Quantitative methods have been used to: (1) better predict civil conflict onset; and (2) understand causal mechanisms to inform policy intervention and theory. However, an exploration of individual conflict onset cases illustrates great variation in the characteristics describing the outbreak of civil war, suggesting that there is not one single set of factors that lead to intrastate war. In this article, we use descriptive statistics to explore persistent clusters in the drivers of civil war onset, finding evidence that some arrangements of structural drivers cluster robustly across multiple model specifications (such as young, poorly developed states with anocratic regimes). Additionally, we find that approximately one-fifth of onset cases cannot be neatly clustered across models, suggesting that these cases are difficult to predict and multiple methods for understanding civil conflict onset (and state failure more generally) may be necessary.

Previous research by Goldstone et al. (2010) generated a highly accurate predictive model of state-level political instability. Notably, this model identifies political institutions – and partial democracy with factionalism, specifically – as the most compelling factors explaining when and where instability events are likely to occur. This article reassesses the model’s explanatory power and makes three related points: (1) the model’s predictive power varies substantially over time; (2) its predictive power peaked in the period used for out-of-sample validation (1995–2004) in the original study and (3) the model performs relatively poorly in the more recent period. The authors find that this decline is not simply due to the Arab Uprisings, instability events that occurred in autocracies. Similar issues are found with attempts to predict nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017) and armed conflict onset and continuation (Hegre et al. 2013). These results inform two conclusions: (1) the drivers of instability are not constant over time and (2) care must be exercised in interpreting prediction exercises as evidence in favor or dispositive of theoretical mechanisms.

This article is driven by an empirical paradox over where Somalia came from (pre-colonial clan-states) and where it ended up (return to pre-colonial clano-territorial conflicts). Existing academic studies on contemporary Somalia, which were supposed to provide critical analysis, continue to applaud the creation of clan-states within the failed state of Somalia. Based on a variety of unique primary sources, this article offers a new perspective on the current state formation processes occurring in the purview of the Somali State. Somali clans are determined to come to terms with the state collapse by averting the return to political power of the detested military regime, which was led by one clan-based leadership that tended to terrorize other rival clans and denied any equal power- and resource-sharing framework. Conceptualizing the contemporary Somali state as similar to pre-colonial clan-sultanates, this article argues that contemporary Somalis are reverting to a pre-colonial realm where each clan had its clan sultan seeking for a clan-state of its own right. Where else do clan-states compete against each other in entering into “treaties” with external entities intent on exploiting war-torn Somalia as tabula rasa? It is towards the objective of answering this question and of providing a better understanding of the Somali conflict that this article is offered to add a comparative empirical understanding of the different trajectories of state formations in Somalia.

This paper develops a predatory theory approach to understanding state failure. Predatory theory expects that state revenue extraction is central to the ability of states to engage in any other activities. States that are able to maximize their revenue extraction subject to well-known constraints are therefore likely to avoid state failure. On the other hand, when state failure occurs, it should reduce state revenue extraction. These hypotheses receive mixed support in several two-stage least-squares time-series analyses that control for the endogenous relationship between state fiscal capacity and state failure. While state failure reduces state fiscal capacity, state fiscal capacity does not deter state failure onset or incidence. In the sub-Saharan African subsample, state fiscal capacity does reduce the incidence of state failure despite a reciprocal negative effect.

Can the dissolution or transgression of sovereign authority – ‘failed states’, for example – be understood within a concept of sovereignty? Extant understandings provide a negative answer; approaches to sovereignty in International Relations and Political Theory conceptualize sovereignty as located in stable entities, generally states. Insofar as political societies face crises of authority, those crises arise from exogenous factors, not the structure of sovereignty. We argue that this is a restrictive notion of sovereignty. In its place, we offer a theorization that can account for the dissolution or transgression of sovereign orders, focusing on the possibility that sovereigns may not recognize their subjects as the originary structure of sovereignty. In our understanding, sovereignty is logically and temporally before sovereign power. Consequently, the possibility of dissolution is a structural condition of all sovereign orders. This enables us to theorize the relationship between sovereignty, sovereign power, and the law, and to apply this broader concept to analyze politics in ‘weak’ and ‘failed states’.

This research examines the impact on health-care provision of advanced state failure and of the violence frequently associated with it, drawing from six country case studies. In all contexts, the coverage and scope of health services change when the state fails. Human resources expand due to unplanned increased production. Injury, threat, death, displacement, migration, insufficient salaries, and degraded skills all impact on performance. Dwindling public domestic funding for health causes increasing household out-of-pocket expenditure. The supply, quality control, distribution, and utilisation of medicines are severely affected. Health information becomes incomplete and unreliable. Leadership and planning are compromised as international agencies pursue their own agendas, frequently disconnected from local dynamics. Yet beyond the state these arenas are crowded with autonomous health actors, who respond to state withdrawal and structural violence in assorted ways, from the harmful to the beneficial. Integrating these existing resources into a cohesive health system calls for a deeper understanding of this pluralism, initiative, adaptation and innovation, and a long-term reorientation of development assistance in order to engage them effectively.