This paper analyses the effects of disease and war on the accumulation of human and physical capital. We employ an overlapping generation framework in which young adults, motivated by old-age provision and possibly altruism, make decisions about investments in schooling and capital. A poverty trap exists for a wide range of constant war losses and premature adult mortality. If parents are altruistic and the sub-utility function for own consumption is more concave than that for their evaluation of their children’s full income in adulthood, the only possible steady-state growth path involves full education. Otherwise, steady-state paths with incompletely educated children may exist. When mortality and destruction rates are stochastic, the initial boundary conditions and agents’ beliefs have a strong influence on the paths generated by a sequence of shocks. Calibrating the model to Kenya, simulations for stochastic settings yield the finding that a trap exists and is always avoided, but the chances of a slow recovery are substantial.

We consider the concept of poverty from the asset-accumulation approach and propose an integrated framework, building upon existing theories, to describe how the interconnected factors of trust (or lack thereof) and social distance can reinforce poverty traps. Social distance is influenced by choice, while trust is the symptom that defines the strength of social ties on a group. We look at how an absence of trust influences how households make decisions about the use and accumulation of assets in ways that could perpetuate poverty. Weak trust also affects how groups interact with each other in a society, creating “trust clusters” within homogeneous groups and antagonism across groups, which in turn affects aspirations and leads to an erosion of the basis of a social contract. For more effective and sustainable poverty reduction, we need to understand these linkages and address them systematically.

This paper investigates how the different food aid programs affect economic development via their effect on the parental trade-off between the number of children and the investment in each child's human capital. This is done in an OLG framework where parents decide on the number of children and the nutrition and secondary schooling of each child. Primary schooling is mandatory. Providing school meals locks countries with no children attending secondary schooling into poverty by reducing the private (nutrition) cost per child. In countries where parents find it optimal to enroll children in secondary schooling, food aid increases the marginal benefit of schooling. Consequently, school feeding programs are conducive to economic development in these countries. If food aid is in the form of a food price subsidy, we show that child nutrition and thus children's human capital increase unambiguously. Although fertility and schooling are not directly affected, a sufficiently high subsidy rate will induce parents to begin to enroll children into secondary schooling by the assumed complementarity between nutrition and schooling in the human capital production function. If the food aid program provides a fixed amount of food per child, this decreases the marginal benefit of parental nutritional investments; therefore, it leads to higher fertility and to lower total provision of nutrition per child.

During the past century, humans converted extensive areas of tropical forest into cultivated lands. Three distinct processes, each predominant during a different historical period, have driven the destruction of the forests. This review describes each of these deforestation dynamics: natural resource degrading poverty traps that predominated during the colonial era, new land settlement schemes that prevailed for two decades after decolonization, and finally, financialized, large enterprise dynamics that have predominated during the past quarter century. Each dynamic has, over time, given rise to different opportunities for conservation. Peasants emigrated from the sites of the poverty traps, and regrowth began to cover these degraded landscapes. Smallholders in the new land settlement areas became better acquainted with tropical tree species and allowed some trees to recolonize their fields, creating silvopastoral and agroforested landscapes. The heads of large enterprises relied on credit to clear land, so government regulators found that they could curb corporate-led deforestation by restricting access to credit when landowners failed to comply with laws against forest clearing. These links between deforestation's dynamics during past eras and conservation policies during the present era illustrate how a historical understanding of tropical deforestation can provide the basis for effective conservation policies.

We extend the dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model in Bond et al. [Economic Theory (48, 171–204, 2011)] and show that if the labor-intensive good is inferior, then there may exist multiple steady states in autarky and poverty traps can arise. Poverty traps for the world economy, in the form of Pareto-dominated steady states, are also shown to exist. We show that the opening of trade can have the effect of pulling the initially poorer country out of a poverty trap, with both countries having steady state capital stocks exceeding the autarky level. However, trade can also pull an initially richer country into a poverty trap. These possibilities are a sharp contrast with dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin models with normality in consumption, where the country with the larger (smaller) capital stock than the other will reach a steady state where the level of welfare is higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state.

Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote-buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule, and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote-buying prohibitively costly.