Book contents
- Frontmatter
- 1 “Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950
- 2 U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949
- 3 American Policy toward German Unification, 1949-1955
- 4 Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
- 5 American Policy toward Germany and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1955
- 6 From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe
- 7 Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
- 8 West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948-1952
- 9 Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany
- 10 American Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry
- 11 Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945-1955
- 12 The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961
- 13 HICOG and the Unions in West Germany: A Study of HICOG’s Labor Policy toward the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1952
- 14 U.S. Military Occupation, Grass Roots Democracy, and Local German Government
- 15 German Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy
- 16 America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany
- 17 U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
- 18 Grand Illusions: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954
- 19 The Federal Republic of Germany as a “Battlefield” in American Nuclear Strategy, 1953-19
- 20 The Presence of American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956
- 21 John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases
- 22 Sources in German Archives on the History of American Policy toward Germany, 1945-1955
- 23 U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and Related Records: Sources for the History of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1955, in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
- Frontmatter
- 1 “Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain”: The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945–1950
- 2 U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949
- 3 American Policy toward German Unification, 1949-1955
- 4 Marshall Plan and Currency Reform
- 5 American Policy toward Germany and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1955
- 6 From Morgenthau Plan to Schuman Plan: America and the Organization of Europe
- 7 Return to Normality: The United States and Ruhr Industry, 1949-1955
- 8 West German Agriculture and the European Recovery Program, 1948-1952
- 9 Science, Technology, and Reparations in Postwar Germany
- 10 American Deconcentration Policy in the Ruhr Coal Industry
- 11 Technology Transfer and the Emergence of the West German Petrochemical Industry, 1945-1955
- 12 The Free University of Berlin: A German Experiment in Higher Education, 1948–1961
- 13 HICOG and the Unions in West Germany: A Study of HICOG’s Labor Policy toward the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1952
- 14 U.S. Military Occupation, Grass Roots Democracy, and Local German Government
- 15 German Democratization as Conservative Restabilization: The Impact of American Policy
- 16 America and the Rebuilding of Urban Germany
- 17 U.S. Policy toward German Veterans, 1945-1950
- 18 Grand Illusions: The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the European Defense Community, 1950-1954
- 19 The Federal Republic of Germany as a “Battlefield” in American Nuclear Strategy, 1953-19
- 20 The Presence of American Troops in Germany and German-American Relations, 1949-1956
- 21 John J. McCloy and the Landsberg Cases
- 22 Sources in German Archives on the History of American Policy toward Germany, 1945-1955
- 23 U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and Related Records: Sources for the History of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1955, in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Perhaps it was his poor health alone that saved Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach from being accused and sentenced to death together with Hermann Göring, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Rudolf Hess, Julius Streicher, and other leading Nazis at the first and most famous of the Nuremberg trials in 1945 and 1946. On the Allied side, hardly anyone questioned the complicity of big business with Hitler. Some even looked upon the industrialists as the driving force within that alliance. From this point of view, it was quite natural to punish Krupp severely as the supposed symbol of the powerful armorers of the Ruhr.
By 1947-48, however, when Gustav Krupp's son Alfried and several leading managers of the firm stood trial (there were prosecutions against I.G. Farben and the Flick concern at the same time), the political atmosphere had changed dramatically. The increasing gravity of the Cold War had turned former enemies into new allies. Alfried Krupp and his colleagues were treated with leniency compared to the defendants of the first trials. One of the main reasons for this mildness was that in the meantime West German industrialists were once again urgently needed to build a common Western dam against the red tide from the East. An essential prerequisite to achieve this goal was the success of the European Recovery Program (ERP). Effective economic restoration of Western Europe, however, required a substantial degree of economic rehabilitation in the Western zones of Germany. But without private industry cooperation in this effort, U.S. Military Government and State Department officials had little confidence that they could win the battle.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994