In this article, we show how interpretive battles about compliance can lead to regulatory differentiation and, in turn, market segmentation. To do so, we study the evolution of unsecured lending in the United States, between 1900 and 1945. In the early 20th century, a large segment of the workforce relied on their wages to access credit: this required the “legal coding” of labor income into capital, where lenders would offer advances in exchange for a lien over future revenues. Regulating these transactions raised conflicts between Progressive reformers, lenders and, after 1929, federal regulators, which spanned over five decades. The historical comparison of three states—Illinois, New York and Georgia—, shows that local discussions revolved around three outcomes—legal status, pricing method and collateralization—, the issue of which led to distinct regulatory paths and market configurations at the state level. Finally, the New Deal policies created an additional strand of federal coding, furthering market divides between unregulated payday lenders, non-bank credit companies, and commercial banks. On financial markets, discussions about compliance often revolve around calculative technologies, and we suggest this as a possible crossing point between STS analyses of capitalization devices and Pistor’s theory of capital modulation.

En 1897, Émile Durkheim, père de la sociologie moderne fait paraître un de ses ouvrages clefs, « Le Suicide », qui va bouleverser le regard que l’on porte sur ce phénomène. Il y affirme, que loin d’être un phénomène purement individuel, le suicide est aussi un fait social, qui peut dire quelque chose de la société dans laquelle vit le suicidant [1]. Durkheim révèle les « déterminants sociaux » pouvant influencer le passage à l’acte suicidaire et il conclue à l’existence de plusieurs catégories sociales de suicide. Il met surtout en évidence que ce sont les mutations sociales rapides qui sont les périodes les plus à risque d’augmentation de la pathologie suicidaire. Dans une première partie, nous tenterons ainsi d’analyser l’évolution des sociétés contemporaines africaines au filtre des concepts Durkheimiens de « régulation » et d’« intégration » pour tenter de donner une ébauche sociologique du suicide en leur sein. Nous envisagerons dans une seconde partie, d’analyser les critiques opposables à la vision de Durkheim pour essayer de s’approcher au plus près d’une représentation sociale actualisée du suicide, mêlant à la fois les bouleversements sociétaux d’une Afrique plongée dans la globalisation et les aspirations individuelles nouvelles entre tradition et modernité [2–4].

Dans cet article, nous empruntons le vocabulaire des études cinématographiques pour visualiser le droit tel qu’il est utilisé, interprété et construit du point de vue des personnes en situation d’itinérance. Nous avançons que les modalités du droit s’expriment différemment dans les lois élaborées pour règlementer les personnes en situation d’itinérance. Les techniques cinélégales que nous proposons sont au fond des métaphores qui permettent de mieux nuancer les représentations sceptiques et instrumentalistes du droit. Ces façons d’éprouver la réglementation des personnes itinérantes peuvent également favoriser l’incarnation de la perception des interactions urbaines entre les personnes en situation d’itinérance et leurs interlocuteurs.

This article examines shifts in the regulation and governance of business crime in competition and deceptive trade practices law. It traces policies and enforcement in Canada's Combines Investigation Act/Competition Act from 1975–2005, a period of seismic shift in regulatory law during which formerly dominant Keynesian welfare-state discourses, practices, and policies were replaced by those characterizing the neo-liberal regulatory state. The Competition Bureau was a key player in this transition, by which competition policy became the primary regulatory mechanism of the modern state. The article's purpose is to analyse enforcement records, annual reports, and other documents from the Competition Bureau to show how priorities and practices have changed and to link these changes to shifts in governance associated with the transition from Keynesian economic philosophies to those of the neo-liberal state.

We study the welfare impact of enforcing a competitive behavior from an unregulated fringe competing with a regulated dominant operator, with imperfectly differentiated goods. The fringe is potentially collusive but may be supervised by a competition authority. We show that the complementarity/substitutability between regulation and competition policy strongly depends on the nature of the market interaction.

Forcing the fringe to adopt a competitive behavior always benefits consumers. However, it also affects the amount of subsidy that must be provided to the regulated firm for cost-reimbursement purposes, which has a social cost when public funds are costly. With complements, antitrust intervention is always welfare-improving. It is also preferable with weak substitutes, but is detrimental to welfare for strong substitutes.

A benevolent social planner, which faces a cost of public funds because of distortive taxation, wants to finance an upstream monopoly. This monopoly produces a necessary input for a downstream competitive sector which competes á la Cournot (with either a fixed number of firms or free entry in the downstream sector). We show that in both cases an ad valorem access charge is a better regulatory tool than a per unit access charge if the access charges are restrained to be positive. The reverse holds when access charges are used to subsidize the downstream market. We then analyze the incidence of the imperfect competition on final prices.

Results are presented from laboratory-based experiments in which we investigated short-term responses of Mytilus edulis L. to experimental changes in the amount and composition of suspended seston. Working with large quantities of cultured algae, we have studied feeding behaviour over ranges of food availability and quality that extend well beyond earlier limits. Findings confirm the ability of mussels to selectively reject inorganic particles as pseudofaeces prior to ingestion, thereby enriching the organic content of ingested matter by 30% more than the organic content of natural filtered seston. Our findings also establish acclimation both of selective and absorptive processes, indicating that the extent to which growth of M. edulis can be stimulated in the short-term will depend upon prior nutritional history. Present maximal growth of 14.8% dry soft tissue d−1 in a standard M. edulis of 1 g dry soft tissue was much higher than has previously been documented for any adult mussel. Maximal growth was achieved when natural seston that had been enriched to more than about 60% organic content with a mixture of algal monocultures was available at concentrations above about 11.5 mg total particulates 1−1. Neither ingestion rate nor net energy balance were improved with further increases in food availability, associated with regulatory reductions in the rate of water filtration (clearance rate) that maintained organic ingestion rate independent of increases in both the amount and organic content of available seston. These findings suggest that digestive processes had become saturated when organic ingestion reached about 6.5 mg organics g−1 dry soft tissue h−1 in a standard M. edulis of 1 g dry soft tissue, representing as much as 20.6% of all soft tissue organic mass mussel−1 d−1. Such saturation of organic ingestion is consistent with previous conclusions based on comparative allometries showing that limitations to growth in M. edulis and other bivalves are associated with the rate of food processing.