Chapter three details methods of statecraft in Bahrain across the Twentieth and Twenty First Century. In particular, the chapter notes several compelling trends. Firstly, the British desire to sail a Middle Course in Bahrain led to reforms designed to ameliorate dissent through indirect and pacific means, yet it also ultimately led to the crystallisation of the Al Khalifa regime. These methods included the civil list, municipal reform, and even the acknowledgement of primogeniture. It also notes that in the 1950s, growing Arab nationalism and a desire to sail this middle course of non-interference meant Britain innovated and improvised techniques of statecraft in order to repress the Higher Executive Committee.Post-Independence diminishing British influence and increasing Saudi ascendency meant that the government eschewed tactics like public-delegation through parliament in favour of methods centred around patronage. This Saudi largesse had the simultaneous effect of binding Bahrain closer to Saudi, resulting in long-term de-democratisation and rentierism. Diminishing British influence upon Independence also seemed to cause a manifestation of both Saudi and Al Khalifa animosity towards political opposition and the Shiʿa.

In this chapter we discuss standards as forms of partial organization. Standards are defined as decided rules for common and voluntary use. Taking the example of CSR and corporate governance standards, we show that the degree of partiality of standards can vary widely – ranging from a single element of organization, i.e. decided rules, to all five elements of organization, i.e. decided rules, hierarchies, membership, monitoring and sanctioning. We demonstrate that in some cases partiality is the result of restrictions in the design of standards, while in other cases it is the result of an explicit choice. We also demonstrate that the degree of partiality of standards can change over time, as there are often pressures for standards to adopt additional organizational elements. Furthermore, we discuss the dispersed nature of many standards, showing how different actors often provide different organizational elements of standards without any central coordination. We close with an outline of an agenda for future research.

In this chapter, we analyse prizes as forms of partial organization, particularly focusing on prizes as one way to organize approval procedures. A basis for this view is that prizes are based on decisions and thus constitute a sanctioning mechanism to actors. Our aim is to explore the characteristics and potential effects of prizes as partial organization. We use prizes in the fields of science and sports as empirical examples to answer these questions. Based on our definition of prizes as publicly communicated decisions of approval, we explore three ways in which prizes vary: the uses of rules; membership; and communication of prizes and prize decisions. From this, two main strategies for prize giving are identified: one more organized and the other more ‘mystical’. The first uses elements of formal organization to formulate rules or membership criteria, and to communicate them to both the potential prize recipients and the audience. The second lacks these elements, which engulf prizes in an aura of mystery. From this finding, we explore some potential and observed effects of prizes on actors’ behaviours, on status and status positions in fields in which the actors operate, and on prize givers themselves.