Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 LAWS, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
- 2 RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
- 3 STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
- 4 A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, DISCRETION, AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
- 5 LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
- 6 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
- 7 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
- 8 LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
- APPENDIX A MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX B POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX C PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX D THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- Titles in the series
5 - LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Preface
- 1 LAWS, BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY, AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DELEGATION
- 2 RATIONAL DELEGATION OR HELPLESS ABDICATION? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS
- 3 STATUTES AS BLUEPRINTS FOR POLICYMAKING
- 4 A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, DISCRETION, AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
- 5 LEGISLATION, AGENCY POLICYMAKING, AND MEDICAID IN MICHIGAN
- 6 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS SEPARATION OF POWERS SYSTEMS
- 7 THE DESIGN OF LAWS ACROSS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
- 8 LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICYMAKING PROCESSES
- APPENDIX A MMC LAWS USED IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX B POLICY CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX C PROCEDURAL CATEGORIES USED FOR MMC LAWS IN CHAPTER 3
- APPENDIX D THE FORMAL MODEL OF DISCRETION
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
Like every other U.S. state, Michigan faced an explosion in Medicaid participation and costs in the early 1990s. From 1990 to 1994 alone, the number of persons eligible for Medicaid grew nearly 25%, from 1,173,384 to 1,464,923. Much of this growth was due to new federal guidelines that increased the number of persons eligible for Medicaid. Partly as a result of this increased participation, during this same time period total expenditures increased from $2,078,412,202 to $4,103,376,419, or 97.4%. By 1995, Medicaid expenditures consumed 20% of the state's budget.
In this chapter we explore a case study, based on extensive interviews with key participants from the state legislature, the Michigan Department of Community Health, and affected interest groups, of Michigan's attempt to bring these costs under control while maintaining sufficient standards of care for Medicaid clients. While a case study like this has some clear benefits, as we will discuss, it also suffers from a significant restriction that we readily acknowledge up front. A focus on any single state precludes us from exploring the influence of some of the most important elements of our theory: namely, the institutions, or rules, that vary across political systems. To be more specific, we cannot examine how behavior in Michigan was influenced by alternative mechanisms for control or by legislative capacity, as these remained constant in Michigan during the period we examine. Thus, we clearly cannot, and do not, treat the evidence from this case study as a test of our theory.
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- Deliberate Discretion?The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy, pp. 109 - 138Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002