The chapter, informed by the Systematicity and Understanding Theses, discusses how understanding in medicine bolsters human agency. Rejecting the initial pathocentric proposal of medicine’s aim (Pellegrino 2001; McAndrew 2019; Hershenov 2020), it advocates the Autonomy Thesis that argues medicine’s goal is not merely treating disease, but promoting health to enhance autonomy (Christman 2009). It adopts a "positive" notion of health that is more than disease absence (Venkatapuram 2013; Nordenfelt 2017) and establishes its relation with well-being and autonomy. The chapter introduces a pluralistic view of health concept difficulties through the lens of "conceptual engineering" and refutes criticisms suggesting the Autonomy Thesis’s permissiveness. The investigation is confined to "mainstream medicine" (Broadbent 2019, ch. 1) and considers the internal morality of medicine (Brody and Miller 1998; Pellegrino 2001). It strives to define a broad yet rigorous aim of medicine that applies to various branches.

This chapter takes on the nature of scientific activity, particularly in medicine, setting out to defend the "Systematicity Thesis," which posits that medicine, like science, is systematic inquiry. Referencing literature on the demarcation issue in philosophy of science, it maintains that despite the failure of established approaches, the issue should not be abandoned. Science, it suggests, is a family resemblance concept unified not by an intrinsic property but by a relational property that allows gradational differences from nonscientific pursuits. Using Hoyningen-Huene’s (2013) account of systematicity as a necessary criterion for science, the chapter shows that both medical science and clinical medicine meet this criterion. In a critical dialogue with Oreskes (2019), the thesis is applied and tested, demonstrating that homeopathy lacks the systematicity present in scientific pursuits, making it vulnerable to biases. It also underscores that systematicity fosters reasoning and inquiry that yield reliable knowledge and understanding.

This chapter focuses on the relationship between writing systems and language, which is never perfect, with the result that irregularities and idiosyncrasies arise even in writing systems that ostensibly have a one-to-one correspondence between grapheme and speech sound (or other unit of language). On the basis of a diverse assortment of examples drawn from around the world, this chapter outlines the ways in which writing systems are and are not systematic and discusses various avenues by which idiosyncrasies arise. The survey begins with a consideration of systematicity at the level of individual graphemes, where both aesthetic and functional aspects are discussed, and follows this with an exploration of the various degrees to which phonetic writing systems cover a language’s phonemic and subphonemic distinctions and where irregularities can arise. Issues of spelling and orthography, already interspersed in the first two parts, are the dedicated topic of the last section. At various points the chapter showcases the tension between desire for economy and efficiency and desire for regularity.

If one reads about science, writes about science, or teaches science, one should know about the whats, hows, whens, and whys of science. What is science? How is it done? When is science needed? Science seeks to understand and systematize the natural world. It does so experimentally, using test tubes, computers, and animals (including humans), among other things. Curiosity and necessity drive science. Since ancient times, people have wanted to understand and then manipulate their world. For example, science has provided the means to painlessly and noninvasively look into the human body through the development of X-rays, magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, and scintigraphy (radioisotopes). Electronics and materials science have enabled creation of cell phones. Chemistry has given us therapeutic drugs, Teflon, and Velcro. Physics and engineering have taken us to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. This broad scope of science makes it difficult, but not impossible, to define. This chapter provides a holistic view of science.

In the Architectonic of Pure Reason, Kant claims that a condition for attaining the status of science is that a body of cognitions achieves architectonic unity. The chapter clarifies what this is and argues that this is more than mere systematicity. While there could be different ways of systematically ordering a body of cognitions, there is only one such order that bestows architectonic unity to it. Architectonic unity is achieved when the ‘idea’ of a science given a priori by reason is realized in an actual body of cognitions. I read this ‘idea’ as the correct description of the body of cognitions that form a science and its parts–whole relationships. In a further step, I discuss the ‘idea’ that is a candidate for providing unity to metaphysics. Kant identifies two candidate ‘ideas’ according to which metaphysics can be understood. Metaphysics can be construed according to either the ‘school concept’ (Schulbegriff) or the ‘worldly concept’ (Weltbegriff) of philosophy. I argue that it is only according to the ‘worldly concept’ that metaphysics can attain architectonic unity and become a science.

The last chapter sums up the main findings of the study and gives an outlook on potential further research at the interface of CA and World Englishes.

JH Elliott argued that the Petrine terms παροικία, πάροικος, and παρεπίδημος are literal, while the majority of scholars understand them metaphorically. This chapter therefore defines metaphors, establishes the criteria by which they can be identifies, and develops tools for their analysis. Metaphors are defined as speaking about one thing (tenor, or target domain) in terms of another (vehicle, or source domain). Though the Petrine regeneration metaphor is cognitive, it is expressed in language grounded in Jewish and Greco-Roman culture. Metaphors are rich, interactive, and not reducible to prose. Simple metaphors can be combined into complex, systematic and narrative structures, which may contain embedded, culturally-based value judgments. This study employs the Metaphor Identification Process (MIP) to determine whether kinship terms in 1 Peter are metaphorical.

The introduction explains how Cassirer's writings interweave three philosophical objectives: elucidating the spheres, the unity, and the history of human culture. Throughout the twentieth century, Cassirer has been mainly remembered for the third component , yet his thought cannot be properly understood if one does not take into account each of these interrelated objectives.

At Against the Mathematicians (M) 2.10 Sextus Empiricus defines technê along Stoic lines, as (a) an organized system of knowledge (b) directed towards an end useful for life. This raises a question. Does the sceptic’s own art satisfy conditions (a) and (b) and thereby qualify as a technê? This is not an idle question. For if it turns out that the sceptic’s art does qualify as a technê, then one might reasonably ask whether, on pain of inconsistency, Sextus ought not to train his guns on the sceptic’s art just as he trains his guns on the liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology and music in M 1–6. The chapter explore the different possible answers that can be given to the question and argues that, though scepticism satisfies condition (b) for a technê, it fails to satisfy condition (a). While skepticism has eudaimonistic use, in that establishes ‘unperturbedness’ (ataraxia), not fixed target or subject matter like technai proper, but one that changes according to dialectical context. Skeptic art has then an asystematic subject matter. Scepticism is, therefore, a non-technical art that differs fundamentally from the kinds of technai Sextus discusses, and attacks, in M 1–6.

Chapter 6, “The Demands of Theoretical Reason and Self-Knowledge”, completes Kant’s account of empirical self-knowledge – the theoretical knowledge I have of myself as a psychological person. Following Kant’s general theory of knowledge, I argue that self-knowledge requires – in addition to a cognition of myself – an attitude of assent towards this cognition and an epistemic ground for holding this cognition to be true. By laying out different types of epistemic grounds, I distinguish corresponding levels of self-knowledge. The highest level is a complete comprehension of myself based on an a priori idea of myself as a whole. While this highest level can never be attained, it sets the normative standard for all lower levels of self-knowledge. Hence, we are bound to conceptualize all psychological phenomena in accordance with a system of psychological predicates, and to approximate a complete individual self-concept, which, if available, would completely a+H9nd fully adequately describe an individual person. Finally, I outline possibilities of error, such as self-blindness and self-deceit, and revaluate the doctrine of transparency that is often ascribed to Kant.

This final chapter shows how Kant understands philosophical systematicity in analogy with legal systematicity. Taking into account the two other central illustrations of systematicity, architecture and organisms, Møller argues that only the legal metaphors illustrate the function of inner critique and the power-conferring role of reason’s lawfulness. This leads to an account of philosophy as the science of the laws of reason which takes into account the legal aspects of Kant’s philosophical methodology.

This chapter gently sets the stage for the book, using accessible language and intuitive examples. It outlines the key insights in the book in simple terms, provides motivation for the issues addressed in subsequent chapters, and introduces relevant facts from everyday experience as well as academic background. Straightforward insights help to motivate and encourage the reader to consider using Cognitive Discourse Analysis in their own research, independent of previous experience in linguistic analysis. The short chapter ends by listing the main content for each of the book’s chapters, thus providing a first detailed and intuitive overview of the book’s overall scope.

Concluding the set of general background chapters that introduce theoretical foundations, Chapter 3 summarises relevant insights from three fairly unrelated fields: cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis, and functional grammar. In cognitive linguistics, prominent insights include the relationship between words, concepts, and meanings, along with their structures in terms of semantics and syntax, general patterns concerning how language is used, and the fact that meanings are embedded in physical experience and transferred to more abstract domains (often referred to as metaphor). Discourse analysis is a generic label encompassing many ways of analysing actual language used in different contexts; this section looks at prominent methods adopted in well-known approaches such as Critical Discourse Analysis and Conversation Analysis, and then addresses a range of discourse-specific phenomena to illustrate pertinent insights in the field. Finally, Functional Grammar with its three levels of analysis (interpersonal, ideational, and textual) offers specific analysis perspectives and insights that are highly relevant and useful for understanding discourse in a cognitive context.