On January 31, 1951, the U.S. high commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, announced his final decisions regarding executive clemency for eighty-nine German war criminals held in Landsberg prison. McCloy affirmed five death sentences out of a total of fifteen, primarily for members of the infamous Einsatzgruppen the SS men who killed thousands of Jews in eastern Europe. The high commissioner also reduced the sentences of seventy-nine inmates. These reductions, coupled with credit for pretrial detention and good conduct, allowed the immediate release of thirty-two of the prisoners. Among them was the industrialist Alfried Krupp, convicted of the abuse of slave labor and plundering in German-occupied countries. McCloy also returned to Krupp his vast industrial holdings, which had been subject to a confiscation order.

McCloy's clemency decisions were the most controversial actions he took as high commissioner. Coming only a few months after the outbreak of the Korean War and the American proposal of German rearmament, McCloy's decisions were blasted by contemporary critics as the height of political expediency, an attempt to win Germany's favor in the increasingly tense Cold War. As one released industrialist put it, “Now that the Americans have Korea on their hands they are a lot more friendly.” Subsequent popular and historical treatments have been equally harsh. William Manchester sharply attacked the release of Krupp in his bestseller, The Arms of Krupp, and the historian Frank Buscher contended that McCloy’s decisions played a major role in the overall “failure” of the war-crimes program to achieve its twin objectives of punishment for the guilty and the democratization of German society.