Book contents
- Frontmatter
- 1 “Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950
- 2 U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949
- 3 American Policy toward German Unification, 1949-1955
- 4 Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
- 5 American Policy toward Germany and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1955
- 6 From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe
- 7 Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
- 8 West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948-1952
- 9 Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany
- 10 American Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry
- 11 Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945-1955
- 12 The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961
- 13 HICOG and the Unions in West Germany: A Study of HICOG’s Labor Policy toward the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1952
- 14 U.S. Military Occupation, Grass Roots Democracy, and Local German Government
- 15 German Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy
- 16 America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany
- 17 U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
- 18 Grand Illusions: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954
- 19 The Federal Republic of Germany as a “Battlefield” in American Nuclear Strategy, 1953-19
- 20 The Presence of American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956
- 21 John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases
- 22 Sources in German Archives on the History of American Policy toward Germany, 1945-1955
- 23 U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and Related Records: Sources for the History of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1955, in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
17 - U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
- Frontmatter
- 1 “Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950
- 2 U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949
- 3 American Policy toward German Unification, 1949-1955
- 4 Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
- 5 American Policy toward Germany and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1955
- 6 From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe
- 7 Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
- 8 West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948-1952
- 9 Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany
- 10 American Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry
- 11 Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945-1955
- 12 The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961
- 13 HICOG and the Unions in West Germany: A Study of HICOG’s Labor Policy toward the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1952
- 14 U.S. Military Occupation, Grass Roots Democracy, and Local German Government
- 15 German Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy
- 16 America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany
- 17 U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
- 18 Grand Illusions: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954
- 19 The Federal Republic of Germany as a “Battlefield” in American Nuclear Strategy, 1953-19
- 20 The Presence of American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956
- 21 John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases
- 22 Sources in German Archives on the History of American Policy toward Germany, 1945-1955
- 23 U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and Related Records: Sources for the History of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1955, in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The Occupation policy of the victorious Allies was guided by a variety of “D's”: denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, decentralization, and democratization. Of these policies, demilitarization was the one that was initially most pressing and the one that found the most consistent support of the Allies - and of the Germans. Because of this, demilitarization was achieved more unequivocally than any of the other D's, a fact that was to cause some embarrassment and difficulty in the 1950s, when the Allies changed their minds and began to push for German rearmament.
Demilitarization as an Allied goal was first stated in the Atlantic Charter, was reiterated in numerous wartime and postwar statements, including those following the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and was embodied in Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067, which laid down U.S. and Allied occupation guidelines. Allied proclamations invariably spoke of the need to rid Germany of Nazism and militarism. In the mind of the Allies the two were inextricably linked, and the latter was the cause of the former. Germany’s enemies accepted fully the contention of Nazi propagandists that the Third Reich was the logical culmination of the Prussian military tradition, albeit with different conclusions.6 If the immediate cause of the Second World War was Hitler and the Nazis, the long-term cause was German militarism. The failure to stamp out German militarism after the First World War had led to the Second.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994