There is an increasing gap between the policy cycle’s speed and that of technological and social change. This gap is becoming broader and more prominent in robotics, that is, movable machines that perform tasks either automatically or with a degree of autonomy. This is because current legislation was unprepared for machine learning and autonomous agents. As a result, the law often lags behind and does not adequately frame robot technologies. This state of affairs inevitably increases legal uncertainty. It is unclear what regulatory frameworks developers have to follow to comply, often resulting in technology that does not perform well in the wild, is unsafe, and can exacerbate biases and lead to discrimination. This paper explores these issues and considers the background, key findings, and lessons learned of the LIAISON project, which stands for “Liaising robot development and policymaking,” and aims to ideate an alignment model for robots’ legal appraisal channeling robot policy development from a hybrid top-down/bottom-up perspective to solve this mismatch. As such, LIAISON seeks to uncover to what extent compliance tools could be used as data generators for robot policy purposes to unravel an optimal regulatory framing for existing and emerging robot technologies.

Observers have portrayed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) variously, as China's great-power strategy, global infrastructure initiative, or commercial projects. Each characterization has had logical reasoning and evidence to support it. But how? How has one initiative been shown to have such varied motives? This article unpacks the Chinese state and establishes that a “tri-block” structure consisting of political leadership, bureaucracy, and economic arms has accounted for such varied motivations and actors in the BRI in China. In the BRI process, the leadership employed strategic rhetoric, and bureaucracies imposed policy ideas. Yet, more pervasively, the implementers have followed commercial motives in specific projects. BRI's strategic rhetoric and hazardous investment have generated external critiques and anti-China backlash, forcing Beijing to readjust the initiative. However, given the tri-block state structure, Beijing's policy adjustment will not be sufficient. Economic actors’ incentives need to be shifted too.

In any conservation programme, a variety of actors participate and interact in its different phases. They commonly have different perspectives and priorities regarding conservation, and diversity in the ensuing perspectives constitutes a barrier to effective conservation. In this paper, we analyse the different perspectives around the Programa de Conservación de Maíz Criollo (Programme for the Conservation of Native Maize in Mexico; PROMAC) in order to understand the possible causes that resulted in the programme not fulfilling its objectives. We used Q methodology and semi-structured interviews with farmers from a natural protected area to analyse the perspectives of the key actors who conceptualized, designed and implemented the programme and of the target population. Our research identified two different perspectives: (1) native maize can only be conserved with the support of community processes; and (2) the government, and not farmers, is responsible for the conservation of native maize. For farmers, native maize is key to their subsistence livelihoods, and they participated in the programme because of government monetary incentives. These differences contributed to dissimilar interpretations throughout the programme’s implementation phase, which, in turn, likely contributed to PROMAC failing to meet its objectives.