly state control. Today, key telecommunications players include joint ventures, state-owned companies and even a major Chinese private corporation. The article concludes that the government's fiscal and regulatory industrial polices were successful, in that they rapidly built a modern communications network while promoting a vibrant free-market competitive environment.
Over the last decade, there have been numerous reports of rural discontent and unrest over excessive local taxes and fees known as villagers' burdens. In response, the central government enacted the tax-for-fee reform (TFR) in 2002 that abolished local fees levied on individuals and rural households in favour of a single agricultural tax. In addition the central government has announced plans to eliminate the agricultural tax as well after 2006. The aim of the TFR is to streamline local revenue collection and establish a more transparent and efficient provision of services. The immediate result, however, is a dramatic reduction in the autonomy of township governments as well as the provision of local services. Poorer townships have become more dependent on county government for revenues, and these townships function more like county administrative units than local self-governments. Moreover, many services have also been cut due to a lack of local revenues. In north-west China, there has been a sharp decline in the provision of educational and medical services. The solution is an increase in county remittances, but these are slow and uneven, and the combination of reduced autonomy and services has produced a number of “administrative shells” at the township level. If the inefficacy continues, then there may be even greater rural discontent and unrest over the loss of basic services than there was over increasing villagers' burdens.
This article examines the global impact of China's post-Mao transformation as reflected in Sino-Cuban relations. China and Cuba resumed their comradeship after Castro endorsed China's crackdown of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, and since then Beijing has promoted its approach towards legitimizing the one-party regime through engaging in economic reforms and opening to the world to Havana. “China's lesson for Cuba” has been discussed by many Cubanists worldwide. However, the Chinese approach has posed a dilemma to Fidel Castro: he admires China's power but has doubts about the future of socialism in China. The article argues that Castro has so far adopted his old strategy for dealing with Soviet influence in the 1960s in his engagement with China: praising his political ally's power as the evidence of socialism's vitality for his domestic consumption, while significantly limiting the application of China's economic policies. But his more pragmatic successors, Raul Castro in particular, may adopt the Chinese approach.
This article explores why and how the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a PRC state research-institute, survived after its involvement with the June Fourth demonstrations in 1989 through research regulation. I show how the explicit ascription of an advisory role to CASS required an increase in freedom of research and an increase in political steering through regulation. I do this by comparing the institutional setting of CASS in the early 1990s with that during Li Tieying's leadership (1998 to 2003). The article traces a general trend in which organizational reforms at institutions of higher education increasingly entail giving political direction to the development of the social science debate. Radical political views are discouraged through regulation, guidelines, meetings, academic activities and financial, material and social encouragement. This institutional approach aims to yield insight into the functioning of CASS as producer of knowledge and as think-tank to the government.
Based on survey data collected from October 2003 to January 2004, this article provides the first systematic empirical analysis of how civic associations in urban China have responded to the internet. It shows, first, that urban grassroots organizations are equipped with a minimal level of internet capacity. Secondly, for these organizations, the internet is most useful for publicity work, information dessemination, and networking with peer and international organizations. Thirdly, social change organizations, younger organizations and organizations in Beijing report more use of the internet than business associations, older organizations and organizations outside Beijing. Finally, organizations with bare-bone internet capacity report more active use of the internet than better-equipped organizations. These findings suggest that the internet has had special appeal to relatively new organizations oriented to social change and that a “web” of civic associations has emerged in China.
Frederic Wakeman Jr., pre-eminent historian of modern China and Haas Professor of Asian Studies emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, died of cancer on 14 September 2006 in Lake Oswego, Oregon, at the age of 68. He is survived by his wife, He Lea Wakeman, his sister, Sue Farquhar, three children, Frederic III, Matthew and Sarah, and two grandchildren.
The qipao ceased to be worn for everyday occasions afer the 1950s in the PRC and the late 1960s in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. But it has powerfully re-emerged in the last few years. This is puzzling considering the swiftness and broad scale of the re-emergence, and the qipao's recent history of being marginalized. Are the political and cultural elites responsible and what motivated them? Besides political and cultural nationalism, are there other reasons that have led a large number of people to resume wearing the qipao? This study finds that the state did not play a significant role in the qipao's re-emergence, that cultural producers and celebrities contributed much to it, and that the symbolic meanings of the modern historical qipao have been repackaged and now cater to a variety of consumers for very different reasons.
A survey of local government officials and enterprise managers in six Chinese cities demonstrates relatively high environmental awareness. However, this awareness remains primarily an abstraction and does not always shape specific policy preferences. This article shows that the development-driven model works well overall, indicating the reluctance of policy makers to implement environmental protection policies at the cost of sacrificing the rate of economic growth. The pollution-driven model applies only to more developed areas, in which elites in more polluted cities are more concerned about environmental protection than those in less polluted cities. A non-linear model that takes into account the interaction between pollution and development works the best in explaining elites' policy preferences. It suggests that pollution becomes a significant factor affecting policy preferences only when a certain development level is reached.