Aha! experiences are often very well recalled. The idea of insight leaving an indelible mark on memory was put forward by the Gestalt psychologists, yet has remained under-studied. This chapter provides an overview the existing empirical evidence for an insight memory advantage and possible explanations for why insight enhances memory. Several studies have focused on the phenomenological aspect of insight by showing that solutions associated with Aha! experiences are remembered better than those without, even after delays of up to two weeks. Confidence (i.e., a metacognitive reaction) and pleasure (i.e., an affective reaction) were also shown to play a role. On the other hand, there could also be a potential association between solution processes involving restructuring (i.e., the cognitive aspect of insight) and better memory. At present a clearer role is seen for the phenomenological effects of insight experiences on memory, but more work is needed that explores both phenomenological and cognitive aspects of insight in the same studies.

In this chapter, we argue that differences in problem-solving experiences can be traced to differences in the activation of brain structures involved in the unconscious processing of information (what we refer to as “the backstage”). Scientists commonly distinguish between two major types of problem-solving experiences: via insight and via analysis. Three properties are often mentioned when describing how insight solutions differ from analytic solutions: (1) Solvers are unable to report much of the processing that leads to the solution which comes to mind in an off–on manner; (2) Solvers experience their solutions together with a feeling of pleasure and reward; (3) Solutions via insight feel correct and they actually are. This is captured by a distinctive response: the Aha! This chapter focuses on these three properties and argues that unconscious processes are important for problem-solving in general, but especially important for insight experiences because most of the processing that leads to the solution happens below awareness. It also argues that the positive affect associated with insight serves an adaptive function.

Insight experiences are powerful: They feel true, they are remembered, and they can shift our decisions and our beliefs. Feelings of insight are also accurate most of the time. However, recent work shows that it is possible to systematically induce false insights and even misattribute our Aha! moments to make false facts seem true. Insights, therefore, seem to be adaptive on average but error prone. This chapter suggests that these results can be integrated by thinking of insights as a metacognitive heuristic for selecting ideas from the stream of consciousness (dubbed the “Eureka heuristic”), reviews key findings about the accuracy of insights and where and why insights go wrong, and discusses implications for our understanding of the development of delusions, false beliefs, and misinformation. Ultimately, understanding the role that feelings of insight play in human cognition may make us better decision-makers in an uncertain world.

Although insight experiences are recognized to be cognitively, physiologically, and neurologically distinct from other forms of reasoning and problem solving, it also appears that the experience of insight is not the same for all types of individuals or in all circumstances. Researchers in our lab and others have begun to examine the individual differences associated with the insight experience: what makes certain individuals more likely to report solving problems insightfully, and how might the subjective experience of insight differ among people according to their underlying psychological and neurobiological characteristics? Research demonstrates that the tendency to experience insight during problem-solving varies among individuals as a function of transient differences in one’s psychological state as well as stable, trait-like differences in neurocognitive dynamics. We argue that an individual differences approach can further disambiguate the components of insight on the behavioral and neural levels and help us understand when, and for whom, such experiences are most likely to occur, and how they may affect us depending on our individual motivations, goals, and underlying neurobiology.

This chapter posits a prepared mind as key to later insight experiences. Following Wallas's (1926) four-stage model, preparation through failures experienced during initial solution attempts anticipates opportunities. At the time of impasse, solvers can predict necessary solution qualities by thinking through failed attempts at a more abstract level. These predictive features (Johnson & Seifert, 1994) describe needed resources, missing information, and solution characteristics, and are “seeded” into memory with the unsolved problem. Later, during incubation, attended features in the current context spontaneously retrieve the unsolved problem from memory, called opportunistic assimilation. This conscious reminding of the unsolved problem is the experience of sudden insight (Aha!). The surprised solver must then puzzle through why the current contextual features brought the problem back to mind and, in the process, restructure the old and new representational pieces into a novel solution. In this account, the insight process depends on effortful thinking during both preparation and illumination, but the incubation stage involves the simple process of associative memory as the source of insight experiences.

First, how does the human cognitive system give rise to gestures? A growing body of literature suggests that gestures are based in people’s perceptual and physical experience of the world. Second, do gestures influence how people take in information from the world? Research suggests that producing gestures modifies producers’ experience of the world in specific ways. Third, does externalizing information in gestures affect cognitive processing? There is evidence that expressing spatial and motoric information in gestures has consequences for thinking, including for memory and problem solving. Fourth, how do gestures influence other people’s cognitive processing? Research indicates that gestures can highlight certain forms of information for others’ thinking, thus engaging social mechanisms that influence cognitive processing. Gestures are closely tied to action, and they reveal how producers schematize information in the objects, tasks, events, and situations that they gesture about. In brief, gestures play an integral role in cognition, both for gesture producers and for gesture recipients, because they are actions of the body that bridge the mind and the world.

Providing medical care during a mass event requires important situational awareness and preparation. Significant planning and relationship building provides a foundation for creating an operational outline, and establishing crowd dynamics and expectations for related medical activities. Collaboration with stakeholders will provide insight into the operations of various other event management entities, and allows for more seamless operations during the event. Once an operational plan has been established and circulated, the event medical team can be prepared for the expected external and crowd conditions and respond appropriately, while maintaining vigilance for any emergency that may arise. Contingency planning is key for the medical team to have appropriate emergency response defaults. Special attention is also needed on communications strategies for real-time intel, information dissemination, and crowd management. Once the event reaches its end, it is important to establish stand-down procedures to be followed as the crowd disperses to ensure an orderly event closure. After action reports can provide valuable insights for future crowd management.

The final chapter focuses on many of the common obstacles that may surface and impede ComB therapy. A range of possible solutions are provided to address issues such as when a BFRB is comorbid with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, and anxiety, as well as with features such as perfectionism, low motivation, ambivalence, readiness for treatment, and lack of adherence to therapy recommendations. Also covered in this chapter are common mistakes made by therapists, issues of relapse prevention and possible future directions for maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of ComB treatment.

This chapter describes the process of ComB treatment implementation, in which the “active ingredients” are introduced that that are chosen to reduce the power of antecedent cues, to divert the individual’s ability to engage in their BFRB, and to provide alternative means for achieving reinforcing outcomes that encourage and perpetuate BFRB activity. The process of introducing appropriate interventions is described in detail, with emphases on fitting interventions to each client’s needs and preferences. The reader is guided through methods for choosing specific interventions, monitoring their effectiveness, and making decisions about modifying the intervention plan as therapy moves forward. The SCAMP formulation is revisited to illustrate how specific interventions within each of the five domains draw upon tried-and-true cognitive behavioral techniques that can be incorporated in problem-solving common difficulties encountered within each domain.

This chapter describes how romantic partners navigate the disagreements that necessarily result from their interdependence and how partners recover when they intentionally or unintentionally hurt each other. Specifically, it reviews the ways in which goals and desires conflict to produce disagreements and how disagreements provide a diagnostic situation in which people make inferences about their partner’s thoughts, feelings, and commitment. Next, it describes typical conflict topics, how conflicts tend to be experienced, and typical conflict prevalence over the course of a romantic relationship. Next, the chapter covers how people manage interpersonal conflicts and highlights specific conflict behaviors that are typically destructive (e.g., hostility, withdrawal) and specific conflict behaviors that are typically constructive (e.g., intimacy, problem solving), as well as how the adaptiveness of conflict behaviors can change depending on the situation. Finally, this chapter reviews how partners can recover from destructive conflicts and other relationship transgressions by accommodating rather than retaliating, sacrificing, and forgiving.

This chapter explains the interventions that are used to repair and strengthen relationships. It starts with a description of common evidence-based therapeutic interventions, including forms of behavioral couple therapy and emotionally focused couple therapy. Then it reviews the evidence supporting short-term and long-term benefits of therapeutic interventions to improve relationship functioning. The second half of this chapter reviews educational interventions that can strengthen relationships and keep them from becoming distressed, including PREP, a widely used and adapted couple relationship education program. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how therapeutic and educational interventions can be strengthened by increasing their accessibility and by adapting them for minority (e.g., same-sex) couples.

The enormity of climate change and the many ways one might address it is overwhelming. This chapter examines two movements that have sought to do so. One, the green bond movement, seeks to explicitly create opportunities for market participants to prioritize labeled sustainable and climate investment. The other, the divestment movement, seeks to move investment away from fossil fuel companies via direct political action that pressures large entities like universities and nonprofits to take their money out of fossil fuel companies and emissions intensive industries. Tripathy’s argument is twofold. First, he describes how the two movements, despite profound ideological and cultural differences, share an underlying assumption that climate change can be addressed by manipulating the workings of financial markets. Our increasing realization that neither of these movements, in isolation or in combination, has been even remotely successful in addressing the problem of climate change should remind us of a classical critique of market solutions: markets are inadequate when it comes to efficiently addressing problems with very distant and broad societal consequences. The chapter thus suggests that the failure of two market approaches with such diverse profiles should make us expand our political will and imagination to look beyond markets for future means to address climate change. Second, Tripathy suggests that in our necessary endeavor to develop alternative solutions, we may seek inspiration from the divestment movement. What is particularly interesting in this movement is its emphasis on democratic ideals of participation and inclusion in the political process itself, as well as its broad conception for a necessary agenda of societal change required to address climate change.

Although commonly treated as two separate areas of study in primate cognition, inferential reasoning and problem solving share two key features. They involve going “beyond the information given,” and they compete with associative accounts to explain observable behavior. Despite these commonalities, the study of inferential reasoning and problem solving differ in non-trivial ways from both a methodological and conceptual perspective. They use different setups and use different concepts to investigate how individuals innovate when faced with novel challenges. However, these differences, I will argue, are far less substantial than their commonalities, especially when contrasted with competing frameworks such as associative or perceptual-based accounts of behavior. In this chapter, I will review some of the most relevant empirical studies in primates on inferential reasoning and problem solving. In general, studies on inferential reasoning entail choosing from two or more alternatives to locate a hidden food item (e.g., object permanence) whereas problem-solving studies require individuals to overcome some obstacle that is blocking their access to a visible food item (e.g., tool use). I will then attempt to synthesize this information to extract the key theoretical constructs, paying particular attention to the commonalities and differences between them. Finally, I will contrast the “inferential” approach to other competing approaches (associative, perceptual) in an attempt to strengthen the ties between inferential reasoning and problem solving and propose ways to foster progress in the coming years.