Contents

pp vii-viii

List of figures

pp ix-ix

List of tables

pp x-xii

List of contributors

pp xiii-xiv

Foreword

pp xv-xvi

Introduction

pp 1-6

I - Monetary institutions and policy

pp 7-8

1 - Reputational versus institutional solutions to the time-consistency problem in monetary policy

pp 9-22

Comment

pp 22-28

2 - Reciprocity and political business cycles in federal monetary unions

pp 29-43

Comment

pp 43-46

3 - The ultimate determinants of central bank independence

pp 47-74

Comment

pp 74-77

4 - Central bank autonomy and exchange rate regimes – their effects on monetary accommodation and activism

pp 78-110

Comment

pp 110-119

5 - Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples

pp 120-153

Comment

pp 154-161

6 - New empirical evidence on the costs of European Monetary Union

pp 162-180

Comment

pp 181-184

II - Exchange rate policy and redistribution

pp 184-186

7 - Exchange rate anchors and inflation: a political economy approach

pp 187-212

Comment

pp 213-216

8 - Why capital controls? Theory and evidence

pp 217-247

Comment

pp 248-252

9 - The political economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism

pp 253-264

Comment

pp 265-268

10 - Unemployment benefits and redistributive taxation in the presence of labor quality externalities

pp 269-289

Comment

pp 289-293

Index

pp 294-296