Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Introduction
- I Monetary institutions and policy
- 1 Reputational versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy
- 2 Reciprocity and political business cycles in federal monetary unions
- 3 The ultimate determinants of central bank independence
- 4 Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes – their effects on monetary accommodation and activism
- 5 Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples
- 6 New empirical evidence on the costs of European Monetary Union
- II Exchange rate policy and redistribution
- Index
4 - Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes – their effects on monetary accommodation and activism
from I - Monetary institutions and policy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Foreword
- Introduction
- I Monetary institutions and policy
- 1 Reputational versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy
- 2 Reciprocity and political business cycles in federal monetary unions
- 3 The ultimate determinants of central bank independence
- 4 Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes – their effects on monetary accommodation and activism
- 5 Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples
- 6 New empirical evidence on the costs of European Monetary Union
- II Exchange rate policy and redistribution
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Policy makers usually adjust the money supply in response to various developments in order to achieve several objectives such as a high level of economic activity, maintenance of the real exchange rate within a desired range, and price stability. The relative importance assigned to alternative objectives is one of the factors affecting the magnitude and the direction of the response of the money supply to various economic developments. For example, if policy makers are mostly concerned with economic activity and employment, they are likely to, at least partially, accommodate recent wage increases. By contrast, if they are concerned mostly with price stability they are likely to “lean against the wind” by reducing money supply growth in response to accelerations in wage inflation. If they are concerned mostly with international competitiveness and the level of the real exchange rate they are likely to loosen the money supply in response to increases in foreign prices. However, if they are concerned mostly with price stability they may actually reduce money growth in response to increases in foreign inflation.
Countries with central banks that have a clear mandate to focus on price stability, and which are relatively independent from political authorities, are therefore more likely to lean against both domestic and foreign inflationary impulses by making money growth independent of those impulses – or even by reducing money growth in response to increases in domestic wage inflation or foreign price inflation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Positive Political EconomyTheory and Evidence, pp. 78 - 110Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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