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This chapter focuses on the transformation of approaches to ethnicity in China’s transition from empire to nation state. That is, how and why these approaches evolved from a maintenance-oriented strategy aimed at pacification and stability in pre-modern times to a transformative strategy aimed at classifying and engineering identities in the socialist era. Historically Confucian universalism provided a neutral and inclusive approach to ethnicity, but it could not accommodate the idea of the nation in modern times. After late Qing and Republican failures at nation building, the CCP accomplished this task through a mix of class universalism and state classification of identities. The new approach served to incorporate minority members as equal citizens in the new modern state by politicizing previously localized identities at the national level. The contradictions therein – promoting political incorporation but also ethnic identities to fit that goal – or centralization and ethnicization, created the first set of institutional dynamics for ethnic strife in contemporary times.
This chapter focuses on the transformation of policy instruments for co-opting minority groups: how and why Chinese approaches evolved from a maintenance-oriented approach in pre-modern times to transformative strategies aimed at egalitarianism in the socialist era. In pre-modern times, hegemonic strategies were used to induce frontier pacification and cooperation, with emphasis on elite co-optation and outer peripheral regions. This approach was practical for the minimalist imperial state with limited infrastructural and resource capacity. In modern times, the Republican regimes attempted nation building by mixing elite appeasement and mass assimilation, to little avail. The CCP turned upside down pre-modern methods by repudiating traditional ethnic elites and penetrating ethnic regions with preferential egalitarian strategies. The new approach promoted political incorporation but also ethnicized policies to fit that goal. The contradictions therein – centralization but ethnicization – created a third set of institutional sources of ethnic tensions in contemporary times.
This chapter continues with the argument that the built-in tensions of the autonomous system – at once centralization and ethnicization – have intensified in the reform era, fueling ethnic strife in contemporary China. The focus of the chapter is the system of ethnic autonomy. On the one hand, the demise of class universalism and the rise of identity politics have made political centralization less justifiable but also more imperative, thanks to the centrifugal tendencies of identity politics, which are now unconstrained by class universalism. On the other hand, the demise of class universalism and the advent of identity politics have made autonomy rights more imperative but also more polarizing, as they are now instrumental to interethnic competition in a new market economy. These new institutional dynamics are illustrated with three contending perspectives from within China: the liberal autonomists, integrationists, and socialist autonomists. From different angles, the three schools help to highlight the institutional sources that contribute to increased ethnic tensions in Tibet and Xinjiang in the reform era.
This article examines the roles digital technologies have played in propelling the shifts in modes of financial governance which have been led by the Chinese Communist Party and enacted by a wide spectrum of regulative actors. Based on analyses of the laws, policies and regulations surrounding digital financial technologies, or so-called fintechs, as well as in-depth interviews with government officials and fintech business executives, I argue that the proliferation of fintechs challenged the existing regulatory schemes defined by the Central Bank and the State Council. This forced a reconsideration of the Chinese government's hegemonic strategies in governing the rapidly changing financial industries. While digital technologies have been promoted to accomplish the goals set by the Party for financial marketization and modernization, a set of institutions including regulatory, organizational and normative rules have been developed to strengthen the Party's control over the digitization of finance. This contradiction is pivotal to understanding the Party's financial policymaking in the digital age.
Many scholars perceive ethnic politics in China as an untouchable topic due to lack of data and contentious, even prohibitive, politics. This book fills a gap in the literature, offering a historical-political perspective on China's contemporary ethnic conflict. Yan Sun accumulates research via field trips, local reports, and policy debates to reveal rare knowledge and findings. Her long-time causal chain of explanation reveals the roots of China's contemporary ethnic strife in the centralizing and ethnicizing strategies of its incomplete transition to a nation state—strategies that depart sharply from its historical patterns of diverse and indirect rule. This departure created the institutional dynamics for politicized identities and ethnic mobilization, particularly in the outer regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. In the 21st century, such factors as the demise of socialist tenets and institutions that upheld interethnic solidarity, and the rise of identity politics and developmentalism, have intensified these built-in tensions.
Drawing on an ethnographic study in two counties in Hunan province, this article explores how political brokerage has contributed to political order in China by facilitating contentious and non-contentious bargaining between the government and ordinary people. To account for the changing role of village leaders in rural politics, the article develops a concept of dual brokerage. This concept not only recognizes formal and informal linkages between village leaders and the two principals – the government and the community of villagers – but also underscores the interactivity between the linkages. We contend that despite the tensions between village leaders’ roles as state agents and as village representatives, these two roles in the reform era tend to be mutually beneficial. Under such an institutional configuration, village leaders in China in the reform era have strong incentives to act as dual agents and can make policy implementation more flexible and the use of state force more moderate. A comparison between the trilateral interactions before and after the tax reform in 2005 confirms that whether village leaders can effectively act as dual agents has a significant impact on the quality of rural governance in China.
China is witnessing a growing trend towards financialization by the state. Drawing on the concept of state-led financialization, this study is the first to explore how the government-guided investment fund (GGIF) has evolved and spread throughout the country. The promotion policies and practices of the central government have laid the key foundation for the development of GGIFs, while local governments have quickly adopted this new financial tool, resulting in its widespread take up. State-owned enterprises are heavily involved in the operation of GGIFs, indicating that this market-oriented tool has largely failed to attract capital from the private sector. This study shows that state-led financialization in China has strengthened rather than weakened the influence of the state in the economy, which is not the case in most Western economies. However, the limitations and risks of the GGIF are also related to the dominant role of the state in GGIF operations.
Chapter 7 explores children’s navigation of their relationship with significant adults in skipped generation families. The analysis adapts Goh’s (2011) concept of ‘intergenerational parenting coalitions’ in seeing the migrant parents and grandparent caregivers as forming ‘multi-local intergenerational parenting coalitions’ - a variant of the ‘multi-local family striving teams.’ Children’s experiences of growing up in multilocal intergenerational parenting teams differed. Children in cohesive families usually received much material and emotional support.But if the middle generation had conflict with the grandparents and remitted little the children could lack nurturing, or alternatively, some children and grandparents clung to each other for solace. Children were usually looked after by paternal grandparents while care by maternal grandparents indicated special family circumstances that impacted on the children’s relationship with caregivers. Children’s closeness to grandparents vis-à-vis migrant parents was also influenced by who they had spent most time with. Even so, all children in skipped generation families enjoyed better relationships with their migrant parents if the two sides interacted regularly. Visits to the city during the school holidays offered many of these children opportunities for interaction with their migrant parents. But the children’s experiences of these visits also varied by the urban lot of their parents.