Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2020
Drawing on an ethnographic study in two counties in Hunan province, this article explores how political brokerage has contributed to political order in China by facilitating contentious and non-contentious bargaining between the government and ordinary people. To account for the changing role of village leaders in rural politics, the article develops a concept of dual brokerage. This concept not only recognizes formal and informal linkages between village leaders and the two principals – the government and the community of villagers – but also underscores the interactivity between the linkages. We contend that despite the tensions between village leaders’ roles as state agents and as village representatives, these two roles in the reform era tend to be mutually beneficial. Under such an institutional configuration, village leaders in China in the reform era have strong incentives to act as dual agents and can make policy implementation more flexible and the use of state force more moderate. A comparison between the trilateral interactions before and after the tax reform in 2005 confirms that whether village leaders can effectively act as dual agents has a significant impact on the quality of rural governance in China.
本文利用在湖南两县的人类志研究,探询政治经纪模式如何在中国通过促成抗争性和非抗争性博弈而增进政治稳定。为了描述和解释村干部角色的变迁,本文阐述了双重经纪的概念。这一概念不仅承认村干部分别与村民和政府之间的联系,而且强调这两种联系相互关联。村干部作为村民代理人的身份与他们作为政府代理人的身份之间虽然存在张力,同时也互相促进。村民的信任有利于村干部行使政府代理人的角色,政府对村干部的信任也有利于村干部代理村民利益。改革年代的制度框架赋予村干部很强的充当双重代理的积极性。村干部在尽力维持这一角色的过程中,使得政策的实施较为温和灵活。本文对 2005 年农业税改革前后的比较,证实农村治理的质量很大程度上取决于村干部是否能够有效地扮演双重代理人的角色。本研究阐释的双重经纪的概念对于理解人大代表和群团组织等居于国家社会之间的个人及组织在中国政治过程中的角色也有参考意义。
Both authors contributed equally to this article.