This paper develops a predatory theory approach to understanding state failure. Predatory theory expects that state revenue extraction is central to the ability of states to engage in any other activities. States that are able to maximize their revenue extraction subject to well-known constraints are therefore likely to avoid state failure. On the other hand, when state failure occurs, it should reduce state revenue extraction. These hypotheses receive mixed support in several two-stage least-squares time-series analyses that control for the endogenous relationship between state fiscal capacity and state failure. While state failure reduces state fiscal capacity, state fiscal capacity does not deter state failure onset or incidence. In the sub-Saharan African subsample, state fiscal capacity does reduce the incidence of state failure despite a reciprocal negative effect.

The comparative study of debt and fiscal consolidation has acquired a new focus in the wake of the global financial crisis. This paper re-evaluates the literature on fiscal consolidation that flourished during the 1980s and 1990s. The conventional approach to explanation is based on segmenting episodes of fiscal change into discrete observations. We argue that this misses the dynamic features of government strategy, especially in the choices made between expenditure-based and revenue-based fiscal consolidation strategies. We propose a focus on pathways rather than episodes of adjustment, to capture what Pierson terms ‘politics in time’. A case-study approach facilitates analysis of complex causality that includes the structures of interest intermediation, the role of ideas in shaping the set of feasible policy choices, and the situation of national economies in the international political economy. We support our argument with qualitative data based on two case studies, Ireland and Greece, and with additional paired comparisons of Ireland with Britain, and Greece with Spain. Our conclusions suggest that the conventional literature, by excluding key political variables from consideration, may distort our understanding and result in misleading policy prescription.

This article investigates the conceptual and theoretical implications of the logic of habit for the path-dependence approach. In the existing literature, we see two different logics of action associated with two distinct models of path dependence: the logic of consequences (instrumental rationality) is linked with utilitarian paths (i.e. increasing returns) and the logic of appropriateness (normative rationality) constitutes normative paths (normative lock-in). However, this study suggests that despite its popularity, the path-dependence approach remains underspecified owing to its exclusion or neglect of the logic of habit, which constitutes a distinct mechanism of reproduction or self-reinforcement in the institutional world. This article, therefore, introduces the notion of the ‘habitual path’ as a different model of path dependence. Although the idea of the habitual path is complementary with the existing models, owing to its distinctive notions of agency and mechanisms of path reproduction, it offers a different interpretation of continuity or regularity. Thus, by enriching the path-dependence approach, the notion of the habitual path would contribute to our comprehension of continuities and discontinuities in the political world.

This paper notes the tendency of ‘social movement unionism’ scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic to focus on and prescribe the citizen repertoire as the single most important repertoire of labor for challenging neoliberal globalization. Consistent with liberal conceptions of civil society and theories of participatory democracy, it implicitly dismisses political unionism as a path to labor’s revitalization. It also assumes epochal change and confines neoliberalism to the post-Washington Consensus era. Deviant case analysis of Italian labor’s use of two repertoires (the citizen and the labor repertoire) and of its two regimes of capitalism (in succession, a post-WWII neoliberal regime and a post-1970 corporatist regime) over the course of the ‘American Century’ gives pause to both these contentions. This study relates labor’s citizen repertoire to the era of US hegemony that promotes changes in party-government that tend to reproduce the image of the archetypically neoliberal American polity: a polity that is devoid of ‘labor’ as a recognized category of the political community, is low in social rights, and, relatedly, is devoid of a party of labor. In this neoliberal political order, labor is perennially locked into the category of ‘citizen’ and reliant on the citizen repertoire. By contrast, the survival of parties of labor in non-US polities during the post-war wave of neoliberalism permitted union movements a route away from labor-decategorizing orders – political unionism. Now, in the post-Washington Consensus wave of neoliberal regime change, that route is more onerous owing to Third Way changes in parties of labor. The major challenge for labor movements that have experienced regime change to a neoliberal polity is in directing their efforts and even their new citizen repertoire to the task of recapturing parties of labor or to creating new ones – or risk long-term US-style labor decategorization.

This article analyses the impact of populist right-wing parties (PRWPs) on welfare state reforms in Western Europe in the light of the trade-off that they face between office and votes. On the one hand, PRWPs appeal to traditionally left-leaning blue-collar ‘insiders’ supportive of social insurance schemes. On the other hand, they have only been able to take part in government as junior coalition partners with liberal or conservative parties who are more likely to retrench these very same welfare programmes. In this context, the article argues that these parties have to choose between betraying their electorate (and losing votes), and betraying their coalition partners (and losing office). When they choose office, it enables welfare state retrenchment by allowing their coalition partners to curtail left-wing opposition, but entails high electoral costs for PRWPs. When they choose votes, it generates deadlock and potentially jeopardizes their participation in government. The paper draws on a comparative analysis of pension reforms during three periods of government participation of PRWPs: the Schüssel I and II cabinets in Austria (2000–06), the Rutte I cabinet in the Netherlands (2010–12) and three pension reforms in Switzerland between 1995 and 2010. The analysis draws on original primary material and interviews.

Deep changes regard the political careers of democratic leaders. Until recently, becoming president or prime minister was the last step before retirement or withdrawal to an undemanding seat on the back benches. On the contrary recent heads of government are enthusiastically seeking alternative ways to capitalize on their prestige and contacts portfolio, often ending up in the world of business or international finance. There are many examples of such a trend, from Blair to Mulroney, from Schröder to Barak. This article provides an empirical analysis of the phenomenon, by examining a dataset of 441 leaders in 78 different democratic countries over a period dating from 1989 to 2012. Attention will be focused on the political background of the prime ministers and presidents, how long they stay in power, the average age of heads of government, what professional pursuits they are involved in after their term in office and what career model they follow. The article concludes by proposing a post-presidential model which indicates some of the current trends and illustrates how former leaders are gaining decision-making power and visibility.

Support for independence from Spain has sharply increased in recent years in Catalonia. According to all available evidence, public opinion has shifted from an overwhelmingly pro-autonomy position to an increasingly pro-independence stance. How can we explain such widespread support for secession in a democratic context? Traditionally, national identity has been regarded as the main explanatory factor, but recent accounts tend to underline the effect of political elite’s agency as well as instrumental calculations regarding the economic consequences of secession. However, the identification of this last causal effect is subject to a fundamental challenge: the possibility that economic expectations are mere rationalizations of prior preferences. In order to overcome this identification problem, we combine the analysis of observational survey data with an original survey-embedded experiment that provides a robust test of the causal nature of economic expectations. Our results show how identity, as well as partisanship, are the main drivers of support for secession, but also that economic considerations play an independent role. Results show that economic motivations are more relevant for citizens with ambivalent identity positions and for those that have no party identification, or are partisans of parties with less clear-cut stances on the issue.