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The evidentiary weight of North Korean defectors' testimony depicting crimes against humanity has drawn considerable attention from the international community in recent years. Despite the attention to North Korean human rights, what remains unexamined is the rise of the transnational advocacy network, which drew attention to the issue in the first place. Andrew Yeo and Danielle Chubb explore the 'hard case' that is North Korea and challenge existing conceptions of transnational human rights networks, how they operate, and why they provoke a response from even the most recalcitrant regimes. In this volume, leading experts and activists assemble original data from multiple language sources, including North Korean sources, and adopt a range of sophisticated methodologies to provide valuable insight into the politics, strategy, and policy objectives of North Korean human rights activism.
China has been much more involved in Africa's economy and trade than in its security. However, over the past decade or so, China has increased its participation in the United Nation's Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs), particularly in Africa. It has also taken steps to better protect its overseas nationals and, in 2017, established a naval base in Djibouti. This article focuses on the participation of China's People's Liberation Army in the United Nation's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since 2013. It aims to unpack the diplomatic process that led China to take part in this mission and to analyse the form of this participation. Mali was the second time (the first being in South Sudan in 2012) that China opted to deploy combat troops under the UN banner, underscoring a deepening involvement in PKOs and an increasing readiness to face risks. Finally, this article explores the implications of China's participation in the MINUSMA for its foreign and security posture as a whole. Often perceived as a realist rising power, by more actively participating in UN PKOs China is trying to demonstrate that it is a responsible and “integrationist” great power, ready to play the game according to the commonly approved international norms. Is this really the case?
China's recent collective forest tenure reform is intended to clarify and certify forest rights, and thereby promote market circulation of forestland, encourage forestry production and safeguard conservation. Central policy statements prioritize parcelling tenure among households to promote efficient management. This study examines how participants experienced the programme in communities in north-west Yunnan. In the study area, rather than individualizing tenure, forestry agencies compelled communities to re-collectivize forests. Nonetheless, residents persist in using household forests despite restrictions. Local officials tacitly sanction these activities. In mountain hinterlands, forest tenure reform has been focused on “stabilizing” forests and communities. Rather than forcibly impose tenure designs, authorities perform what we call accommodative buffering. A set of formal institutions, rules and mappings enables projects like forest ecological compensation payments to go forward. However, state agents at local and higher levels tolerate informal practices that contain the trouble that poorly fitted formal institutions might cause. While potentially more resilient than by-the-book enforcement, these arrangements could leave residents vulnerable to political shifts that require a demonstration of policy adherence.
This essay offers an analysis and a critique of the rise of the cult of the state in contemporary China, or what Xu Jilin calls “statism.” Statism means more than the emergence of a strong state; statism is the fetishization of state power, the subjugation of everything to the interests of the state, or in this instance, the Party-State. Although China’s state cult is largely the product of China’s recent economic rise, Xu takes great pains to illustrate that the fetishization of state power has occurred in other contexts in the recent past—chiefly in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan—suggesting the dangers associated with this development. He also focuses his attention on changes in China’s intellectual world that have accompanied and facilitated the rise of the state cult, particularly the evolution of China’s New Left from an originally critical stance that denounced the unholy alliance of state cadres and capitalist entrepreneurs, to an embrace of the state as an entity capable of achieving “responsive democracy” through good governance (without democratic responsibility). The article also analyzes the impact of the ideas of Carl Schmitt on contemporary Chinese intellectuals.
This text is a sort of eulogy for Li Shenzhi (1923-2003), an establishment intellectual loyal to the Communist regime for much of his life, but whose revulsion following the Tian’anmen massacre led him to embrace liberalism and denounce the abuses of the Communist revolution in China. Subsequently, he became known as “China’s Havel,” and continues to be much admired for his courage and outspokenness. In this essay, however, Xu Jilin links Li Shenzhi to the moral idealism of China’s traditional Confucian scholar-officials, arguing that these values of service and commitment were more important than his conversion to liberalism. He praises Li as an “old-style Communist” and insists that devotion and sacrifice to a cause are positive values. This can be read as a critique of secularism—and hence of liberalism—and thus as a call to action. The essay, which is very different from others included in this volume, suggests that Xu continues to search for some sort of cultural continuity that will provide a moral basis to contemporary Chinese society, and that can coexist with liberal political institutions.