Introduction

The very last line of “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, Williams's frequently reprinted companion piece to J. J. C. Smart's “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics”, prophesies of utilitarianism: “The day cannot be too far off in which we hear no more of it” (Williams 1973a: 150). Ironically, however, the significant impact of this essay's attack ensured that we would, in the ensuing decades, hear much more of it. And attack seems not too strong a word, as Williams pursues the “breaking point of utilitarian thought” (ibid.: 114). Furthermore, while it is true that Williams comes to regret “an excess of polemical assertiveness” in his reply to Smart, he never abandons its constituent claims (Williams 1995h: 211). This chapter examines those claims, as well as others, which may be principally summarized as follows: that act (or what Williams calls “direct”) utilitarianism alienates moral agents from both their actions and their feelings, and in so doing undermines their integrity; that rule (or what Williams calls “indirect”) utilitarianism relies on an untenable division between theory and practice; and, finally, in a claim crucial to appreciating Williams's overall take on ethical life, “that for utilitarianism, tragedy is impossible” (Williams 1972: 86).

“Utilitarianism”, according to Williams, “is the most ambitious of extant ethical theories” (Williams 1985: 92). Just what Williams means by an ethical theory, and whether what Williams means by an ethical theory captures what most philosophers mean by an ethical theory, turn out to be fairly contentious issues, ones that will occupy us in the next chapter, in connection with Williams's more general assault on “the morality system”.