Populist rhetoric – presenting arguments in people-centric, anti-elite and ‘good v. evil’ frames – is said to provide populist parties and candidates with an advantage in electoral competition. Yet, identifying the causal effect of populist rhetoric is complicated by its enmeshment with certain positions and issues. We implement a survey experiment in the UK (n≈9,000), in which hypothetical candidates with unknown policy positions randomly make (non-)populist arguments, taking different positions on various issues. Our findings show that, on average, populist arguments have a negative effect on voters’ evaluations of the candidate profiles and no effect on voters’ issue preferences. However, populist arguments sway voters’ issue preferences when made by a candidate profile that voters are inclined to support. Among voters with strong populist attitudes, populist arguments also do not dampen candidates’ electoral viability. These findings suggest that populist rhetoric is useful in convincing and mobilizing supporters but detrimental in expanding electoral support.

A large body of literature indicates that partisan-motivated reasoning drives resistance to political persuasion. But recent scholarship has challenged this view, suggesting that people don’t always resist uncongenial information, and even when they do, it is not clear why. In this article, I present two survey experiments that examine when and why partisans selectively dismiss uncongenial information. The findings show that, in the absence of affective triggers, partisans were persuaded by both congenial and uncongenial information. But when randomly induced to feel adversarial, they became more dismissive of uncongenial information and ultimately disagreed more, not less, after considering the same information. These results (1) identify a crucial condition that provokes resistance to political persuasion; (2) demonstrate partisan-motivated reasoning more clearly than previous studies; and (3) underscore the importance of the quality of elite-level political discourse in determining the quality of citizen-level opinion formation.

How does a politician’s gender shape citizen responses to performance in office? Much of the existing literature suggests that voters hold higher expectations of women politicians and are more likely to punish them for malfeasance. An alternative perspective suggests that voters view men politicians as more agentic and are, therefore, more responsive to their performance, whether good or bad. Using an online survey experiment in Argentina, we randomly assign respondents to information that the distribution of a government food programme in a hypothetical city is biased or unbiased, and we also randomly assign the gender of the mayor. We find that respondents are more responsive to performance information – both positive and negative – about men mayors. We find little evidence that respondents hold different expectations of malfeasance by men versus women politicians. These results contribute to our understanding of how citizens process performance information in a context with few women politicians.

This study tests whether citizens’ evaluations of the performance of artificial intelligence (AI) in public policies are subject to motivated reasoning. Specifically, we test whether respondents’ preferences for AI regulation or their subjective attitudes toward AI are sources of motivated reasoning across varying use cases, differing in nature, complexity, safety-criticality and normative considerations: AI in municipal services, self-driving cars and recidivism prediction. Experimental results from two preregistered studies conducted among German citizens reveal that subjective attitudes toward AI cause substantial and robust motivated reasoning across all three policy domains. Regulatory preferences are only a selective source for motivated reasoning about AI in public policy. Overall, the results point to the cognitive limitations of strategies that attempt to objectify the benefits of AI without considering the context of the application domain. Politicians and policymakers need to consider these limitations in their attempts to increase citizens’ appreciation of AI in public policy.

Much work is concerned with the effects of mainstream parties accommodating the positions of populist radical right parties. Little is known about the role of political rhetoric in mainstream party responses to radical right challengers though. This is a significant gap given the evident shifts in mainstream party discourse across European democracies. Using a pre-registered survey experiment in Germany, I analyze how voters react when mainstream parties engage in populist rhetoric and adopt radical right issue positions. Theoretically, I propose that voters, particularly those with populist attitudes, may use populist rhetoric as a heuristic when evaluating parties. I find that, in line with spatial theories of voting, voters penalize or reward mainstream parties based on their adoption of radical right positions, but that the use of populist rhetoric does not significantly impact voter evaluations. These findings demonstrate the relevance of programmatic party strategies in mainstream-challenger competition and cast doubt on the effectiveness of populist rhetoric.

With a security alliance with the United States and deep economic relations with China, South Korea faces complex foreign policy choices amid US–China competition. A critical decision is whether to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a US-led grouping widely viewed as aiming to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The choice depends on its domestic politics as much as its relationships with both superpowers. Using a public opinion survey with a priming experiment, we investigate South Korean citizens’ preferences regarding the Quad. We find that, without additional information, nearly half of the respondents supported joining the Quad. Yet neither mentioning the security benefits of joining the Quad nor mentioning the potential economic costs associated with Chinese retaliation for joining the Quad changed their level of support. Nor did we detect any treatment heterogeneity. Beyond the experiment, we find that threat perceptions and party affiliation are strongly correlated with respondents’ preferences.

Intergroup attitudes and identity ties can shape foreign policy preferences. Anti-Muslim bias is particularly salient in the USA and the UK, but little work assesses whether this bias generalizes to other countries. We evaluate the extent of anti-Muslim bias in foreign policy attitudes through harmonized survey experiments in thirteen European countries (N=19,673). Experimental vignettes present factual reports of religious persecution by China, counter-stereotypically depicting Muslims as victims. We find evidence of anti-Muslim bias. Participants are less opposed to persecution and less likely to support intervention when Muslims, as opposed to other religious groups, are persecuted. However, this bias is not present in all countries. Exploratory analyses underscore that pre-existing intergroup attitudes and shared group identity moderate how group-based evaluations shape foreign policy attitudes. We provide extensive cross-national evidence that anti-Muslim bias is country-specific and that social identity ties and intergroup attitudes influence foreign policy preferences.

The Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization removed the federal right to an abortion, thereby entrusting the states to decide the fate of women’s reproductive health care policies. The outcome activated pro-choice and pro-life groups in efforts to secure favorable policies in states. One tool that groups have utilized to gain support for their position involves selective framing of women’s reproductive policies, including careful selection of wording employed in popular referenda. Using a survey experiment, this study investigates how word/phrase choice influences support for women’s reproductive policies. Two general findings stand out. First, word/phrase choices significantly impact aggregate levels of support for policies. Second, predictor variables exhibit non-static relationships with support across statements. For example, some gender gaps were evident in support for general statements and pro-choice-leaning statements but absent for specific statements and pro-life-framed statements. These findings hold implications for elections on reproductive health policies.

Political parties vary in their responses to electoral challenges, including the rise of populist competitors. To address these challenges, they sometimes engage with peripheral issues located outside their ideological comfort zones, and at other times they adhere more closely to their core policies. Although these patterns are well-documented, voters' perceptions thereof remain under-examined. This article argues that voters evaluate parties' claims not just based on the direction of their policy engagement – positive or negative – but also based on the commitment behind these actions, distinguishing ideological commitment from strategic manoeuvres. Employing a pre-registered vignette experiment, the article shows that voters differentiate responses to core versus peripheral issues, regardless of their personal agreement with the policies. Populist attitudes further moderate these perceptions, as voters with such views are typically more sceptical of parties' motives, limiting the impact of party behaviour on perceived commitment primarily to non-populist individuals. This highlights the importance of perceived commitment in elections and the constraints parties face in responding to competition.

This study examines the impact of COVID-19-induced policy environments on civil servants’ public service motivation (PSM), a topic not yet adequately researched. Using a vignette survey experiment, we investigate how four types of COVID-19 policy environment information – 1) total deduction of annual leave compensation, 2) a significant increase in working hours, 3) positive assessments of government responses from domestic audiences, and 4) positive assessments of government responses from other advanced democracies – shape civil servants’ PSM during the pandemic. We analyze original data from over 4,000 South Korean civil servants in central and local governments, gathered as part of a representative survey. Results show that reducing compensation to prepare the disaster relief fund has a negative impact, whereas recognition by advanced democracies has a positive impact on PSM. Our analysis suggests the importance of policy environments in both motivating and demotivating civil servants during a pandemic crisis.

We conduct a survey experiment testing the causal link between ethical justifications and acceptability towards two environmental policies: conservation area expansion and wildlife infrastructure. In a 2 × 3 experiment with American participants (n = 1604), we test two ethical justifications – anthropocentric justification (nature as instrumentally valuable) and a non-anthropocentric justification (nature as intrinsically valuable) compared to a control group. We find partial support that non-anthropocentric justification increases policy acceptability compared to no justification. Contrary to expectations, non-anthropocentric justification leads to higher policy acceptability than anthropocentric justification. These results are robust to individual differences in political orientation and environmental concern. Additionally, participants in the non-anthropocentric experimental condition respond that similar conservation policies generally are, and should be, passed to benefit wildlife and ecosystems compared to control group participants. Likewise, participants given the anthropocentric justification report that similar policies are, and should be, passed for humans and society compared to the control group.

A startling feature of the countless recent sex scandals involving politicians has been the almost complete lack of public apologies. This note explores the electoral incentives politicians face when crafting communication strategies in the aftermath of sex scandals. We focus on two communication strategies – denials and apologies – and assess their impact on incumbent support across a wide range of scandals that vary in terms of the seriousness of the charges as well as the availability of evidence. Using data from a series of survey experiments, including over 10,000 respondents we find that citizens punish incumbents who apologize, even in the case of accusations that appear the least serious in the eyes of voters. Moreover, apologies fail to generate political support compared to denials, even in cases when voters are exposed to evidence. This suggests that in most cases apologies are simply not politically viable communication strategies.

This article proposes that elections with substantial amounts of campaign activity change the substance of a state supreme court’s legitimacy from one derived from the court’s legalistic nature to one derived through representation. Using a national survey, it shows that because of this change the perceived legitimacy of courts with robust elections does not induce acceptance of their decisions. Only nonrepresentative courts with the legalistic form of legitimacy can convert their institutional legitimacy into decisional acceptance. This means that even highly legitimate courts with robust elections are ineffective at inducing acceptance. This hinders the ability of those courts to build public support for their decisions, which is essential for the effective functioning of the judiciary. Additional analyses show this effect is not caused by the politicization associated with campaigning but rather through the representation provided by elections.

In China, both governments and civil institutions play important roles in non-profit regulation. However, with various regulatory instruments available, it remains unclear which has the strongest public support and most effectively promotes civic engagement. This study compared the impact of different non-profit regulatory instruments addressing information disclosure on two aspects of civic engagement intention: willingness to donate and willingness to volunteer. A survey experiment was conducted to analyse the perspectives of 939 Chinese participants on four types of regulation: no regulation, civil regulation, accommodative government regulation and deterrent government regulation. Results showed that regulation was preferred to no regulation and deterrent government regulation was preferred to accommodative government regulation, which was preferred to civil regulation. Additionally, public trust in non-profits significantly mediated the relationship between regulation and civic engagement intention. These findings suggest that government regulation, particularly the deterrent approach, garners strong public support and may be prioritized within the Chinese context.

Across the world, political parties are incorporating social movement strategies and frames. In this study, we pivot from the dominant focus on party characteristics to analyze drivers of support for movement parties in six European countries. We report results from a choice-based conjoint survey experiment showing that contrary to previous research, movement party voters favor neither candidates who are institutional outsiders nor those who actively participate in protests. Candidate policy positions are the most important driver of the vote for movement parties. Movement party voters, additionally, prefer candidates who either display anti-elitist sentiments or who want to ensure the smooth running of the current political system. These insights invite renewed attention to movement parties as an electoral vehicle whose voters prioritize decisive policy change.

How can public opinion change in a pro-immigration direction? Recent studies suggest that those who support immigration care less about it than those who oppose it, which may explain why lawmakers do not enact pro-immigration reforms even when voters are pro-immigration. To see if the personal issue importance of immigration can be changed, I conducted a probability-based, nationally representative US survey experiment (N = 3,450) exposing respondents to verifiable arguments about the broad national benefits of expanding legal immigration and the costs of not doing so. Using new measures of issue importance, my descriptive results show that only one-fifth of voters who prioritize the issue have a pro-immigration preference. Furthermore, while anti-immigration respondents prioritize policies regarding law enforcement and (reducing) future immigration, pro-immigration respondents prioritize (helping) immigrants already here. The experimental results confirm that the provided arguments raised immigration’s importance among pro-immigration voters but did not backfire by mobilizing anti-immigration voters. Contrary to expectations, the arguments increased pro-immigration policy preferences, but did not change voters’ subissue priorities within immigration or their willingness to sign a petition. Overall, the treatment was effective beyond changing minds by shifting stated issue positions and priorities in a pro-immigration direction. It can thus be used in a nontargeted information campaign to promote pro-immigration reforms.